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A. INTRODUCTION, OVERVIEW AND OUTLOOK
1. Introduction
Life has been defined as ´things that make models´ (Patten et al., 1997) and models have been
conceived as the only means for the acquisition of knowledge:"...alle Erkenntnis [ist]
Erkenntnis in Modellen und/oder durch Modelle" (Stachowiak, 1983b, p. 129). Apparently,
models are universal and indispensable. Models guide the observation, description and
representation of and the interaction with ecological phenomena and systems. In this thesis
the features and limitations as to representation and prediction of two model types,
experimental model systems and simulation models and of the corresponding images of
science are investigated.
To put this thesis into context the following paragraphs try to clarify the ´context of
discovery´ and a few key terms such as ´model´ and ´sustainability´, to tentatively
approximate the philosophy of science background and, finally, to present the scope and
structure of the thesis.
When defining terms it should be kept in mind that definitions and theoretical concepts are
essentially inseparable (Pawlowski, 1980) and that notions arise from an intricate interplay of
conventions, empirical findings, hypothetical assumptions and criteria of simplicity and
fruitfulness (Stegmüller, 1970).
1.1. ´Context of discovery´
The project "Sustainable production and utilisation of energy crops", framed this thesis. The
initial mindset underlying the project was a positivist sender-receiver concept of causality and
of human interaction with the ecosphere: Human activity causes matter, energy and eventually
information fluxes into ecosystems which lead to observable and undesirable impacts.
Environmental science was attributed the task of providing models for the representation of
these interactions, for mitigation and for the "operationalisation of sustainability" (Härdtlein
et al., 1998a, Härdtlein et al., 1998b, Lewandowski et al., 1999). Both ecosphere-
anthroposphere and science-society were regarded as neatly separated, conceptually
delimitable systems. This syntactic conception and the underlying paradigms are challenged
in this thesis: Firstly, paradigms for the representation of ecosystems and the role of scientific
models for knowledge production in the environmental sciences are critically reviewed.
Secondly, in view of models´ limitations, images of ´science for sustainability´ (in the sense
outlined below) are examined.
1.2. Models
There is a large variety of models in science, i.e. mental models (Paton, 1993), material model
systems such as mesocosms, mathematical models ranging from statistical to functional and
from phenomenological to causal models and simulation models (Wagner, 1997). Two types
of models at the opposing ends of this range will be investigated in this thesis: (1)
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Experimental model systems, which are related to the manipulation of material systems by
laboratory practices. (2) Dynamical simulation models, which display a limited affinity to
substance and to experimental practice.
A few words on the term ´model´ seem warranted at this stage. A general definition is:
material or ideal (re-)production of an object by means of analogies realised by a cognitive
subject (i.e. an observer) (Ehmke, 1997). Analogies are similarities among different objects
concerning certain aspects or properties. They permit the inference of probable properties of
object B from the properties of object A (Löther, 1997). Others, however, stress the function
of models as representations, either ideal or real (Müller, 1983).
The referents of models are systems, or more precisely their structure (Weinert, 1995).
Experimental model systems are dualistic in that they unite a material part with a conceptual
or "structural" part. Simulation models, in contrast, consummate the tendency in physics
(since Mach) to replace substance by structure (Müller, 1983); not the reflection of reality
which is faithful to the object is regarded as true, but the relation which is faithful to the
structure of a system. This iso- or homomorphism operates with mere symbols which need
not correspond to elements of an objective reality (Jammer, 1965). The significance of models
as a consistent synthesis of a priori independent elements of observation has increased ever
since (Müller, 1983, p. 68). This synthesis usually has a mathematical and, consequently,
fictional nature: "I think that a model - a specially prepared, usually fictional description of a
system under study - is employed whenever a mathematical theory is applied to reality"
(Cartwright, 1983, p. 158).
Models, theory and data are difficult to delimit. A model is always a simplified description of
some features of a system (Joergensen et al., 1999) and models are more specific than theory
in that they make use of a limited set of concrete parameters (Weinert, 1995) and in that they
apply to a smaller range of phenomena (Wagner, 1997). Yet from a non-positivist point of
view, data are theory-laden, while theory and models are functionally equivalent so that data
and theory may be regarded as specific types of models.
Models have to be made. To construct a model, specific parameters have to be chosen and
some functional or structural relationship between these parameters has to be expressed
(Weinert, 1995). The neopragmatic modelling theory has emphasised the role of decisions and
selections in modelling (Wernecke, 1994). Accordingly, models substitute an original for
specific purposes and goals, for specific temporal intervals and for specific cognitive subjects
(Stachowiak, 1983b), i.e. for specific observers.
1.3. Metaphors as background and analytical instruments as motor
Metaphors are the fabric of argument, analogical reasoning and model construction. Major
sources of metaphors in ecology are physics (e.g., mechanical and systemic metaphors), the
´information´ sciences (e.g., computer, noise, memory, networks (Margaleff, 1991,
Mikulecky, 1991) and more exotic areas such as medicine (ecosystem health; (Rapport, 1998,
Rapport, 1995).
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Metaphors convey a "surplus", i.e. they stand out from formal concepts, which are forced to
reduction and abstraction (Blumenberg, 1998); thus they may inspire, but also stifle
conceptual innovation. Take mechanistic metaphors which belong to the basic model of
occidental science as an example . Their emergence is tied to the construction of mechanical
clocks in early modern times (Merchant, 1987), which in turn stand for orderly and
determinate behaviour (i.e. the world as a clockwork (Mayr, 1980). The pendulum visualises
the orderly course of linear time and of processes taking place in time, and the pendulum
remains a major point of metaphorical reference in discussions on dynamical models in
biology and ecology; e.g. Bossel claims that so-called real-structure models "would be able to
predict what would happen if the pendulum were stopped" (Bossel, 1992), while Kampis
ascertains that new and a priori unpredictable variables of motion may come up any time (e.g.
as the string of the pendulum breaks and the ball starts to roll (Kampis, 1994).
The development of analytical tools nourishes metaphorical notions. The discovery of
complexity (Hedrich, 1994) has been associated with the advent of diverse analytical
instruments such as computers, cybernetics and systems theory (Lilienfeld, 1978) and of self-
organisation (Krohn et al., 1990, Paslack, 1991) which challenge linear and mechanistic
metaphors and notions. These theories (arguably) claim universal validity (Lilienfeld, 1978)
and hence could be regarded as interdisciplinary or "diagonal" theories (Heckhausen, 1987).
In the wake of this structural scientific revolution (Hedrich, 1994), talk of self-organisation
has become customary in ecology (e.g., (Müller, 1996, Müller, 1997) ecosystems have come
to be regarded as true systems (Trepl, 1988) and systemic and computational metaphors
(Paton, 1996) have sprung up. Envisaging ecosystems as large computers presumably is
linked to the rise of computers and simulation models. It seems as if the medium indeed was
the message here (McLuhan) and as if any alternative to the computer metaphor was stricken
with the drawback of appearing as a mere appendage to the computer metaphor (analogously:
West and Travis, 1991).
1.4. Images of science: Representation for understanding and predicting?
The representation of ecological phenomena by models, one might be tempted to say, is
guided by two major aims, understanding and prediction, just as the whole of science is
(Toulmin, 1981). The spirit of the conventional separation of models into research tools
(understanding) and predictive tools (see e.g.; (Huwe and Ploeg van der, 1992) seems to
correspond to this image of science which represents, understands and predicts. Yet the terms
prediction and understanding are far from being clear. For example it has been shown that
prediction and understanding are not structurally equivalent and that the term prediction may
adopt more than 30 different meanings (Stegmüller, 1969). Understanding may cover such
divers things as an adequate conceptual representation or the capability of interacting
successfully with a natural system. The term representation is as unclear. Representation may
refer to mental states (and mental models), to substitution (of an original by a model) or to a
relation between signs which conserves the structure of the represented original (Scheerer,
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1993). Hence both the mental models which guide a farmer and the scientific models which
conserve the structure of the original are representations.
I claim that a positivist image of science, which aims at the understanding of well-defined,
disciplinary mini-problems, "puzzles" (Kuhn, 1970) and at the prediction of controlled and
shielded laboratory systems is misleading, particularly in the environmental sciences: On the
one hand it may overrate the contribution of science and its models to the understanding and
predicting of real-world systems (as opposed to the manipulated, abstracted systems of
laboratory and theory) and on the other hand it may underrate the potential for the interactive
organisation of ecological knowledge and for the (re-)contextualisation of knowledge in local
applications.
1.5. Images of science for sustainability
The positivist image of science according to which science follows its internal logic to
continuously approximate an objective reality and produces universal, objective knowledge
has been challenged recently by science research (Felt et al., 1995), but also by environmental
"science in action" (Latour, 1994). Risk assessment, for example, the concept of sustainability
or the precautionary principle have challenged the positivist image (Funtowicz and Ravetz,
1993b, Hansson, 1999, Nowotny, 1993, O'Riordan and Jordan, 1995, Röling and Jiggins,
1994, Rosa, 1998). I subsume environmental issues which do not fit into the positivist puzzle
framework under the term ´sustainability issues´ and try to clarify the notion of sustainability
underlying this thesis in the following.
Sustainability has been called the last great narrative of modernity (Fischer-Kowalski and
Schandl, 1998: "Sustainable Development als gegenwärtig letzte ´große Erzählung´), left after
other narratives such as "progress" had to step back and give way to post-modern
arbitrariness. A concept of sustainability should acknowledge that a global exo-perspective
has been lost and that mankind does not stand outside nature, to manipulate and control it, but
that the environment, its state and its evaluation are constructed within society (Nowotny,
1996).
Sustainability faces ill-defined issues (Scholz, 1997) and soft systems (Checkland and
Scholes, 1996), for which neither the means nor the ends/goals are clear. ´Hard´ system
descriptions, i.e. abstracted and formalised descriptions can offer no substitute for the process
of deliberation in which observers and actors frame systems and negotiate goals for concrete
systems. Thus perspectivity, values and norms become mingled with ´facts´.
Sustainability necessitates management instead of solutions and schemes of practical
interaction with concrete systems instead of objective and universal representations. Universal
and context-independent representations can not compensate the lack of experience with the
corporeal world1. As to the time dimension, the concept of sustainability suggests to keep the
future open for certain developments (Nowotny, 1996): While I agree that in principle the
                                                
1
 Experience plays a ever smaller role in the world we live in, becoming replaced by the universalized
expectations produced by scientific specialists to whom the world is an object of possible or potential
experience (Marquard, 1994)
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future has, topologically spoken, an open, bifurcated structure (Wright, 1994), its degrees of
freedom are ever more restricted by the "extended present" we live in (Nowotny, 1995, p. 52-
53).
To summarise, I contest that sustainability is a hard, operationalizable concept, which could
be defined naturalistically as others suggest (e.g., Härdtlein et al., 1998a). I argue in favour of
its irremediably discursive character, which calls for negotiation and context-dependent
(´local´) definitions instead of reductionist, naturalistic and universal formulations.
1.6. Scope and structure of the thesis
The thesis consists of seven parts, this introductory section (A) and six papers (B-G; fig. A.1).
Figure. A.1. Scope and structure of the thesis and the interrelation of the papers.
Paper B investigates experimental model systems; in particular, closure and the establishment
of control are addressed and it is discussed how model systems relate to their reference, the
ecosystem. In contrast to experimental model systems, theories of the complex such as the
theory of dynamical system facilitate the simultaneous handling of a much larger number of
parameters (fig. A.1.). Paper C critically revises dynamical simulation models, opposing the
paradigm of the dynamical system (with its notion of an abstract state) and the paradigm of
self-modifying systems. It is claimed that the scheme for closure and control in the laboratory
serves as a model for the closure of dynamical models. Paper D argues that simulation models
suffer from a diminished contact to their reference, the ecosystem ("fictionalisation"), and it
compares the (contrasting) ways, how model and original are re-related in technoscience (due
to the extension of the laboratory conditions) and in simulation modelling (fitting of the
model to the data). Papers E and F take up the limitations of simulation models and it is
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outlined how uncertainty2, unpredictability and the notions of self-modification and
endoperspective could affect the image of science and the role of models for decision-making
and management. Paper F elaborates on the role of models for policy, embedding modelling
into a post-normal conception of a managerial science for policy. Paper G presents an
example, the emission of excess nitrogen from agriculture which contributes to a "post-
normal" issue, global N overload (characterised e.g., by large scale, scope, stakes and
epistemic uncertainty); the suitability and validity of different model (among them simulation
models) and remediation approaches are discussed.
2. Material
The material for this theoretical thesis was extracted from a wide range of scientific papers
and books. In the following I roughly sketch the different areas considered and give a few
examples of representative authors for illustration in a footnote3:
(a) empirical work from the environmental sciences represented mostly in the review paper
on nitrate fate (see G.)
(b) contributions to ecosystem theory and to modelling in the environmental sciences, ranging
from hierarchy theory and the matter/energy/thermodynamics school to advocates of an
information paradigm for ecosystem research.
(c) conceptual and philosophical work on models and their role for the environmental
sciences (with a focus on the issue of validity and validation and for knowledge
acquisition in general.
(d) philosophical work on the role and uses of experiment.
                                                
2
 I use the term uncertainty as a generic one; a more precise terminology would distinguish risk, uncertainty
(unknown probabilities, but known possible outcomes) and indeterminacy (unknown probabilities; unknown
outcomes) (Scheringer, 1999). In many instances in this thesis uncertainty refers to the indeterminacy inherent
in ecosystems.
3
 Hierarchy theory: Ahl and Allen, 1996, Allen and Hoekstra, 1992, O´Neill et al., 1986; system ecology with a
matter/energy paradigm Joergensen, 1992, Joergensen et al., 1995, Müller, 1997. Information paradigm: Hauhs
and Lange, 1996a, Hauhs and Lange, 1996b, Lange, 1999, Lange et al., 1997
models: Wagner, 1997, Weinert, 1995. Validity: Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1992, Konikow and Bredehoeft, 1992,
Oreskes, in press, Oreskes et al., 1994, Rastetter, 1996, Rykiel, 1996. General modelling theory: Stachowiak,
1973, Stachowiak, 1983a, Wernecke, 1994
Role and uses of experiment: Gooding et al., 1989, Hoyningen-Huene, 1989, Latour, 1990, Le Grand, 1990,
Pickering, 1989, Pickering, 1990, Radder, 1986, Rheinberger, 1995
Science research: Felt et al., 1995, Knorr-Cetina, 1991, Latour, 1994, Latour and Woolgar, 1979, Nowotny,
1997, Nowotny, 1999a, Nowotny, 1999b
Risk : Hansson, 1999, Kolek, 1993, Kunreuther and Slowic, 1996, Renn, 1998, Rosa, 1998, Stern and Fineberg,
1996b, Stern and Fineberg, 1996a. Precautionary principle: Martin, 1997, O'Riordan and Jordan, 1995,
Perrings, 1991, Sandin, 1999, Westra, 1997. Post-normal science: Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993a, Funtowicz
and Ravetz, 1993b, Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1991. Managerial science: Nowotny, 1993
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(e) contributions from the sociology of science (Luhmann, 1994) and from science research
critically investigating "science in action" scientific practices and different forms of
knowledge production.
(f) work from an emerging (transdiscplinary?) field where the environmental sciences
become interlocked with philosophical, sociological and normative deliberations;
characteristic topics are risk, the precautionary principle, the notion of post-normal
science and of managerial science.
The thesis aims at the interdisciplinary integration of the different perspectives and pretends
to be a tentative contribution to a reflective theory of ecology and the environmental sciences.
3. Results, threads and themes
A few recurrent themes and threads will be outlined in the following to account for linkages
and common backgrounds of the different papers.
3.1. Modelling as encoding
Modelling can be envisaged as an encoding process, in which natural phenomena and process
are ´translated´ into parameters and (mathematical) relations, i.e. the natural system is
encoded into the propositions of a formal system representing the (abstract) state of the
system. Inferences on the behaviour of the formal system (e.g., a dynamical system), are then
decoded to the natural system to produce statements on its behaviour (Rosen, 1991).
Encoding in models is faced with a frame problem (Paton, 1996), i.e. the question which
variables are adequate to represent an ecological system (Kampis, 1992a). Encoding is at the
root of both experimental model systems (B) and of simulation models (C, D).
Abstract states
The Greek philosophers Parmenides and Heraklit first uttered the dichotomy of being versus
becoming. According to Parmenides, the world is unchangeable and time reversible, while
Heraklit claims that the world is subject to constant change and time is irreversible (Mainzer,
1995). ´Being´ by way of historical accident (Longo, 1994) still dominates Western thinking
and static notions, self-identity and the assumption of identity in time belong to the fable of
modern science (Merchant, 1987, pp. 232).
The notion of an (abstract) state captured by a set of parameters/variables and their relation,
reflects this tradition (C). Eco-Systems frequently are equated with state variables which are
interrelated through the processes (formalised as mathematical relations) while the processes
are interrelated through the state variables (Joergensen et al., 1999). The abstract state can be
updated by applying a temporal transition function. The variables define a state space in
which the ecosystem moves along trajectories computed by the formal system. The state
space model (Patten et al., 1997) asserts that there exists one and only one sequence of inputs
that, starting from an initial condition, will put an open system in a given state (Joergensen et
al., 1999). The state-space conception corresponds to the image of Wittgenstein´ Tractatus
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world: the state of the world at a given moment can be characterised entirely by indicating
which elementary, logically independent states exist (Wright, 1994). Time in this conception
is external to the phenomena, universal (Mittelstaedt, 1980) and homogeneous; it has no
privileged points such as the now and no beginning nor end (Rescher and Urquhart, 1994) and
it can be treated as an external parameter.
Contingency
The identification of abstract states is in line with a long-standing programme in philosophy
and then science4 to reduce and eventually eliminate contingency. In C and D we show that
dynamical models follow this rationale in that they aim at the abstraction of the dynamical
part of a system from its contingent features, which are relegated to initial conditions, free
parameters and ´background/noise´. The dynamical part is frequently taken to stand for the
identity of the natural system and is equated with the essence of this system.
The recent programmatic shift from ´being to becoming´ (Prigogine, 1988) or from linearity
to history via complexity (Longo, 1994), which puts supposed contingency into a different
light, is one guideline of this thesis.
Encoding as framing mediated by language
Conventionally, encoding is assumed to follow a sender-receiver conception (Janich, 1992a),
in which nature under investigation5 sends syntactic and objectiveable signals to scientific
observers concerning her being. However, I agree with the work of others who claim that
distinctions (Luhmann, 1994), selections (Knorr-Cetina, 1991) or decisions (Stachowiak,
1973) form the basis of observation and of modelling (F). This may be in the form of
laboratory selections for model systems, e.g., the selection of certain materials, instruments
and experimental set-ups or in the form of decisions, e.g., decisions as to which variables and
processes are relevant for a simulation model. Established sets of specific distinctions,
selections and decisions form a perspective and may be characteristic for certain disciplines
(i.e. scientific subsystems) or other, cognitive, or social systems. The validity of perspectives
and reading frames is a matter of intra-, interdisciplinary or even transscientific validation,
depending on the respective issue and the relevant social (sub-)system demanding the
justification of knowledge claims.
Adopting the shift from the Tractatus world to the linguistic turn (Wittgenstein, 1971), I agree
with the idea that reality is irremediably mediated by language and that facts, statements and
hence natural states are necessarily framed by language (Janich, 1992a, Janich, 1998) and not
                                                
4
 Hegel writes:"Die philosophische Betrachtung hat keine andere Absicht, als das Zufällige (i.e. das
Kontingente; D.H.) zu entfernen. " (cf. (Marquard, 1987). And as to the role of contingency in science it may
be said: "Zu jedem Zeitpunkt war die Physik strukturell eingeteilt in zwei grundsätzlich verschiedene Teile: in
den dynamischen und in den kontingenten. Zu jedem Zeitpunkt konnte man einen bestimmten Teil der
Phänomene durch Gesetze erklären, und der andere Teil blieb einfach übrig als Anfangsbedingung oder freier
Parameter." (Kanitscheider, 1999).
5
 Note that Bacon´s "experimental account", which became the model of experimentation was apparently
inspired by early modern torture of witches (Merchant, 1987).
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by an objective, underlying world to which language corresponds (as a correspondence theory
of truth world suggest (Hempel, 1992).
3.2. Ecosystems as open systems
When addressing the relation between model and original one touches on issues such as
prediction and reference (see below) and on a variety of terms such as equivalence, adequacy,
congruence and correspondence; representation and substitution; relation, transformation and
code; correlate and copy; concretion, abstraction, realisation, interpretation and formalisation;
verification, validation, confirmation, corroboration and evidence (Müller, 1983). Prerequisite
for addressing these issues is a conception of the original, here the ecosystem, which is to be
set against the model, i.e. the assumptions and analogies, which experimental model systems
(B) and dynamical simulation models (C-F) invoke. Hence in the following I outline the
notion of the ecosystem underlying this thesis6.
Without physical openness or object openness (Joergensen et al., 1999), encompassing
material, energetic, thermodynamic and informational openness, no organism and no
ecosystem could exist. For example, energy input is necessary for anti-entropic, exergetic
processes, cycling processes and emergent properties; net outflow of entropy is a basic
condition for existence (Joergensen et al., 1999).
On-line systems with rule-making capacities
Receiving external inputs (whether natural or anthropogenic) ecosystems are subject to
´disturbance´ and become instationary; instationarity, however, has also endogenous sources
(the distinction of the three sources of instationarity is drawn from (Lange, 2000): Ecosystems
can be considered selfmodifying systems, i.e. component system which draw upon an open-
ended set of different types of components, which produce and destroy their own components
during their typical activities (Kampis, 1992b) and which produce internal novelty on-line7. It
usually may be legitimate to take physical and chemical systems off-line for the purpose of
computation as during computation these systems do not modify the rules according to which
they behave (Fuchs and Hofkirchner, submitted). Ecosystems, cognitive systems and social
systems, however, continue to evolve. In contrast to non-living systems, in ecosystems actors,
agents of evolutionary change exist, which according to the evolutionary contingency thesis
have rule-making capacities (Beatty, 1995). Physical-chemical laws only stake out a space of
possibles, yet the degrees of freedom for behaviour and rule-change remain large.
Accordingly, "there may be genuine laws that are relevant to biology, (e.g., laws of physics
and chemistry), but those laws are not distinctively biological" (Beatty, 1995, p. 75).
When an on-line system is treated as an off-line system for analytical purposes, for example
when ecosystems are encoded as dynamical systems, the ecosystem is converted into a stable
                                                
6
 This conception of the ecosystem can in turn be regarded as a model, though a semantic, fragmentary,
conceptually open and partly metaphorical model, which is neither formalized nor materialized.
7
 The debate on which codfication is appropriate might be pointless, in case ecosystem behavior can, analo-
gously to human behaviour, not be codified, formalized and reduced to a set of rules at all (Woolgar, 1987).
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system of stable signs (more on encoding and conceptual and material stabilisation in C, D).
Yet converting the living into stable signs has a price: The only way of converting a human
being into a stable sign is to kill her (Gendolla, 2000); the same, I would argue, holds for
ecosystems.
In many physical-technical systems, the situation is somewhat different. As the setting of e.g.
astronomical systems is rather stable on human time scales it is possible to accumulatively
build a closed (for closure see below) model of the relevant system and simulate specific
human interaction with that system: "What is admirable is.. how the complete space flight can
be simulated in advance, and then slowly extended..., by incorporating inside the Space
Centre more and more outside features brought back to the centre by each trial. " (Latour,
1994, p. 248)8. For ecosystems, such a step by step incorporation easily fails, as the
representational knowledge brought back from a concrete ecosystem is likely to be
invalidated due to self-modification.
Microdetermination versus emergence
For many physical and chemical systems, microdetermination (Klee, 1984) is invoked (see
B), claiming that at the system level there are not degrees of freedom (Hoyeningen-Huene,
1994) and that consequently reductive experimental and explanatory approaches are justified
(B). Yet microdetermination may not hold for living systems such as cognitive systems or
ecosystems. Ecosystems may be regarded as hierarchical (Ahl and Allen, 1996, Allen and
Hoekstra, 1992, Müller, 1992, O´Neill et al., 1986), self-organising systems, in which
unpredictable (and incomputable?) system level properties and constraints emerge from the
interaction of subsystems (Joergensen et al., 1992, Müller, 1996). Yet one may object that
emergentism suggests that "macro-properties ... come out of nowhere. But why? ... They have
been here in the world all along, standing right beside the properties of
microphysics."(Cartwright, 1999, p. 33). In any case, whether emergent or not, little is known
about the existence and character of ecosystem level laws.
The generation of meaning
The view of ecological systems as stable ensembles of syntactic signs (D), which can be
represented objectively by a purely syntactic model (equating syntactic with objective as has
been common since Netwon (Rosen, 1991) contrasts with the context-relativity of the
meaning of the signs. The syntactic information supposedly encoded in ecosystem
components are insufficient to deduce the corporeal appearance of the ecosystem and its
phenomenology. Take the syntactic information in the genetic data of an organism: "The
context of an ecosystem assigns meaning to the biological data set encoded in the genes, i.e. it
provides the machinery by which it can be expressed into organisms. No procedure is known
by which this assignment of meaning can be atomized, it seems to reside in the context as a
whole" (Hauhs and Lange, 1996a).
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 Yet even here the logic of the situation which recurrs fails to capture the details which make a particular
situation unique, as Challenger tragically demonstrated (Checkland and Scholes, 1996).
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I would conjecture that ecology could benefit from a conception of information that is not
limited to syntactic, naturalist perspectives (e.g., Janich, 1992b, Janich, 1996b, Janich, 1998).
Summarising it may be said that ecosystems contradict static notions and the assumption of
identity in time (see above). Ecosystems are epistemically (Joergensen et al., 1999) or
conceptually (Kampis, 1994) open systems, which change rules and setting endogenously.
3.3. Experimental model systems
Following a reductionist rationale, ecosystems are compartmentalised and studied under
manipulated conditions, allowing for the investigation of a limited number of parameters and
for the inference of causal relationships and the causal capacities (Cartwright, 1994) of the
investigated parameters. In B we build a picture of prepared experimental set-ups as models
for ecological phenomena and systems, i.e. as model systems and we highlight the underlying
assumptions and the limitations of this model conception:
Experimental model systems are closed systems; they are spatially and temporally bounded
and conceptually closed as matter, energy and information flux into and from the system are
supposedly controlled by the experimenter.
Model systems are dualistic as along with a conceptual model component they consist of a
material component which has to be manipulated and closed and which is encoded into a
formal, numerical-mathematical system measuring certain parameters. Each measurement
highlights certain features of a system and assigns them quantitative values, relegating all
other features to the background (i.e. the unmarked space; F).
We distinguish different types of set-ups and model systems, based on their characteristic
duration, spatial heterogeneity, number of factors and control of boundary fluxes as related to
closure and control of the model system.
Analogy assumptions and decoding
Scientists use experimental systems as models of ecosystems based on the assumption that
analogies between the model system and the ecosystem exist (examples of such analogies are
"representative" samples, mesocosms or the substitution of adult by juvenile organisms) and
that the two material systems realise a common formal system. Accordingly, three steps to
infer statements on ecosystem behaviour from experiments can be distinguished: (1)
establishment of an analogy between experimental system and ecosystem, (2) encoding of the
experimental system into a formal system and (3) decoding to the ecosystem and inference of
statements on the ecosystem.
The analogy assumption and the decoding step, however, face a radical discrepancy between
the concept and realisation of model systems and eco-systems. Model systems are
materially/physically and conceptually closed and idealised systems, which are arbitrarily
bounded in space and time. They comprise a limited number of a priori defined factors
arranged in a stable setting and shielded from environmental influences (see the notion of a
"nomological machine" (Cartwright, 1999); adapted to ecology in D). Model systems result in
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abstract, formal process and system descriptions, entailing little for concrete, real-world
systems. Ecosystems, in contrast are physically (e.g., thermodynamical openness, broad range
of external influences) and conceptually open systems due to non-linearity and sensitivity to
initial conditions, to feedback loops and indirect effects, to historicity and long-range
correlations, to the emergence of system level properties and constraints and, maybe most
importantly, due to the on-line production of internal novelty (Kampis, 1994; for more details
see C).
In D we conclude that conducting experiments it is possible to identify causal factors.
Ecosystems are open systems with an unstable, instationary setting and with infinite factors
interrelated in changeable ways. These factors may enhance, reduce or neutralise the effect of
an experimentally determined factor. Experimental model systems thus need to be evaluated:
How does the generalised model system relate to a concrete system with a concrete history in
a concrete location?
Model systems and the phenomena observed through the agency of these systems are created
by scientific observers (Latour, 1994, Rheinberger, 1995); see also below on reference),
conforming to the verum factum principle of modern science which states that truth and
understanding can only be attributed to systems constructed by man (Hösle, 1990). Model
systems correspond to one of the states of nature Bacon distinguishes, the state of slavery or
techné (Merchant, 1987, p. 181): due to the craftsmanship of the experimenter nature is
subjugated and controlled by way of artificial, ´technical´setups9.
3.4. Dynamical simulation models
Theories of the complex such as systems theory and the advent of computers made it possible
to simultaneously handle a much larger number of parameters than in experimental model
systems, presumably in a controllable and tractable way. A parameter is here conceived as an
objective-real entity or factor, which influences a given material phenomenon causing
concrete effects (Franz, 1997).
Dynamical systems have since become the paradigm for the representation of ecosystems
(Lange, 1998). "A dynamical system is one whose state changes with time (t)" (Arrowsmith
and Place, 1994). Dynamical systems are conceptually closed systems in that they consist of a
set of a priori fixed and specifically related variables, which define an abstract state (Kampis,
1994); the state of the system is updated with the help of the external parameter time.
Accordingly, the ´behaviour´ of an ecological system can be computed and, assuming certain
values or developments for external driving factors, scenarios and future states can be
simulated. Dynamical simulation models of complex ecological systems and so-called
integrated models of e.g., economic-ecological systems (Costanza et al., 1993) are used both
in research and science for policy.
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Simulation: From simulating diseases to the simulation of systems
The notion of simulation has an agitated history. Originally referring to the simulation of an
illness it nowadays refers to the representation of physical, biological, ecological etc.
processes through mathematical or physical models, allowing for a realistic though simpler,
cheaper or less dangerous investigation than the studied object itself (Brockhaus-
Enzyklopädie, 1983). The medium computer and computer simulations offer the advantage of
reducing contact to the original/reference and of protecting the human observer from
excessive contact with reality. However, in D it is illustrated that simulation may reduce
contact to reality to such a degree that its signs start forming a closed self-referential system
(Baudrillard, 1982).
Based on the notion of self-modifying systems in C we criticise this essentialist notion, which
bans contingency from the model following a laboratory conception of closure. Yet it fails, of
course, in banning contingency from the represented system, which in the course of time
tends to diverge more and more from the static representation of the model. Thus the model is
exposed to the danger of losing contact to the original and the predictive capacity of models
becomes limited (C).
3.5. Closure and stability
Stability is a prerequisite for the successful representation, prediction, management and
intervention into systems. Stability is a complex (metaphorical) concept, encompassing and
interrelating so divers aspects as material stability or the stability of the object under study,
laboratory stability achieved through purification, conceptual stability, technical stabilisation
when the objects of the laboratory are reproduced outside the laboratory, and real world or
pragmatic/social stability through the establishment of an technology and a network of actors.
In the following I try to shed a light on the different facets of stability that recur in the
different parts of this thesis.
Stable settings
The stability of a system may be equated with the stability of its structure (see the definitions
of ´model´ above) or, more general, of the setting. "What a system does depends on the
setting, and the kinds of settings necessary for it to produce systematic and predictable results
are very exceptional" (Cartwright, 1999, p. 73). Stability is rarely found, usually it has to be
created some way. Material and conceptual purification in experiment and theory is an
established scheme for stabilisation (B), avoiding contact with messy real-world systems.
Accordingly, "physical systems ... are highly abstracted and idealised replicas of phenomena,
being characterizations of how the phenomena would have behaved had idealised conditions
been met" (Weinert, 1995). When scientists build model systems they pursue this rationale,
building nomological machines (Cartwright, 1999); see D), i.e. stable settings which are
shielded from the (messy) environment and in which different components with specific
capacities are interrelated in a known way (see the hint at the machine metaphor and at the
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verum factum principle above). Stabilisation and shielding aims at the material and
conceptual closure and control of the system, as we argue in B. Closure, however, is relative
to the domain of phenomena of interest, to the respective theory (Radder, 1986) and to the list
of parameters/factors selected as relevant for the representation of the phenomena. Hence
differences, selections and decisions come into play again.
In C we argue that this laboratory conception of closure and control may be regarded as a
´model´ (in the sense of a standard to be imitated) for dynamical modelling in that dynamical
systems aim at the exclusion of contingency or ´noise´ and at a high degree of closure.
Moreover, they make use of descriptions, parameter values, laws etc. obtained under lab
conditions. Yet, when applying dynamical models to non-laboratory conditions, the setting is
beyond control, the shield has to be removed and the system opened, so that contingency
enters and the laboratory account may not obtain.
Extending closure
There is more to stability than just the material and conceptual closure of an experimental set-
up. While stability depends on how the world is, it also depends on skills, instruments,
theories and the mutually reinforcing judgements of other scientists about all three (Gooding
et al., 1989, p. 14). There is a process of self-vindication; "as a laboratory science matures, it
develops a body of types of theory and types of apparatus and types of analysis that are
mutually adjusted to each other", (Hacking, 1992, p. 30); they become a "closed system"10. It
would be interesting to investigate the role of simulation models in this self-vindicating
network.
To function outside the laboratory, theory and world have to be tailored to each other
(Hacking, 1992), the laboratory conditions have to be extended: "Every time a fact is verified
and a machine runs, it means that the lab .. conditions have been extended in some way"
(Latour, 1994, p. 250). This extension is not restricted to the technical, it requires the
stabilisation of a larger network of actors; e.g., "negotiation between Pasteur and the farmers´
representatives" was necessary "to transform the farm into a laboratory" (Latour, 1994, p.
249; my emphasis). For successful stabilisation and closure the social setting needs to be
stabilised (Radder, 1986), else the predictions fail pitifully and the system is sent back to the
laboratory (Latour, 1994). Utilisation technologies such as forestry (Hauhs, 1999, Hauhs and
Lange, 2000b, Hauhs et al., submitted) or agriculture stand for the successful extension of the
network, which e.g., stabilises the natural setting through regular reset and the socio-technical
setting through the training of future users by an established educational system.
Apparently, both on the object and subject side a number of conditions is necessary for
successful stabilisation, closure, and prediction, which here in effect is a "retro-diction"
(Latour, 1994, p. 249), as the setting is to be stabilised ahead of prediction. In contrast to
many areas of technoscience, the contribution of ecological models to extension, stabilisation
and retro-diction is frequently limited. The lacking reference of both experimental model
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systems (see above) and simulation models (D) to ecological systems and the impossibility of
employing these models as blueprints for the moulding and stabilising of ecosystems may be
one reason why for example foresters disregard science as a source of knowledge for the
improvement of their technological systems (Hauhs, 1999).
3.6. Reference and representation as creation
It might be claimed that contact and reference to reality are progressively lost along a line
from mimesis via representation to simulation. While experimental model systems would
stand somewhere in between mimesis and representation11, simulation models would belong
to the final stage of an also historical development, in which signs progressively lose an
assignable meaning and reference to the objects of reality (Baudrillard, 1982). However, for
any representation and any model, whether an experimental model system or a simulation
model it is easy to state that representations correspond to things, processes or relationships,
but it is notoriously difficult to justify (Gooding et al., 1989, p. 14). For in experimental
systems scientific objects are "...articulated from traces, or graphemes, within a space of
representation. Outside such a space, the particular piece of nature set up in the laboratory
remains without scientifically assignable meaning" (Rheinberger, 1995). The phenomena are
thoroughly constituted by the material setting of the laboratory (Latour, 1994); representation
thus is equivalent to bringing scientific objects into existence (Rheinberger, 1995). Not only
simulation models, but also experimental model systems suffer from lacking contact to the
outside world: "Nature as such, then, is not a reference point for the experiment, it is even a
danger ...the reference point of any experimentally controlled system can be nothing else but
another experimentally controlled system " (Rheinberger, 1995). Reference has to be created
ex post, by extending the laboratory conditions into the real world (see above, closure).
Simulation models neither bring their objects into existence nor are they suitable for the
transformation of the setting of the real world. The representation function of simulation
models should thus in my view not be overrated.
3.7. Modelling for policy
Simulation models frequently are employed outside the realm of academic, normal science,
e.g., in decision-making, risk assessment and regulatory issues. In F we discuss the framing
and encoding of ecosystems in the context of science for policy. We argue that conventional
frames such as the dynamical system follow an essentialist rationale entailing two major
shortcomings: Firstly, they are incapable of handling internal novelty production which in the
course of time invalidates the closed frame of description (see C). Secondly, the implicit
assumption that the essence of the system can be captured contrasts with the descriptive
complexity of such eco- or integrated systems, for which competing non-equivalent
descriptions are derived from different exo- and endoperspectives and rationalities. Based on
a constructive notion of observation, we show that the different descriptions are relative to the
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domain of phenomena of interest, the differences and selections applied to the system, to the
choice of variables etc. As uncertainty as to the behaviour of self-modifying systems
increases, descriptions become ever more dependent upon interests, values and norms,
resulting in a plurality of legitimate descriptions and in epistemic uncertainty. Scientific
knowledge claims need not no longer be justified only within the confines of a small peer
community, but are subject to public contestation.
Epistemic uncertainty as to ´complex´, ill-defined problems can not be remedied by the puzzle
solving activity of normal science; while scientific inputs are irremediably soft, decisions to
be taken are hard. For such issues a managerial, post-normal type of science has been
conceived, which accounts for the plurality of non-equivalent descriptions. According to this
concept, discourse among stakeholders and deliberation are needed to identify phenomena
and parameters of interest, to formulate problems and to frame observation and analysis.
Science would have to abandon its privileged epistemic standpoint, participate in discourse
with stakeholders (extension of the peer community, democratisation) and become one
societal subsystem among others, contributing to the social construction of observational
frames and to the integration of different perspectives and knowledge types.
3.8. Prediction or space of possibles?
To Aristotle, prediction was a fictional endeavour, i.e. the task of poets reporting what could
happen and what would be possible according to necessity or adequacy (Gendolla, 2000).
Positivist science, in contrast, has prescribed the abstention from real-world events and their
prediction (Schenk, 1997). Notwithstanding, prediction has been at the heart of scientific
utopia since Bacon laid the foundations of empirical, positivist science. In his Nova Atlantis,
Bacon writes: "And we do also declare natural divinations of diseases, plagues, swarms of
hurtful creatures, scarcity, tempest, earthquakes, great inundations, comets, temperature of the
year, and divers other things; and we give counsel thereupon, what the people shall do for the
prevention and remedy of them" (Bacon, 1626). While prediction has until recently played
little role in the earth sciences, in the last decades there has been a "rise of prediction in the
earth sciences" (Oreskes, 2000) marked by scientific promises as to the predictability of earth
systems and to the feasibility of integrated assessments and whole earth models (Jamieson,
2000) and the rise of prediction is marked by complementary societal demands and
expectations as to predictive models for improved planning and management12.
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 A recent example for the expectations of the public are the massive fires in the U.S., resonating in media
articles like "Next, the fire forecast" (The Economist, 2000) and "Eine Sekunde Brandsimulation dauert eine
Minute" (Hujer, 2000), suggesting that the simulation of fire dynamics is possible in principle, although it is
limited by computing capacity thus far. Once such models are developped, the planning of measures (such as
evacuation) would become much easier. Here, the wish is father to the thought. The public understanding of
simulation and prediction is also shaped by more critical voices, e.g., by Lambel and Simiu (2000), who
denounce the unfortunate, treacherous role of weather forecasts, when measures against a major oils spill in the
French Atlantic were planned or by ´Die Zeit´ (2000) which points out that the only model that predicted the
desastrous floddings in Mozambique was an extremely simple one, suggesting that ´big science´ is not
necessarily a solution for the limitations of predictability.
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In C we claim that simulation models are unsuitable for predictive purposes. When models are
used in the context of science for policy (see above), the closest they can get to an
anticipatory role (Costanza and Ruth, 1998) is in the Aristotelian sense of staking out the
space of possibilities, i.e. the space of possible system development under a certain range of
conditions and assumptions. Accordingly, models do not serve for the (faithful) representation
of reality, but rather are heuristic and/or communicative tools, which refer to a space of
possibles.
One is tempted to ask how planning is possible when prediction is impossible. I would argue
that the underlying notion of planning is tied to mechanistic and clockwork metaphors and to
the idea of an universal, privileged exo-perspective. In view of the failure of the mechanistic
notion and of the predictability of future developments, the local, variable, spatio-temporal
context gains importance; multiple endo-perspectives gain priority over a universal and
generalised exo-perspective (Nowotny, 1996).
3.9. Nitrogen overload as an example
The terrestrial nitrogen cycle, its anthropogenic modifications through industrial agriculture
and the models to represent and manage the nitrogen cycle serve as illustration in the different
parts. G investigates the fate of nitrate emissions from agriculture in more detail. We conclude
that while the retention capacity of landscapes and watersheds seems relatively high (around
70-80%) in the short run, in the long run, retention potentials might be depleted and memory
effects play a role. Thus the nitrogen overload problem is temporarily postponed, along with
its partial transfer to larger scales (e.g. the sea) and to the atmosphere (nitrous oxide
production in the course of denitrification).
One typical effort to gain control over the problem is the development and application of
simulation models of the nitrogen cycle (Addiscott, 1996, de Willigen, 1991, de Willigen and
Neetson, 1985, Frissel and van Veen, 1981, Richter and Benbi, 1996, Vereecken et al., 1991;
Engel, 1993, van Veen, 1994). Notoriously, they fail to predict important processes in a
satisfactory way; e.g., an experienced farmer estimates nitrate loss with the same
(un-)precision as the models (Kohl and Werner, 1988). The fundamental reasons for the
lacking predictive capacity have been outlined in C and D. Notwithstanding, calls for
improved simulation models persist (WBGU, 1999). Other efforts such as budget approaches
differ in that they are based on potentials or capacities (see B) and are risk-oriented. Yet they
also fail to address the post-normal nature of the issue, which eludes puzzle solving and
disciplinary approaches, as the following points may outline: Nitrogen overload is both a local
(as most sources are small scale) and global issue; the sectoral cycle of agriculture is part of a
larger regional cycle; while nitrate leaching ultimately takes place on the field, the underlying
reason frequently is animal production detached from the land etc. The field and the farm are
but minor components of industrial agriculture, which could be considered as a "large
technological system" (Hughes, 1987), involving a historically grown, entangled network of
different objects (such as the farm), actors and rationalities. Industrial agriculture may no
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longer be a mere object, shaped intentionally by man, but a quasi-object (Latour, 1998), i.e. an
object which enforces its logic and temporal reign on human subjects (Nowotny, 1995).
3.10. Science as an ecosystem?
The conventional image of science draws from a positivist tradition, as I have claimed in
various sections above. Accordingly, scientific observers (for all relativity may have taught)
are severed from the observed systems and, owing to their peculiar form of reasoning and
methodology, posses a privileged epistemic perspective, i.e. a global exo-perspective. Thus
science produces and accumulates abstract, true, objective and universal knowledge.
This type of knowledge production ("Modus 1"; (Nowotny, 1999a) takes place in peculiar
institutions, which are organised according to discipline and social-cognitive hierarchy, which
strive to guard their autonomy and to erect barriers of entry, in that they create a field which is
"simultaneously open and public [...] as well as closed and selective. This public official space
[...] is at the same time increasingly more strictly reserved to those who have met the
requirements for admittance" (Bourdieu, 1991). Science holds a monopoly on certain kinds of
knowledge and "it has to maintain its claims by guarding its institutional boundaries, ... its
autonomy in the production of knowledge " (Nowotny, 1993, p. 64).
This image of science has come under siege. After the jolts of relativity several decades ago
the discovery of complexity (Emmeche, 1997, Hedrich, 1994), associated to chaos, non-
linearity, self-organisation (Krohn et al., 1990), self-modification (Kampis, 1991) and
endoperspectives (Atmanspacher, 1994), put into question the predictability and
controllability of nature and the corresponding capabilities of science. In any case from
abstract knowledge little would obtain for the concrete case (Cartwright, 1983), so that
science runs the risk of running into an "objectivity trap" (Nowotny, 1993), i.e. the production
of universal knowledge which is ineffectual and fruitless in concrete, real-world contexts. As
to the social and societal conditions of knowledge production, science research demonstrated
the contingency of scientific knowledge (Shapin, 1982) and while the demand for scientific
expertise is still growing, scientific expertise is increasingly contested by the public
(Nowotny, 1999b), particularly where risks are addressed (Heidenescher, 1999, Renn, 1998,
Stern and Fineberg, 1996a). As Rheinberger, director at the MPI for the history of science
summarises: The dream of the enlightenment of a unified image of a general science, which
allows us to manipulate and control a unified and general nature seems to have finished.
Instead of a privileged epistemic standpoint we have to accommodate in a world that is
complex and disorderly (Rheinberger, 1996).
New modes of knowledge production, particularly in the environmental sciences and in the
field of risk assessment13, may be emerging: transdiciplinary, context-dependent knowledge
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 Take the Third SETAC World Congress (Brighton, U.K.; May 2000) on environmental and aquatic
toxicology as an example. Sections ranged from ´hard´ topics as environmental toxicology and chemistry to
risk assessment and management and "Science and policy needed to achieve sustainable ecosystems". A large
part of the participants did not come from academia, but from industry, regulatory entities, NGOs etc.
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production, which transcends disciplinary and institutional boundaries ("Modus 2"; Nowotny
(1999a), managerial science (Nowotny, 1993) or post-normal science (Funtowicz and Ravetz,
1993a). In these images, knowledge production is recognised as indexical, i.e. as tied to
certain agents operating at a certain place and time (Knorr-Cetina, 1991) and it becomes tied
to specific contexts; scientific knowledge is (re-)configured for certain contexts and concrete
problems and it is not tested in the abstract but under concrete and local circumstances. If
science is to avoid becoming stuck in the objectivity trap, it has to develop greater context-
sensitivity (Nowotny, 1993).
As future developments are not predictable let alone controllable, the local, variable, spatio-
temporal context gains relevance; multiple endo-perspectives acquire priority over a universal
and generalised exo-perspective (Nowotny, 1996). Sensitivity for context, local- and endo-
perspectives and the testing of scientific knowledge in the concrete hint at the opening of the
scientific system; e.g., the concept of post-normal science suggests an extension of the peer
community, particularly to improve quality control as related to concrete problem contexts.
Knowledge organisation and integration according to such an image could benefit from the
structural and transdisciplinary encoding capacities of the ´sciences of complexity´ (Nowotny,
1999a, p. 109-114), offering maximal structure with minimal accumulation. A non-linear
agenda for knowledge integration would envisage science rather as an ecosystem than as a
linear production line (Nowotny, 1999a, p. 112).
4. Conclusions and Outlook: A role for models in ecology
4.1. Model systems as ´models´ of ecological research?
Model systems in ecology tend to follow the ´model´ of experimental conduct and its
underlying paradigms and assumptions which were established in areas like physics,
chemistry or microbiology (e.g., ´closure´ B). The success of this ´model´ for the conduct of
experiments is likely to be linked to the technical knowledge implicit in the experimental set-
up (Hoyningen-Huene, 1989) and to the extension (encompassing the ´extendability´) of
semi-laboratory conditions into the non-manipulated, real world (D). In ecology, however, the
contribution of experimental model systems as well as of simulation models to the acquisition
of such effective knowledge ("Bewirkungswissen"), allowing for the closure and stabilisation
of the setting of natural systems may in many cases be limited. Along with object properties
(such as endogenous instationarity, self-modification or ´emergence´ of system level
properties), technical and social obstacles (e.g., lacking the possibility of technical realisation
outside the laboratory; failure to establish an extended network transcending the boundaries of
the laboratory as e.g. in biotechnology) make it difficult to establish closure and control (see
B) in ecosystems. Notwithstanding, the socio-technical systems of agriculture and forestry
have accumulated a remarkable amount of effective knowledge, though the contribution of
science to this knowledge might be minor (Hauhs, 1999). Accordingly, it has been proposed
to tap the (endo-)knowledge of the practitioners and to strive for a computer-based integration
of scientific and object knowledge (Hauhs et al., submitted).
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4.2. Abstract states, identity and endoperspectives
The idea of an ecosystem identity, that could be determined from an exo-perspective seems to
be at the heart of the essentialist notion of an abstract state and also of softer, metaphorical
concepts such as integrity (Westra and Lemons, 1995) and ecosystem health (Rapport, 1995,
Rapport et al., 1998). Analogies between cognitive systems and ecosystems resonate here, in
particular the issues of personal identity and integrity14. For example, personal identity is
fairly unproblematic from an endoperspective, while any identity definition from an exo-
perspective is highly debatable (Nagel, 1991). Correspondingly, the fierce debates on nature
conservation, on opposing images of nature as symbol, ecosystem or resource or on the
´protection´ of either processes or structures (for a review and discussion of these debates see
Doppler, in press) might be circumvented by adopting an endoperspective with respect to the
systems to be protected or managed. Ecosystem practitioners, interacting with corporeal
systems might acquire such endoperspectives as they share the history of a concrete system in
a concrete place (see the suggestion of nature conservation as utilzation technolgy (Hauhs and
Lange, 1996a). Thus debates on identity, integrity and the essence of ecological systems may
be rendered academic and of little practical avail.
I reckon that in several areas ecology might draw benefits from the debates in the philosophy
of the mind and related fields, as they seem to be stricken by analogous problems (e.g., the
on-line character of biological and cognitive systems or the generation of information and
meaning). Opposing a merely naturalistic programme (Keil and Schnädelbach, 2000) and the
dominance of computational metaphors (Emmeche, 1994), I would, however, consider that
non-naturalist, culturalist (Janich, 1996a, Janich, 1998), hermeneutic approaches (Gadamer,
1975) and alternative metaphors (West and Travis, 1991) could also be fruitful, particularly in
the context of sustainability issues.
4.3. Simulation models: Representation, knowledge organisation and conventional
metaphors
Even though computer models may have heuristic and prospective value, the established
understanding-prediction difference may be too restricted to obtain an adequate image of
simulation models. At present, the role of computers and simulation models as instruments of
knowledge organisation and communication is likely underrated. Computers and (simulation)
models may be useful for the synthesis, storage and integration of scientific knowledge, for
the integration of universal scientific and local object knowledge and for the teaching of
´complexity´ (Dörner, 1996). The process of modeling may be fruitful for the clarification of
disciplinary knowledge and the negotiation of conflicting disciplinary paradigms and
knowledge claims and for consensus building and the reconciliation of non-equivalent
perspectives in science for policy (Costanza and Ruth, 1998). Emerging paradigms such as the
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 Note for example the resemblance between the stoical distinction of permanent attributes and states from
ephemeral traits of a person (Rescher and Urquhart, 1994) and the separation of contingent ephemeral traits of
ecosystems from the abstract state.
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paradigm of interactivity (Hauhs and Lange, 2000a) may assign computers a new role in the
organisation of knowledge and its distribution among scientists and practitioners.
The understanding of new media at their onset is often shaped by accustomed, established
metaphors. Take the example of the internet which frequently is regarded as a big book
(Lachmayer et al., 2000) or the computer which is regarded as a big calculator (Hauhs and
Lange, 2000a). Conventional book and computer metaphors may stifle the understanding of
new media and their utilisation. The emerging analytical instruments and formalisms of the
sciences of complexity, simulations and computers themselves have produced an array of
signs and sign systems, which still may lack reference and meaning. Utilisation, reading and
interpretation frames for these signs may have to be forged and external references may have
to be created, endowing them with practical and pragmatic ´meaning´. Analogical cases may
be the Mandelbrot-Fractals, which were devoid of an external reference upon their creation
(Gendolla, 2000) and the medium book, which in early modern times struggled to replace
medieval reading habits and frames (Lachmayer et al., 2000). Thus it may be presumed that
the (still underdetermined) pragmatic or praxeological meaning of formalisms of complexity,
simulations and computers will be determined by future applications and usage.
Caution, however, seems warranted, particularly as computers and simulations contribute to
the "pictorial turn" (Mitchell, 1997a, Mitchell, 1997b, Sandbothe, 1996), e.g., by visualising
scientific findings and conjectures. Visualisation tends to conceal as much as it displays show
(Nowotny and Weiss, 2000) and visualisation fosters affirmative, non-critical and non-
reflexive tendencies (Lachmayer et al., 2000).
4.4. The contact of models to reality
Whether human observers ever really get into contact with the world or whether they operate
only with their models has been subject to much debate between realists and constructivists. I
reckon that the modelling procedure as "science in action" (Latour, 1994) is indeed largely
constructivist, as it is the outcome of contingent differences, selections and choices.
Moreover, I argued that models in ecology are closed systems with limited reference to a
concrete, corporeal reality. Even though the model system as a theoretical construct may have
no real counterpart in nature, I agree with others that theoretical entities may be real (for the
opposition of entity realism an theory realism see Cartwright (1999) and Hacking (1994) and
can be handled and interacted with in real-world systems.
There is a basic opposition of abstract-concrete, ideal-material, closed-open, analogous-digital
or, as Gendolla (2000) puts it, the opposition of mediality versus iconicity, density,
individuality, irregularity (i.e. the windows instead of the dirt on them). Scientific models
usually strive for mediality in that they try to cleanse their findings from contexts and
indexicality. Scientific models (i.e. both simulation models and experimental model systems)
replace corporeal presence and actuality by some sort of virtuality or simulation15, for which
                                                
15
 The discovery of the central perspective stood at the cradle of modern science, giving rise to a supposedly
priviledged ´exo-perspective´ and fostering objectification (Nowotny and Rheinberger, 2000). Yet the model
procedure the central perspective invoked can be considered as a basic model of simulation (Gendolla, 2000).
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reference usually has to be established ex post, extending the conditions of the simulated
world into the corporeal one (D).
4.5. Scientific models for sustainability?
In sustainability issues, when the concrete interaction with concrete systems is on the agenda,
abstract scientific models have shortcomings. Firstly, as ´simulations´ they prescribe no mode
for the actual interaction with concrete, corporeal systems. While in principle they may serve
as blueprints for the modification of a concrete system, they do not teach the procedures
necessary to put them into practice. Secondly, scientific models do not aim at the selection of
action, as they operate on the mode of observation. Thirdly, science targets pre-configurated
solutions (see Knorr-Cetina (1991) on the opportunistic logic of science), instead of
potentially insolvable problems, let alone problems of the ´Lebenswelt´ (Krüger, 1987). Yet
sustainability issues usually are not solvable, i.e. they ask for management instead of
solutions. Thus scientific knowledge may have to be reconfigurated in concrete contexts and
validated for concrete, corporeal systems bringing to the fore local and endo-perspectives
(Nowotny, 1996, Rheinberger, 1996).
Context-relativity and endo-perspectives, but also the notions of the precautionary principle,
post-normal science and the views forwarded in recent risk research challenge the established
authority of science. Science may no longer be "immune from society" and an "institutional
split" might occur within the sciences, between a public policy or managerial branch and an
academic branch (Nowotny, 1993). In an alternative scenario, however, major institutional or
mental change may not be imminent; the science system as an adaptable evolutionary system
in a functionally differentiated society (Luhmann, 1994) would gently and swiftly
accommodate external disturbance (e.g., owing to changing societal demands) and internal
novelty production (e.g., owing to calls for inter- and transdisciplinarity) - just as an
ecosystem usually would.
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as models for natural systems
Abstract
Experimental systems in which phenomena are studied under controlled conditions allow
scientists to infer causal relationships from observable effects. Investigating ecosystems,
however, scientists face complex systems. The conventional approach is to divide the system
into conceptual units and to prepare experimental systems accordingly. Experimental systems
are employed as models for ecosystems: scientists assume an analogy between experimental
system and ecosystem, encode the experimental system into a formal system by measuring
variables and decode statements from the formal system to the ecosystem.
We distinguished three types of experimental systems, i.e. laboratory, container and field
setups, further divided into seven subtypes. Starting from the premises of experimental
systems, we comment on the possibilities and limitations of experimentally derived causal
relationships and on their significance for ecosystem understanding and prediction, illustrated
by examples from soil science and the environmental sciences.
Experimental setups have a characteristic duration, degree of structural integrity, internal
variability and boundaries, which relate to conceptual closure and experimental control:
Control tends to be maximum on short time scales, in homogeneous setups with analytical
boundaries and in systems with few parameters to be observed. Complexity is increased at the
expense of control. The higher the degree of manipulation, however, the better is reproduce-
ability but the larger is the deviation from unique ecosystems with their infinite number of
factors. The material realization of closed systems is preceded by a conceptual closure of the
system. Closure is relative to the domain of phenomena of interest, the theory and the list of
variables selected by the scientist.
Successful decoding from experimental systems to ecosystems largely depends on the validity
of the chosen analogy. Laboratory systems are idealized systems which contain a limited
number of a priori defined variables and which are shielded from environmental influences.
In contrast, ecosystems are materially and conceptually open, instationary, historical systems,
in which system level properties can emerge and in which variables are produced internally.
We conclude that conducting experiments, causal factors can be identified, but that causal
knowledge derived from insufficiently closed systems is invalid. In ecosystems innumerous
factors interact which may enhance, reduce or neutralize the effect of an experimentally
determined factor. Thus experimental model systems need to be evaluated for concrete
ecosystems with a concrete history. Increasingly detailed studies of isolated phenomena in the
laboratory will probably not contribute much to ecosystem level understanding. Conducting
experiments, scientists should aim at the maximum degree of complexity they can actually
handle and they should justify the chosen analogy.
B. Limitations of controlled experimental systems as models for natural systems 37
1. Introduction
Ecosystem research reflects three categories of scientific aims (Hacking, 1994; Toulmin,
1981): Firstly, the understanding and representation of ecosystems, secondly, the prediction of
their behavior and thirdly, the intervention into or the management of ecosystems.
Accordingly, the type of knowledge required on ecosystems ranges from explanatory over
phenomenological to technological knowledge.
Investigating ecosystems, scientists face complex systems in the sense that these systems can
not be described by a single theory or discipline (Kornwachs and Lucadou, 1984) leading to
different non-equivalent, but legitimate descriptions of the same system (Giampietro and
Pastore, 2000). Moreover, ecosystems are open with regard to matter, energy and information,
they are instationary on all scales, i.e. temporally variable (Lange, 1998; Lange, 1999) and
spatially heterogeneous. Ecosystems thus are difficult to treat experimentally and
theoretically, although they may be relatively easy to handle practically, as in the case of
agricultural or forestry systems (Hauhs and Lange, 1996).
Experiments serve to reconstruct partial aspects of the ecosystem and to infer if-then
statements or causal relationships, in which the if-part describes what has been prepared by
the scientist and the then-part the ensuing course of events (Janich, 1992, p. 234). The
experimental setups, which are prepared to exclude undesirable factors, differ from
experiment to experiment with respect to their material realization and particularly to the
degree of idealization.
Different types of experimental systems serve as models of ecosystem aspects, i.e. of certain
processes or structures. The term model refers to a material or ideal (re-)production of an
object by means of analogies realized by a cognitive subject (i.e. an observer) (Ehmke, 1997).
Analogies are similarities among different objects concerning certain aspects or properties.
They permit the inference of probable properties of object B from the properties of object A
(Löther, 1997). Scientists assume that material (structural) or conceptual (functional)
analogies exist and can be used to infer ecosystem features from experiments. This is the basis
for our understanding of experimental systems as models.
When scientific observers reconstruct ecosystem aspects conceptually and materially in
experimental model systems they firstly chose the domain of phenomena to be represented.
Secondly, they need to select variables which are necessary to represent that domain from the
infinite list of variables of the material system (Ashby, 1976, p. 40). The system which they
obtain is thus a list of variables which abstracts from the material object. Thirdly, they build
an experimental model, consisting of a conceptual system part and a material realization in an
experimental setup.
Selecting variables, the scientific observer establishes a reading frame for the system. For
example, ecosystems may be ´read´ from a biogeochemical or a population ecology
perspective, resulting in different descriptions of the same system. Reading frames are
embedded into a network of theories (Hanson, 1958) and preunderstanding (Gadamer, 1975)
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and in this sense are theory-laden. The reading frames of the experimental setups are based on
certain premises concerning time, space, and closedness (control).
In this paper we will conceive experimental systems as models of ecosystems and will discuss
the nature of this modeling relation from a biogeochemical perspective. Taking three typical
experimental setups in the environmental sciences, i.e. laboratory experiments, container/pot
experiments and field-scale experiments, further divided into seven subtypes, we will show
the conceptual and technical steps leading to the idealization and to the closure of these model
systems and we will discus their underlying premises as to time, space, and closure.
Confronting them with a notion of ecosystems that encompasses the concepts of emergence
and self-modification, the limitations of the models concerning transferability to the
ecosystem scale will be highlighted. Finally we will comment on the use of experiments in the
environmental sciences.
2. Modeling relations
Figure B.1 illustrates the relation between a material system which is governed by its causal
structure and the formal system into which scientists (as observers) encode the material
system by measuring certain variables (Rosen, 1991). Variables are quantifiable entities,
which represent factors capable of causing concrete effects. Each measurement of a
determined variable highlights certain features of a system and assigns them quantitative
values, relegating all other features, both known and unknown, to the system background. In
the formal system, scientists infer sets of functions from the observed if-then relationships.
Figure B.1. Modeling relation between a material system and the corresponding formal
system. The material system is encoded by assigning quantitative values to certain variables.
The sequence of encoding - inference - decoding aims at the representation of causality in the
material system (adapted from Rosen, 1991).
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Commonly, the inference structure of the formal system is taken to represent the causal
structure of the material system. In the decoding step, statements on system behavior derived
from the formal system are transferred to the material system. This procedure entails a
number of conceptual problems, discussed in detail by Rosen (1991). A modeling relation is
established between the formal system and the material system. Similarly, modeling relations
between different material systems can be invoked, e.g. when a mesocosm experiment is
taken to represent an ecosystem (Boudou and Ribeyre, 1997), which are acompanied by
peculiar problems: e.g. the problem of spatial representativity in sampling in that a sample
taken at one specific location is supposed to stand for a larger spatial unit or for other
locations. For practical reasons, adult trees are sometimes substituted by juvenile trees in
experiments (Dieffenbach et al., 1997, George et al., 1999). In addition to the issue of spatial
representativity, the use of juvenile trees as material models for adult trees brings about the
problem of their different developmental stages.
Statements derived for the spatially explicit experimental system are frequently extrapolated
to larger spatial units if the experimental system is regarded as characteristic for, e.g. a certain
landscape section. The experimental system serves as a material model for the larger explicit
geographical unit (material-material analogy) (Matzner and Tenhunen, 2000). In an extreme
case of analogical inference, the model system (e.g. a specific podsol soil) is encoded into a
formal system which is taken to represent an abstract or idealized system type (e.g. podsols in
general; formal-formal analogy). When we infer statements on ecosystem behavior, we thus
usually apply a three step procedure (fig. B.2).
Figure B.2. Experimental systems as models of ecosystems. A modeling relation (analogy)
between ecosystem and experimental system is invoked. The experimental system is encoded
into a formal system, which is supposed to be valid for the ecosystem as well. Decoding is the
transfer of statements from the formal system to the ecosystem.
F o rm al
S y ste mA n alo gy
E nc
o d i
ng
E co
sy ste m
C
a
u
sa
lit
y
In
fe
r
en
c
e
E xpe rim enta l
S y ste mC
a
u
sa
lit
y
D e
co
din
g
D eco ding
B. Limitations of controlled experimental systems as models for natural systems 40
The three steps encompass (a) an analogy between two material systems, i.e. an ecosystem
and an experimental system, (b) a material-formal encoding step, in which the experimental
system is encoded and (c) a decoding step, linking the formal to the ecosystem. The observer
thereby assumes that the two material systems, i.e. the experimental system and the ecosystem
realize a common formal system (Rosen, 1991, p. 62). When decoding we apply the formal
relationship, e.g. process and system descriptions obtained under laboratory conditions, to the
ecosystem.
Scientists choose from a multitude of experimental setups establishing material-material
modeling relations (analogies) which entail different assumptions and difficulties some of
which we will highlight in the following. The underlying questions will be to what extent the
analogies invoked by the different setups are justified and whether the encoding of the setup is
valid.
3. Experimental Setups
The material realization of experimental setups is a laborious task that requires a high level of
craftmanship (Hacking, 1992). Focussing on terrestrial ecosystems and the soil compartment
(but exemplary for the environmental sciences in general), we distinguish three main types of
experimental setups, i.e. laboratory, container and field experiments, which we further
differentiate into seven subtypes:
1) laboratory setups in which purified, fabricated and synthesized components like strains of
microorganisms, clay minerals from geological deposits or synthetic oxides (Kretzschmar et
al., 1997b; Kretzschmar et al., 1997a), purified or synthezised organic (Alewell, 1993;
Kretzschmar et al., 1997b), and artificial solutions play the part of the respective natural com-
ponents, but with idealized features (Lab - idealized components);
2) laboratory setups with ´natural´ components like microorganisms on their natural
substrate (Küsel and Drake, 1996), soil from the site in question (Zander et al., 1999) and
natural waters, but divested of their natural structural arrangement (Lab - natural
components);
3) container setups with structurally homogenized soil like in greenhouse containers
(George et al., 1999) or rhizotron experiments (Dieffenbach et al., 1997) in which plants grow
in homogenized soil (Container - homogeneous);
4) container setups which use structurally intact soil, like in undisturbed soil cores and
columns used to study solute transport or chemical composition (Hantschel et al., 1988; (Vogt
and Matschonat, 1997) and soil physical characteristics (Container - undisturbed);
5) field experiments like tracer experiments to study solute movement (Zander et al., 1999),
acidity-exclusion experiments (Matschonat and Falkengren-Grerup, 2000), liming of parts of
a forest stand (Kaupenjohann, 1989), or fertilizer experiments with replicates on plots (Field -
plot scale);
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6) whole-ecosystem manipulations with respect to acidity (Moldan et al., 1998; Wright et
al., 1988), nitrogen, or drought (Wright and Rasmussen, 1998) (Field - whole ecosystem);
7) field observation without direct manipulation (reducing the risk of unintentional side
effects), like in monitoring under conditions of "naturally" changing (Dillon and LaZerte,
1992) or differing boundary conditions (Matzner and Tenhunen, 2000; Schulze and Ulrich,
1991), space-for-time substitution (Bäumler et al., 1997; Crews et al., 1995), or use of spatial
variability to evaluate laboratory-derived relationships (Ross and Barlett, 1995) (Field - not
manipulated). In space-for-time substitution spatially explicit systems are supposed to be
linked by a common developmental sequence, so that from sampling ecosystems at distinct
developmental stages and at different locations, the future development of the systems in the
sequence can be inferred (Zimmermann et al., 2000). This setup combines the issue of spatial
representativity and the problem of the idealization of the course of development.
4. Experimental closure and control
"A well-designed experiment is constructed to allow us to infer the character of the cause
from the character of its more readily observable effects" (Cartwright, 1983, p. 83). Precon-
ditions for the inference of causal relationships are the manipulation of the cause to "look to
see if the effects change in the appropriate manner" (Cartwright, 1999) and the closure of the
experimental setup. Closed systems, however, are not just found, but have to be created and
maintained (Radder, 1986).
We distinguish conceptual closure which aims at conceptual closedness and which is a
theoretical concept from control or experimental closure which refers to the act of estab-
lishing and maintaining closedness in explicit, material settings. Both experimental control
and conceptual closure are required to obtain closed experimental systems and valid causal
relationships.
To control the influence of external factors and fluxes from the outside to the inside and vice
versa, boundaries need to be established and maintained. The issue of boundaries will be
discussed below.
The way how closure is established and maintained and the degree of concomitant control
over internal variables and external factors varies widely among the setups described above.
They usually have a characteristic duration, degree of structural integrity and internal
variability. Figures B.3 a-d demonstrate the relationship of these characteristics with the
establishment and maintenance of control.
4.1. Temporal scales
Laboratory setups, in general, are carried out on short temporal scales and consequently need
only be kept closed during a relatively short time (Radder, 1986), while container and field
experiments usually operate on longer time scales (fig. B.3a). To establish control at the
beginning of an experiment, the initial conditions concerning the relevant variables need to be
known. The accessability of these variables is high in laboratory setups, as these systems are
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constructed by the experimenter according to his notion of closure. The verum factum
principle of modern science which attributes truth and understanding only to systems con-
structed by man (Hösle, 1990) reflects this assumption.
Figure B.3. Characteristic features of experimental setups with respect to time, space and
control. Numbers refer to the experimental setups: 1 lab - idealized components, 2 lab -
natural components, 3 container -  homogeneous, 4 container - undisturbed, 5 field - plot
scale, 6 field - whole ecosystem, 7 field - not-manipulated.
Figure B.3a. Characteristic duration of experiments and control. The typical duration of
experiments is indicated by straight lines, prolonged in a few cases (dotted line). Control
tends to decrease in the course of each single experiment (indicated by the slope).
Figure B.3b. Relation between spatial heterogeneity and control of internal factors. The more
homogeneous the setup, the better can internal factors be controlled.
Figure B.3c. Relation between degree of manipulation and control of internal factors
(hexagons) and number of factors and complexity of interactions (circles). Complexity
increases at the expense of control.
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Figure B.3d. Relation between degree of manipulation and control of boundary fluxes. The
more manipulated a setup, the better can fluxes across boundaries be controlled by the
experimenter.
As compared to laboratory experiments, potentially more factors come into play in container
and field experiments, and their interrelation as well as spatial and temporal variability is
often only incompletely known. Along with the increasing number of factors more effort has
to be spent to exert control.
In the course of an experiment, control tends to decrease as the system may evolve, and new
variables and interactions among causal factors may appear. Maintenance of control on the
pragmatic side requires a high degree of craftmanship to exclude disturbances and to impede
unwanted system evolution: "Much of scientific practice can be understood as the open-
ended, creative and embodied work involved in the practical management of resistances;
closure can be seen [...] as a successful outcome of this management process" (Pickering,
1990, p. 216). For example, in experiments with soil cores, algal growth may take place on
container walls and tubes, and formerly sterile setups may become recolonized by micro-
organisms. Such system evolution also poses conceptual problems discussed below.
4.2. Spatial structure and heterogeneity
The environmental sciences have focused on the issue of heterogeneity (Böttcher, 1997;
Manderscheid and Matzner, 1995), because of the conceptual, epistemic and practical
problems it poses. In terrestrial ecosystems, virtually all parameters are linked to structure and
are spatially distributed; examples are hydraulic conductivities or temperature. Heterogeneity
makes sampling the most common practical problem: When the investigation aims at state-
ments for a spatially explicit system a limited number of samples must suffice to represent the
whole system. The appropriate number of samples can not be known in advance, however,
and only estimated afterwards. Depending on the parameter and the spatial heterogeneity and
temporal variability in the measurement period the number of samples necessary to fulfil
certain precision demands would often exceed the number of samples actually taken as was
estimated for soil solution sampling with suction cups (Manderscheid and Matzner, 1995) or
ammonium sorption isotherms (Smethurst et al., 1999).
The spatial structure of ecosystems is the result of an interaction of processes on different
temporal and spatial scales (O´Neill et al., 1989; Risser and Box, 1987; Wiens, 1989), but it is
often assumed to be temporally invariable and thus regarded as an internal boundary condi-
tion. The spatial heterogeneity of ecosystems on all scales limits practical and epistemic
access to structure: Studying spatial structure interferes with the system (Oreskes, in press).
The spatial distribution of parameters can only loosely be restricted by measurements (Lange,
1998) and structure is unknowable at any scales of real interest (Beven, 1996).
To handle heterogeneity conceptually, scientists resort to continuum theory, "in which a
material with heterogeneous parts is treated as if it were a single homogeneous entity: the
continuum" (Oreskes, in press). Thereby, new properties are obtained, like the permeability of
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porous media, which permit scientists to describe heterogeneous material in a tractable
manner. This way, however, fine-scale information on structure is lost.
The degree of spatial heterogeneity and the degree of control of structural parameters and
internal factors linked to them is inversely related (fig. B.3b). In laboratory experiments,
structure can be constructed, allowing for structural parameters which can be easily accessed
epistemically and controlled (reflecting the verum factum principle). Yet, the homogenous
setting of laboratory experiments can not be decoded easily to natural systems as in them,
heterogeneity plays a prominent role.
Internal variables can be controlled more efficiently the higher the degree of manipulation of
the setup is (fig. B.3c). Yet the number of variables and the complexity of a setup usually are
reduced with increasing degree of manipulation. A high degree of manipulation and the con-
comitant reduction of complexity often increase control and reproduceability. The number of
factors that can thus be handled in controlled experimental systems is notoriously low, e.g. in
a poster session on terrestrial ecology only one out of 36 experimental systems investigated an
ensemble of more than three factors (including time as a factor) (Caswell, 1988).
As the degree of manipulation increases and the number of factors studied decreases, the
analogy between the manipulated, reproducible experimental system and the complex, unique
ecosystem (Breckling, 1992) becomes forced.
4.3. Boundaries
Control of boundary fluxes is related to the degree of manipulation (fig. B.3d). The more
manipulated a setup, the better can fluxes across boundaries be controlled by the experi-
menter.
Boundaries control fluxes between the system and its environment. According to hierarchy
theory, boundaries form where there is a significant gradient in concentrations of energy,
matter or information. At boundaries, changes in interaction rate and strength occur (Ahl and
Allen, 1996, p. 165) and internal flows and cycles are more rapid and intensive than inter-
actions with the environment. Process rates are high within the system (termed holon) and
decline towards its boundaries (Ahl and Allen, 1996; Müller, 1992). Within this concept,
boundaries are organized by and thus belong to the system and have to be defined empirically
(self-organization; (Paslack, 1991) contrasting with the conventional, analytical notion of
boundaries which are imposed externally and a priori, instead of being based on empirical
criteria.
In whole ecosystem manipulation, scientists try to make use of boundaries that are based on
gradients of energy, matter (Müller, 1998) or information (Hauhs and Lange, 1996). In water-
shed experiments, for example, gradients of potential energy delimit the system under study
so that boundaries need not be imposed artificially (externally) upon the system, while they
still can be controlled considerably. This type of boundaries comes closest to the notion of
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boundaries forwarded by hierarchy theory and thus to the idea of a `natural´ boundary, shaped
by the system and not imposed externally.
In many field experiments, this conceptual notion of boundaries, however, does not solve the
issue of the spatial location and identification of boundaries. For practical reasons, boundaries
may still have to be defined analytically to get the studied system closed. Moreover, as in
ecological systems no parameter can be regarded as spatio-temporally constant, system
definition requires the choice of in- and output boundaries not only in space but also in time
(Hauhs, 1992). The precise location of even the analytically defined boundaries is often
unknown and the assessment of boundary conditions remains vague in the practice of field
investigations (Hoffmann, 1997) as heterogeneity and variability at the analytical boundaries
decrease control over the fluxes of matter, energy and information.
In laboratory experiments boundaries can only be conceived analytically, are external to the
system and are (and can be) arbitrarily imposed upon the system by the scientist. Boundary
establishment is thus conceptually trivial and merely an issue of material realization. When a
laboratory experiment is set up dexterously, control of boundaries and boundary fluxes is very
high.
Decoding would pose no major problems in field studies in which boundaries and scales
correspond to the boundaries and scales of the system for which statements are to be derived.
However, there is no criterion telling scientists a priori whether the scales of an experimental
system match the scales of an ecosystem. In the case of laboratory experiments even more
severe conceptual problems arise in the decoding step, as laboratory experiments are
arbitrarily bounded in space and time, without regard for the scales on which relevant
processes operate in the ecosystem.
4.4. Hierarchical levels and upscaling
The reductionist assumption of "microdetermination" (Klee, 1984), i.e. the assumption that
the state of the whole (ecosystem) is determined by its components, allows for the extrapo-
lation of their properties to the higher scale. Consider studies on denitrification as an example
for how the different setups address issues on different scales or hierarchical levels. In labo-
ratory setups, oxygen, nitrate and carbon control denitrification (Ferguson, 1994). These are
primary or proximal factors steering processes at the microphysical or cellular level (lab -
artificial or natural components). Distal factors operate on higher scales, constraining the
proximal factors on the lower level (Groffman et al., 1987). In undisturbed soil cores for
example, natural structure determines the spatial distribution of carbon, oxygen and nitrate so
that microsites with different characteristics come into being. Structure thus delimits the range
of potential fluxes or rates of denitrification that can possibly occur. As the spatial and
temporal scales of investigation increase further, one has to focus on distal rather than
proximal factors (Groffman et al., 1987) and, following the reductionist upscaling rationale,
one needs to account for more causal factors and more complex interactions among them. In
field setups, microtopography, rainfall (Ball et al., 1997) and seasonal patterns of C avail-
ability (Groffman et al., 1987) among others are distal factors (field - plot scale). In whole
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ecosystem experiments, e.g. in catchments, hydrologic and pedologic processes vary with
topography and regulate the factors controlling denitrification at the microscale level (Corre et
al., 1996). Experimental control of this network of factors, factors that may not be easily
accessible (e.g. due to their spatial and temporal distribution), may become increasingly
difficult.When upscaling from abstract process descriptions obtained in the laboratory, where
there are only a limited number of factors interacting under idealized conditions, to the eco-
system scale, one is faced with unique aspects of the concrete system, such as microsites
(Groffman and Gold, 1998) and land use history (Addy et al., 1999). Accordingly, whole eco-
system experiments have revealed a number of unexpected insights one would not have
arrived at on the basis of laboratory experiments, or even field experiments, alone (Emmett et
al., 1998; Schindler, 1998; Wright and Rasmussen, 1998).
5. Conceptual closure
The material realization of experimentally closed systems in the laboratory is preceded by a
conceptual closure of the system under study. Closure roughly implies that the inside of a
system is not influenced by the outside. However, this does not imply the closure to any con-
ceivable influence, but has to be relativized in two ways (Radder, 1986), introducing rele-
vance criteria into the description: Firstly, only such influences are considered which are
relevant to the domain of interest. Secondly, closure is only relative to the theory taken to be
valid for the description of a system. The theory specifies the number of types of possible
influences upon the system by the environment. When scientists close systems conceptually,
they thus have to choose the domain of phenomena of interest, a theory and a corresponding
list of variables. The theory encompasses the state of the art and the preunderstanding of a
system and it guides observation; at this stage experiment and observation become ´theory-
laden´ and excluded factors become noise/background. For the system under study a set of
hypothesis is derived from the theory, forming a conceptual model of the system which hints
at the factors of relevance. The criteria on which model and list of variables are based are both
explicit and implicit and are derived from different sources. In different areas of science,
different perspectives on natural systems prevail, giving rise to the construction of different,
non-equivalent descriptions of the same system. For example, soil population biologists
would describe a section of the soil in different terms as compared to geochemists (O´Neill et
al., 1986) and hence would compile a different list of variables. The formation of scientists
and the tradition of their area of science provides them with both explicit and implicit criteria
for the choice of relevant variables. When certain variables are chosen to be ignored, practical
reasons may play a role as well, as some variables are too difficult or expensive to measure.
However, to achieve a valid system description and closure, all relevant factors have to be
taken into account. The unwarranted exclusion of factors may invalidate closure and thus
observation easily (Cartwright, 1983). As conceptual closure predetermines both the results
and their interpretation it is a crucial step in all experimental work.
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6. Decoding from model systems to ecosystems
If the aim of experiments in laboratory and field is to derive statements about ecosystems and
their behavior, we have to ask how the experimental and conceptual closure of experimental
systems relate to the openness of ecosystems and what consequences concerning prediction,
understanding and intervention arise from the discrepancy between closed experimental
systems and open ecosystems. Ecosystems differ from experimental systems in that eco-
systems are (a) thermodynamically open and subject to a broad range of external influences,
in that they are (b) conceptually open, due to emergence of properties and production of new
variables (self-modification) and in that (c) time is organized internally.
6.1. Thermodynamical openness
The behavior of ecosystems usually is, for predictive and management purposes, conceived as
the relationship between external input and resultant output. Although both boundaries and
matter and energy fluxes across boundaries are difficult to assess, external input is taken as an
external driving factor or boundary condition.
No data set, however, can completely represent the range of naturally occurring conditions so
that ecosystem behavior can only be assessed for the range covered by the respective data set
(Konikow and Bredehoeft, 1992), which limits inference of ecosystem behavior. Moreover,
boundary conditions may change with time, e.g. due to atmospheric deposition or climate
change, and supposedly external boundary conditions are not independent from the ecosystem
because of the increasing importance of feedback at larger scales (Jarvis, 1995; Jarvis and
McNaughton, 1986) as the example of the Amazonian rainforest and its self-organized
climate demonstrate (Salati and Vose, 1984).
6.2. Conceptual openness
In laboratory and field experiments isolated ecosystem components and their properties are
studied. The reductionist assumption of microdetermination (Klee, 1984) implies that at the
system level there are no degrees of freedom (Hoyningen-Huene, 1994), because the state of
the whole is exclusively determined by its components. However, on the (eco-)system level
properties and constraints may emerge which are unknowable or only empirically assessible a
posteriori (Hoyningen-Huene, 1994). Emergent properties may arise relative to a certain
description (descriptive emergence), e.g. permeability of porous media is a property that does
not exist on a microscopic level but emerges from the interrelation of the component particles
on a macroscopic level (Oreskes, in press). In hierarchically organized systems, in which
higher levels exert some control over the behavior on lower levels, also constraints may
emerge. Hierarchical constraints frequently are related to self-organization and are invoked in
ecosystem theory (Joergensen et al., 1992; Müller, 1996; Müller, 1997) and the earth sciences
(Werner, 1999) to explain whole-system behavior. Due to emergence, properties derived from
laboratory or field experiments may be subject to unpredictable changes or constraints on the
ecosystem level. Factors from lower hierarchical levels (such as determined in laboratory
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experiments) might even be irrelevant on the ecosystem level and the identification and
measurement of ecosystem level variables might be more useful.
In the conceptual closure of laboratory and field setups the type and number of variables are
specified a priori and remain fixed throughout the experiment. Ecosystems, in contrast, are
self-modifying systems (Kampis, 1991), which produce and destroy their own components
during their typical activities. These systems constantly produce internal novelty, new
variables and de novo interaction of components (Kampis, 1994), which can only be defined a
posteriori. Ecosystem thus are conceptually open.
6.3. System time and history
Problems of structure and heterogeneity in space have been studied intensively in ecosystem
research but the structure of time has received little attention. Laboratory and field experi-
ments refer to a Newtonian notion of universal time (Mittelstaedt, 1980), which is external to
the studied phenomena and is consequently regarded as a parameter (parameter time).
Accordingly, the abstract state of a system, in which essential features are supposedly
captured, can be updated by a temporal transition function in which time is a parameter. Even
in this conceptual framework, non-linearity and sensitivity to initial conditions may lead to
considerable deviation of computed and actual behavior (Cambel, 1993; Ott, 1993; Zimmer,
1999). Yet ecosystems are self-organized, hierarchical systems in which subsystems
experience and organize time internally on different scales (system time (Kampis, 1991;
Kampis, 1994; Kümmerer, 1996). External parameter time fails to capture the features of
internal system time, in which time is tied to the phenomenon. Moreover, parameter time
assumes that history is irrelevant for the calculation of future states because it would already
be captured by the initial conditions. The history of ecosystems however, cannot be reduced
to an abstract state and a set of initial values (Lange, 1998), (Ebeling et al., 1990; Hauhs and
Lange, 1996). Ecosystems display memory effects and non-trivial long-range correlations
(Ebeling et al., 1995, pp. 48-50) which demonstrate that they are historical systems.
All in all, experimental systems resemble trivial machines for which there is an operator
relating input to output. Experimental systems can be defined a priori and are predictable and
independent of their history (Foerster, 1998). Ecosystems, in contrast, should rather be viewed
as non-trivial machines, which are definable only a posteriori and in which the historical
record of operations influences present operations.
7. Causal factors and their relevance
In view of the limitations of experimental systems as models for ecosystems, the question is
what we can learn from these models. Following Nancy Cartwright, we do not question that
causal factors which have the characteristics of potentials or capacities to bring about certain
effects act in nature and that it is possible to identify experimentally these causal factors
(Cartwright, 1983; Cartwright, 1994). To gain pragmatic relevance, these causal factors need
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also to be accessible in practice because the factors identified in the experiment augment our
strategic knowledge only if there is a chance to actually employ or interfere with them under
field conditions. Prediction of the actual behavior from the knowledge about the capacities is
not possible, however, as other factors may enhance, reduce, neutralize or even overcom-
pensate the effect of that particular factor in the concrete natural system. This fact has been
pointed out by laboratory scientists also ("It is essential to keep in mind that thermodynamics
tell us what is possible or impossible in energy terms and says nothing about which reactions
will occur [...]" (Bartlett, 1999), p. 375).
Consider charge development of organic matter in acid forest soils as an example. The theo-
retical conception is that exchangeable cations are unspecifically bound to single organic
functional groups that carry variable negative charge depending on the variable pH, and the
sum of which constitutes the cation exchange capacity (CEC). Results from laboratory
experiments with soil (lab - natural components), such as shown in Figure B.4a (data from
Matschonat and Vogt, 1997), suggest that pH-dependent protonation and deprotonation of the
functional groups has a large capacity to modify the CEC. Studies with muck, which was used
as a model substance to represent soil organic matter and whose concentration of organically
complexed aluminum was manipulated in the laboratory (lab - idealized components),
indicate also for the variable ´organic aluminum´ a large capacity to affect organic matter
CEC (Fig B.4b, data from Hargrove and Thomas, 1982). However, Figure B.4c shows that for
unmanipuled samples taken from a range of soils in the northeaestern U.S. (field - not
manipulated), already the variability of the factor ´organic carbon concentration´ alone
accounted for about 90% in CEC variation (Ross and Barlett, 1995). This leaves not much
residual variability to be explained by other potential factors influencing CEC, such as proto-
nation/deprotonation of organic functional groups and complexation of aluminium by organic
matter, however large their capacity seemed to be in laboratory studies.
So why is it that experimental accounts sometimes turn out to be valid outside the manipu-
lated experimental conditions, under field conditions? Natural systems can in some cases be
arranged to mimick the setting of the model system; to extend the laboratory conditions, the
question is "how to transform the farm into a laboratory?" (Latour, 1994, p. 249). Following
such a rationale, e.g. in agriculture or forestry, a high degree of control of the variables of
interest can be achieved (which includes the possibility to handle the system as if it was a
trivial machine as to certain features). Yet the experimental account fails to work in eco-
systems in which such purposeful interference is not possible or not desired.
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Figure B.4. Some factors affecting the cation exchange capacity (CEC) of organic matter. A:
Laboratory relationship of the CEC of organic matter-rich forest soil samples with experi-
mentally manipulated solution pH (data from Matschonat and Vogt, 1997); B: Laboratory
relationship of the CEC of muck samples with experimentally manipulated concentration of
organically complexed Al (data from Hargrove and Thomas, 1982); C: A field study on
unmanipulated forest soil samples, making use of the spatial variablility of the variables (data
from Ross and Barlett, 1995). Variability on organic carbon concentration alone already
accounted for most of the variability in CEC. The pH range was 2.7-4.2 and organically
complexed Al was 0.1-2.6 mmolc g-1 carbon in this study.
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8. Conclusions
We have regarded experimental setups as models for natural systems insofar as in an en-
coding step, a closed system is built from which in a decoding step, statements on ecosystems
are derived. These models are dualistic in that they consist of a theoretical part (formal
system) and a material part (material system), both of which have to be closed to allow for the
inference of causal relationships and the identification of causal factors. A key issue in the
identification of causal factors is whether the list of variables is complete with respect to the
studied phenomena (Cartwright, 1983). Causal knowledge derived from insufficiently closed
systems is invalid, even for the experimental system itself. As it is not possible to know in
advance whether all relevant factors have been accounted for, any conceptual closure has to
be checked empirically.
As experimentally derived causal factors designate no more than capacities, both possibilities
and limitations arise when they are transfered to ecosystems. While good experimental
practice has to provide for closed systems with stable settings to allow for causal inference, in
ecosystems the setting is not stable. The better the experimental system is prepared and
manipulated to control internal variables and external factors and to maintain stability, the
more it deviates from natural conditions, in which heterogeneity, variability and instability
prevail and in which many factors interact in ways that have been shaped by the individual
history of the system. Thus even if the list of variables is complete for an experimental
system, in the ecosystem additional factors come into play which interfere with the factors of
the experimental account. Therefore, the prediction of ecosystem behavior from experi-
mentally derived factors is seldom possible.
While knowledge transferred from model systems does not allow for prediction, causal factors
and their capacities can help to identify factors that enhance or impede the propensity for
certain events to take place, e.g. in risk assessment. Risk factors and enhancing/attenuating
factors may then be observed or interfered with. Due to the uncertainty conveyed by the
capacity character of causal factors, the precautionary principle should hold for scientific
knowledge claims concerning ecosystems.
What follows from the concept of capacities for the conductance of experiments? The ex-
perimental setup should aim at the maximum degree of complexity that the experimenter can
actually handle. This degree of complexity is determined by the scientist´s knowledge and by
his or her technical means but in practice, is also limited by resources such as time. In any
case, when starting from simple experimental systems an integration of more complexity
should be aimed at, approaching ecosystem conditions stepwise. Long-term behavior may
only be revealed by long-term experiments, but these are costly and the strategic knowledge
derived from them may come too late. Substituting space for time is one way of obtaining
hints at long-term ecosystem behavior, although such results are to be interpreted cautiously
as they construct a space/time analogy from concrete, singular environmental settings. When
scientists claim their experimental system to be models of ecosystems, they should justify the
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chosen analogy. The more the experimental setup deviates from natural conditions (e.g. by
arbitrarily reduced the number of factors), the more it calls for justification.
Experimental model systems require evaluation as to their explanatory and predictive capacity
for natural settings. To decide how a generalized model system relates to a concrete setting,
i.e. a concrete system with a concrete history in a concrete location, it needs to be tested with
and adapted to the specific system itself. The comparison of one model system (or the state-
ments derived from it) with other models systems or with mathematical simulation models
says nothing about their validity under non-manipulated, open system conditions. One must
even be ready to revise the linkages of factors in conceptual models when these are applied to
concrete systems. It is obvious that one hundred percent explainability can not be obtained
and maybe, increasingly detailed studies of isolated phenomena in the laboratory will not
contribute much to our ecosystem level understanding.
Even though this capacity-based approach to ecosystems seems workable, we did not intend
to exclude alternative approaches or imply that the capacity-based approach is the most
adequate or efficient one. Other promising approaches might, among others, be based on
complexity measures, local knowledge (Hauhs and Lange, 1996; Lange et al., 1997) and
phenomenological laws.
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C. Biogeochemical Models in the Environmental Sciences:
The Dynamical System Paradigm and the Role of Simulation Modeling
Abstract
Dynamical systems are the paradigm for the representation of complex systems. The fixed
encoding in a closed set of equations, however, contrasts with the openness of biogeochemical
systems. Parameter identification is a major problem in biogeochemical systems and
calibration of parameters converts models into ´fitting machines´. Openness, self-modification
and historicity of biogeochemical systems make non-trivial predictions of future outcomes
impossible. Notwithstanding, simulation models serve as instruments of synthesis and have
heuristic value to challenge existing data and theories. The modeling process itself, as a
learning and communication process, can be a mode of coping with different types of
complexity.
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1. Introduction
System metaphors pervade ecology and the environmental sciences. System metaphors are
characterized by a set of basic attributes, i.e. interacting parts, organization, collective
behavior and whole system functionality (Paton, 1993). Machine and circuit are concepts
associated with system metaphors. The circuit concept of eco-systems accounts for fluxes of
matter and energy in arbitrarily defined eco-systems (developed e.g. by Odum, 1983). The
machine metaphor (Haken, 1993) stands for the regular input-output behavior of determinate
machines which follow clockwork mechanisms. Systems theory has transferred the system
metaphor into a set of formal and theoretical methods. Although systems theory originated in
information theory and cybernetics, its formal approaches claim universal and
interdisciplinary validity (Lilienfeld, 1978).
Environmental sciences regard their object of study as complex natural systems. Different
concepts of complexity can be discerned, first, descriptive complexity, second, ontological
complexity, third, complex (non-linear) dynamical systems and fourth, an emerging
´complexity paradigm´ replacing the classic, simplifying paradigm (Emmeche, 1997). The
notion of ontological complexity is questioned by some researchers, which maintain that
complexity has to be conceived as a relation between representation and a represented system
(Hauhs and Lange, 1996). Complexity thus is a function of the chosen description, systems
which can not be described by a single theory or discipline are regarded as complex
(Kornwachs and Lucadou, 1984). Accordingly, the number of different, non-equivalent
descriptions of a certain system has been equated with the degree of complexity of the system
(Casti, 1986).
Dynamical systems have become the formal paradigm in the ´discovery of complexity´ across
a range of disciplines: Dynamical systems as universal paradigm propelled the diffusion of
complexity concepts in the empirical sciences and have become the leading paradigm for both
conceptual and numerical models of complex phenomena. Encoding in a dynamical system is
regarded as an adequate way of coping with the (descriptive) complexity of natural systems,
allowing for better system understanding and the simulation and prediction of system
´behavior´. Consequently, in the environmental sciences ecosystems are treated, modeled and
simulated as (if they were) dynamical systems (see e.g. (Bossel, 1997, Richter, 1994).
Models play an outstanding role in the study, management and utilization of complex natural
systems. Models can be differentiated according to the degree of process description, which
ranges from indicators to empirical, functional approaches and to mechanistic (stochastic to
deterministic), physically based models (Bork and Rohdenburg, 1987, Hoosbeek and Bryant,
1992). Accordingly, three types of models can be discerned (Bossel, 1992): First, behavior-
descriptive models, e.g. the growth-and-yield tables of forestry. These so-called empirical,
functional and predictive black box models dominate ´utilization technology´ in forestry,
agriculture and the management of water resources (Hauhs et al., 1998). Second, elementary-
structure models which elucidate determined basic processes. Due to the aggregate
description, the parameters of these models lack empirically measurable counterparts and
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have to be fitted. The Lotka-Volterra equations are an example for this approach (Richter,
1985). Third, mechanistic ´real-structure´ models which make use of supposedly ´real´
empirical parameters. Simulation models in the environmental sciences are elementary- to
real-structure models, depending on model purpose (e.g. research models vs. management
models; Huwe and Ploeg van der, 1992).
In this paper we focus on mechanistic dynamical models, which simulate biogeochemical
processes in ecosystems on a variety of scales. The field of biogeochemical models
encompasses models for the behavior and cycling of water and elements, ecotoxicological
models and global change models.
Biogeochemical models as scientific products may be regarded from the perspective of
prediction or the perspective of understanding, following a debate on the aims of science
(Toulmin, 1981). As predictive instruments they are used to simulate the behaviour of
complex systems and to compute scenarios of system behaviour under varying external
conditions. Examples are the effect of different fertiliser regimes on nutrient losses to the
aquatic system, the behaviour of newly created pesticides or the effect of climate change on
the terrestrial carbon cycle. On a societal level, models fulfil important roles as management
models, as decision support models and in risk assessment studies on different spatial and
temporal scales. Dynamical simulation modeling was inspired by and in turn nourished the
hope that the environmental sciences would open a way towards environmental engineering
(see e.g. Patten, 1994) and the title of the conference proceedings edited by Dubois (1981).
The goal was to enable an ecosystem engineer to manipulate natural systems according to
societal aims.
In the following, the paradigm of dynamical systems will be characterized, with particular
reference to the notions of state and time. We will show how the dynamical system paradigm
is adapted in the modeling procedure prevailing in the environmental sciences and we will
cast a light on a number of problems arising in the course of the modeling procedure. The
paradigm of self-modifying systems is presented as an alternative to the essentialist dynamical
system paradigm. Making reference to the two opposing paradigms, fundamental limitations
of the dynamical systems approach in the environmental sciences are discussed. Emphasis is
on ´noise´ and on the internal production of variables, which can not be accounted for in
dynamical systems. In our opinion dynamical models are not suited for the prediction of the
future behavior of natural systems. While dynamical models (as products) may play a role as
heuristic tools, the modeling process itself can be a way of coping with descriptive and
communicative complexity.
2. The dynamical system as a paradigm
The increasing interest in middle-number systems along with the ´discovery of complexity´ in
mathematics, physics and the biological sciences (Hedrich, 1994) has found its formal
counterpart in the paradigm of complex dynamical systems. Originally a mathematical
formalism, it has inspired research in the empirical sciences and has found widespread
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adoption in ecology and the environmental sciences. "A dynamical system is one whose state
changes with time (t) "(Arrowsmith and Place, 1994, p. 1, first sentence). The generic system
diagram for any continuous dynamical system is shown in Fig. C.1.
Figure C.1. Generic system diagram for a continuous dynamical system: The general form of
the state equations describing the system is: ∂z/∂t = f (z,u,t) and v = g (z,u,t). z is the state
vector, u the vector of environmental inputs, v the vector of system outputs, t the (external
parameter) time, f the (vector) state function and g the (vector) output function (adapted from
(Bossel, 1997).
The notion of an abstract system state lies at the heart of dynamical systems: The abstract
state is the entirety of all states of a system at a given time. The states of a system are
represented by the state variables, which contain all the information relevant to the present of
a particular process. The possible states of the system are delimited by an abstract phase
space, which has a fixed number of degrees of freedom. The degrees of freedom are defined
by the state variables of the system. The system state moves along trajectories in the phase
space. In an exo-perspective on the dynamical system, the system collapses to a closed system
(Kampis, 1994): The system and its boundaries are defined externally and analytically,
closing the system towards its environment except for the vector of environmental input
(external variables). The encoding in a dynamical system as a formal set is invariable (first
order system). This implies a syntactic conception of information, as pragmatic information
would not only change the state but also the structure of the system (Kornwachs and Lucadou,
1984). Fitting into a concept of formal computation (as opposed to e.g. informal, biological
and physical concepts; Emmeche, 1994), the system is regarded as a processor of syntactic
gf z
state
t t
u v
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information, which processes incoming signals according to fixed rules, excluding ´noise´
from the dynamical system.
The temporal dynamics of the system, i.e. the transition from state to state, comes about as the
state variables are updated by a transition function. The transition function is a causal-
determinate function for a determinate system: If the state of a dynamical system at a certain
time is known, the state for any other point in time can be computed. Accordingly, the same
transition function can be applied for every interval. Its effect is reversible as the effect of
time can always be 'undone' by the application of the time evolution function. In this
exophysical concept of time-invariance (Kampis, 1994), time is scalar, invariant, reversible
and universal. The underlying notion of time is parameter time (Drieschner, 1996), derived
from absolute Newtonian time, which has the following characteristics (Mittelstaedt, 1980, p.
15): Both its topological structure (temporal sequence) and its metric structure (parameter
time) are equal. Time has no relationship to objects external to it, while any process refers to
the same absolute, universal time (external time).
At the outset of dynamical system building the set for the encoding of the system is needed.
The material object under study is not the system, because every material object contains an
unlimited number of variables and, therefore, of possible systems. The system is a list of
variables (Ashby, 1976, p. 40). The task of the modeler is to vary the list of variables until the
system becomes determinate: a determinate machine is one whose behavior can be
encompassed in a list of variables that is logically and mathematically workable (Lilienfeld,
1978, p. 37). The basic question is which variables are necessary in order to express a given
domain of phenomena (Kampis, 1992a). Modeling is thus faced with a frame problem (Paton,
1996), i.e. the question how reading frames or frames of description should look like
(Kampis, 1992a).
Notwithstanding the frame problem, an essentialist notion underlies the dynamical system
paradigm: It is assumed that the modeler can discern the essential properties of the
represented system. Modelers pretend to isolate "...the essential (behaviorally relevant) system
structure, i.e. the identification of essential state variables, their feedbacks, and critical
parameters" (Bossel, 1992, p. 264). In this view the dynamical system retains the essence of
the represented system, i.e. that which remains the ´nature´ of the system throughout its
change from potentiality to actuality. Abstract state and system structure stand for this
essence.
3. Ecosystems as dynamical biogeochemical systems?
Ecosystems are constituted from two perspectives (O´Neill et al., 1986, p. 8-13): Firstly, there
is the population-community approach, which views ecosystems as networks of interacting
populations and in which the environment is regarded as context. Secondly, there is the
process-functional approach which focuses on matter and energy fluxes, regarding ecosystems
(and compartments) as bio-physico-chemical reactors (see e.g. "the soil as a reactor" by
Richter, 1986). Here the function is considered more important than the biotic entities
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performing it. The circuit and the machine metaphor have been formalized to deal with the
biogeochemical perspective on ecosystems.
Biogeochemical models, the focus of this paper, deal with a range of spatiotemporal scales. At
one extreme, inputs and outputs of total landscape units (catchments, watersheds) are
measured and modeled. At the other extreme, processes such as decomposition or the nitrogen
cycle are studied at the point scale. Models for (agro-)ecosystem management and
environmental risk assessment deal e.g. with the dynamics of organic matter (Powlson, 1996),
the loss of (excess) nutrients such as nitrogen (e.g. de Willigen, 1991, de Willigen and
Neetson, 1985, Engel, 1993, Frissel and van Veen, 1981, Groot et al., 1991, van Veen, 1994)
and phosphorous (e.g. Cassell et al., 1998), and with the dynamics of organic contaminants
such as pesticides (e.g. Calvet, 1995, Richter et al., 1996; Walker, 1995) and other xenobiotics
(Behrendt, 1999).
Mechanistic biogeochemical models are encoded as dynamical systems, which are developed
in an iterative procedure consisting of the following steps (adapted from Joergensen, 1991 and
1995):
♦ Definition of problem and bounding of the problem in time, space and subsystems
♦ Development of model structure
♦ Sensitivity analysis
♦ Calibration
♦ ´Validation´ (conceptual validity)
♦ Application as scientific or predictive tool
♦ Validation of prognoses (operational validation)
In the course of model structure development, a conceptual model and mathematical
formulations of the processes are developed. For the representation of ecosystems as
dynamical systems the problem of system identification, i.e. the identification of state
variables, system structure, and the characteristics of the components and the problem of
parameter identification have to be addressed (Richter, 1994). The system structure, which
connects the elements of the system, is invariable (first-order system). The number of degrees
of freedom (variables) is given by the respective system structure. System state and system
output of these determinate systems (Fig. C.2) is a function of parameter time and of the:
♦ initial values of the variables
♦ parameters of the system
♦ boundary conditions, i.e. the external variables or driving factors
♦ temporal transition function of the state variables as a function of parameters and
boundary conditions
Characteristic limitations of this modeling procedure are investigated in the following.
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Figure C.2. Characteristics of dynamical systems in the environmental sciences. The system
describes the transformation of inputs into outputs and system states under the influence of
external driving variables and system parameters (adapted from Berg and Kuhlmann, 1993,
p. 4-5 and Gnauck, 1995)
3.1. System structure and processes
Modelers face a basic problem: There are neither theories that allow the construction of
models from first principles nor theories that relate observations across different scales
(Hauhs et al., 1996). Process descriptions which have been obtained on different but mostly
small scales in field and laboratory studies, become the point of departure for model
construction: From the variety of processes descriptions, the modeler chooses the ´relevant´
processes to represent a determined domain of phenomena without disposing of a priori
criteria of relevance nor a posteriori criteria to test the selection. Thus modelers tend to base
their choice on what from their background of experience seems important, i.e. on prior
experience and intuition (Hornung, 1996), putting together what seems relevant to them.
Presumably there is an optimal level of model complexity (Wissel, 1989, p. 3), i.e. a point
where the degree of model complexity - measured e.g. by the number of state variables -
matches data resolution and quality, leading to maximal knowledge gain about the modeled
system (Joergensen, 1992, p. 87). However, whether such a point exists indeed and how it is
to be found in practice is far from clear. In modeling practice the idea prevails that accounting
for more processes leads to more realistic model structures and hence to more accurate
models. Environmental systems are regarded as complex, thus "increased complexity in
models is interpreted as evidence of closer approximation to reality" (Oreskes, in press). The
tendency of putting together as many processes (with their respective parameters) as possible
has been termed ´naive modeling´ by Hauhs et al., (1996). It entails the unrestricted increase
of degrees of freedom and frequently leads to non-identifiability of model parameters and
overparameterization (see below).
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3.2. Parameters
In ecology, parameters are coefficients regarded as constant for a specific (eco-)system , p.
67), although in principle no measurable aspect can be considered constant over the observed
temporal scales in ecosystems (Hauhs, 1992) due to manyfold feed-backs. Although the
application of parameters as constants is unrealistic, the dynamical system approach calls for
determined parameter values. Many parameters depend upon internal and external variables
and are computed as parameter functions, considered constant for a specific system. For
example hydraulic conductivity depends upon water content in a supposedly reproducible
way.
Spatial structure is a focal issue in the environmental sciences (De Boer, 1992, Jarvis, 1995,
O´Neill et al., 1989, Risser and Box, 1987; Wiens, 1989), as in ecosystems processes in a
hierarchy of spatial scales interact shaping a spatially heterogeneous medium (physical
structure). The interaction of scale and structure is even more problematic than the non-
linearities of the processes. Due to the spatial heterogeneity of ecosystems on all scales,
spatial structure is unknowable at any scales of real interest (Beven, 1996). In terrestrial
ecosystems, virtually all parameters like the conductance parameters or temperature are
spatially distributed. Typical examples are hydraulic conductivities or temperature. For
modeling purposes a spatially distributed parameter function has to be computed, which is an
arbitrarily distributed continuos-valued function. It is neither constrained by theory (e.g. first
principles), nor by a priori fixation and it is only loosely restricted by measurement due to
variability. The parameter function thus offers enough degrees of freedom to be fitted to any
data set, as demonstrated by Figure C.3.
Figure C.3. Breakthrough curve for a Deuterium tracer experiment, together with two
different best fits to parameterize a model on soil water movement. The model visualizes the
soil as a column containing mobile and immobile fractions of water; ß is the ratio of water
contents of the two fractions and v convection velocity. The two degrees of freedom are
already too much for a unique solution (from Lange, 1998).
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Fitted parameters may allow for adequate reproduction of data from the past, though saying
little about the ´correct´ value of the parameter and leaving the issue of parameter
identifiability open (Hornung, 1996). Non-identifiability of parameters is a major short-
coming of environmental models.
3.3. Variables and degrees of freedom
In a dynamical system the variables are defined in advance, staking out the phase space of the
system. Ecosystems are (stochastic) systems with an infinite number of variables and hence
an infinite-dimensional phase space (Lange, 1998). To represent a domain of phenomena, the
´relevant´ variables have to be chosen for the dynamical system. However, there are only
subjective criteria of which set of variables is necessary, which set is sufficient and which
parts of a set are superfluous to represent a certain domain. Table C.1 describes the different
organic matter pools and their parameterization for a specific site used in three simulation
models of nitrogen dynamics. The choice of number, size, and kinetic coefficients of the
organic pools is "obviously arbitrary" (Richter and Benbi, 1996).
Table. C.1. Characteristics of the different organic matter pools distinguished in three
simulation models for agricultural nitrogen dynamics. Parameterization is for a specific site
in Denmark (adapted from Vereecken et al., 1991).
Model Pool C/N ratio % of organic C Half life time
SWATNIT Litter 8 8-1 693 d
Manure 10 +/- 1 693 d
Humus 12 92 - 99 189 y
DAISY Biomass Pool 1 6 0.28 693 d
Biomass Pool 2 10 0.04 49.5 d
Soil Organic Pool 1 11 +/- 80 515 y
Soil Organic Pool 2 11 +/- 20 10 y
AMINO Humus 16 99.2 50 y
Fraction 2 12 < 0.5 77 d
Fraction 3 58 <0.5 3 y
Fraction 4 76 0.5 130 d
Fraction 5 76 <0.5 37 d
Fraction 6 24 <0.5 65 d
Fraction 7 24 <0.5 590 d
3.4. Initialization
In the initialization step, the state variables of the system are attributed initial values, making
the initial state of the system explicit. Due to ecosystem heterogeneity and measurement
problems the actual initial value of a variable can not be assessed. Thus initial values are
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approximated or chosen arbitrarily, assuming that the system has a short memory and is not
sensitive to initial conditions.
3.5. Boundary conditions and external driving variables
Ecosystems are open systems that do not sustain a boundary of their own. Thus ecosystems
and their boundaries are defined arbitrarily, i.e. any biotic-abiotic system of interaction can be
envisaged as an ecosystem. The choice of boundaries and boundary conditions determines
external variables and internal system variables. However, in the practice of field
investigation, the precise location of even the analytically defined boundaries is unknown and
the assessment of boundary conditions remains vague (Hoffmann, 1997).
Ecosystem boundaries are usually chosen in such a way that physical factors, e.g. weather and
climate, become external variables of the system. The external driving variables are assumed
to be independent of the respective ecosystem i.e. there is no feedback. They presumably
propel the ecosystem which, encoded as a dynamical system, reacts to the external variables
in a determinate way.
Future weather and climate conditions can not be known a priori, therefore in practice,
weather records from the past are used to compute short-term behaviour (Addiscott, 1993).
However, past weather records may be unrepresentative of the full range of natural driving
forces (Konikow and Bredehoeft, 1992). Particularly when driving forces themselves are
subject to major changes (e.g. global climate change) the ´information content´ of weather
records is invalidated.
3.6. Calibration
Calibration is the attempt to find the best accordance between computed and observed data by
the variation of some selected parameters (Joergensen, 1992, p. 68). However, due to the non-
identifiability of parameters and to overparameterization, calibration is a ´fitting exercise´.
Therefor it is an open question whether it assures predictive capacity and whether it
contributes to understanding (see below).
4. Selforganization and self-modifying systems
Dynamical systems theory has inspired the paradigmatic shift from external organization to
self-organization in the empirical sciences (Kratky and Wallner, 1990). In ecology and
ecosystem theory the paradigm of self-organization is gaining influence (e.g. Kauffman, 1993,
Müller, 1997). Self-organization can be envisaged as an irreversible process leading to
complex structures of the system through the cooperative action of subsystems. Several
concepts of self-organization have emerged, e.g. cybernetics, autopoiesis (Maturana and
Varela, 1980, molecular self-organization (Eigen and Schuster, 1979) and synergetics (Haken,
1990). In most of these concepts self-organization is viewed as a cyclic, recursive process
from an exo-perspective. For example an autopoietic machine is defined as "a machine
organized as a network of processes of production of components that produces the
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components which realize the network of processes that produced them" (Maturana and
Varela, 1980, p. 78). Cyclic self-organization in which components produce identical or
essentially similar components can in principle be represented by non-linear dynamical
systems. In contrast to this cyclic conception, original self-organization can be visualized by a
spiral shifting away from its original position in an adaptive evolutionary process. Original
self-organization can be represented by the notion of self-modifying component systems, in
which the focus is on incessant (self-)modification. Component systems have the following
properties (Kampis, 1992b):
♦ The set of the different types of the components of the system is open-ended.
♦ The system produces and destroys its own components during its typical activities.
Due to the production, destruction and de novo interaction of components, these systems
constantly produce new variables, leading to internal novelty. Sources of internal novelty may
be the following (Kampis, 1994):
♦ Neglected or ´frozen´ lower level variables
♦ New interactions with the environment
♦ New contexts
♦ Change of material properties
Take a pendulum as an example (Fig. C.4): It is encoded as a ´typical´ pendulum swinging
back and forth, yet in the course of time new variables of motion keep coming up. Adepts of
real-structure models claim that such a model "would be able to predict what would happen if
the pendulum were stopped" (Bossel, 1992). The prediction though is only possible, if the
potentiality of a stoppage is incorporated a priori into the encoding, i.e. if it is accounted for
in the reading frame. However, systems pick up information on-line and there is an unlimited
supply of things we do not take into account in a given model (Kampis, 1992a), so that it is
impossible to map all the relevant properties of the components in advance. Newly produced
variables are definable only a posteriori.
The validity of the respective set determines the validity of the prediction of system behavior.
The encoding of the system in a determined frame of description as in the case of dynamical
systems can not give account of the complexity of temporal production of variables (Kampis,
1994), which successively invalidates the set. The time frame is crucial here: While in the
short run (as indicated by system times, see below) a given set may predict system behavior
with a certain degree of accuracy, in the long run self-modifying systems become
unpredictable. The encoded abstract system state is outdated by the production of internal
novelty. As component systems are self-referential an external point of reference is lost. The
system becomes an endo-system to which an external observer has no access. On large scales
the exo-models thus break down.
The notion of time in self-organizing systems is fairly different from time in dynamical
systems: External parameter time is replaced by the concept of endo-time or system time.
System time is linked to the period of time a system takes before reproducing (Kümmerer,
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1996). Hierarchy theory assumes that natural systems can be described in the framework of a
nested, constitutive hierarchy (Ahl and Allen, 1996, O´Neill et al., 1986, Müller, 1992). The
different levels of organization correspond to different temporal scale levels and to different
system times. Accordingly, system times vary from minutes-days (e.g. chemical reactions in
soil; molecular level) to months-years (e.g. population dynamics; nutrient cycles) and
decades-centuries (e.g. ecosystems, landscapes, global system) (Ulrich, 1993). Symmetry
breaking in self-organizing systems (Prigogine et al., 1969) entails irreversibility and the
notion of structurally determined systems which depend upon their history.
Figure C.4. Encoding of a dynamical system, taking the pendulum as an example. The set of
variables (=encoding) on the left side represents the swinging of the pendulum. However, this
encoding is not able to account for new variables of motion that keep coming up in the course
of time (see the right sight of the figure). New variables thus invalidate old encodings and the
system becomes unpredictable (adapted from Kampis, 1994).
The paradigm of self-modifying systems is non-classical, as these systems are:
♦ Non-determined: In open systems ´properties´, ´states´ and ´objects´ are definable only a
posteriori.
♦ Non-local: Objects are context- and time-dependent, are globally dissolved and thus only
(a posteriori and) globally definable.
♦ Non-predictable: Internal novelty can not be handled externally, as the advent of new
variables invalidates the encoding.
Table C.2 contrasts the two paradigms, the exophysical, essentialist paradigm with its notion
of reversibility and the paradigm of self-organization, represented by the endophysical
time
X 1 X 2 X nX 1 X 2 X n X n+1X 1 X 2 X n
Swinging 1 Swinging 2 Rolling
C 1 C 2encodings
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concept of self-modifying systems. Within the essentialist paradigm, properties and states
stand for the identity of the system and can be defined a priori. Causality is transparent, the
ontologically conceived complexity of the system is invariable and the system is computable
as properties, states and transition functions are well defined. In ecological modeling a strong
notion of essentialism is represented by the "base model", which accounts for the complete
input-output behavior of a real ecosystem and which is valid for all frames (Zeigler, 1976).
Table C.2. The classical, reversible, essentialist paradigm of dynamical systems versus self-
modification as a model of original self-organisation (compiled from Kampis, 1994 and
Paslack, 1991).
Essentialism
(Reversibility)
Self-modification
(Irreversibility)
Being-Becoming Properties
States
Relations
Confluences (potentiality)
Objects Objects locally and a priori
definable
Objects globally and a posteriori
definable (Objects context- and
time dependent)
Causality Transparent
Strong
Linear
Opaque
Weak
Non-linear; circular
System Dynamical systems
Analytically defined
Given hierarchy
Closed
Growing systems
Realistically defined
Self-created hierachy
Open
Complexity Constant Variable
Environment Environment structures system
External regulation
(external drivers)
Systems structure environment
Internal regulation
Time Scalar, universal parameter time
(exo time)
System time
(endo-time)
Dynamics/
Development
Reversible trajectories
Continuity
Regularity
Irreversible Process
Bifurcation
Singularity
Computability Computable Non-computable
(Set not definable in advance)
Theoretical ecologist take different positions with regard to the base model concept. While
valid real-structure models are supposed to be achievable in principle (Bossel, 1992, Nielsen,
1992) others doubt that such representations can be achieved even for simple real ecosystems
(Wissel, 1989, pp. 1-7., Joergensen (1992) acknowledges that such a base model can never be
fully known, because of the complexity of the system and the impossibility to observe all
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states. In this view, complexity is ontologically conceived and the impossibility of condensing
the essence of an ecosystem into a dynamical systems is attributed to practical observational
and computational (and not principle) limitations.
In the paradigm of self-modification, ´properties´ must be envisioned in a relational way as
they depend on a changing material context. The notion of a system state has to be
abandoned, as states require variables as expressions of the properties of the system. The
identity and the definition of the system´s components is context and time-dependent and "is
only revealed at the end of a process, when all confluences and relations are already known in
retrospect" (Kampis, 1994).
Modern natural science is based on an exophysical conception, in which the material system
under study is regarded as a sender and the observer as a receiver, collecting the signals
emitted by the object. This exo-physical concept collides with the endo-physical notion of
self-modifying systems, which pick up and create information on-line and for which limited
internal accessibility of information is an ontologically conceived factor (Kampis, 1994). In
such systems definitions become temporally changeable due to self-modification; thus the
classical concept of computability where everything has to be defined in advance ceases to
work.
5. Dynamical systems as analytical tool for ´noisy´ ecosystems?
Systems theory claims to be an interdisciplinary, universal theory, which allows for privileged
access to complex phenomena (Lilienfeld, 1978). Dynamical systems as formal, paradigmatic
representation of complex systems play an outstanding role in a proclaimed ´structural
scientific revolution´ driven by the ´discovery of complexity´ (see e.g. the title of the book by
Hedrich, 1994). In the empirical sciences the theory of dynamical systems is important both
with regard to the diffusion of complexity concepts and to its application in natural system
modeling. The mathematical theory describes the possible behavior of natural systems, only if
these systems are adequately represented by systems of partial differential equations.
Dynamical systems can only show the behavior prescribed by the mathematical theory, and
no other behavior (Hedrich, 1994, p. 30).
The theory of dynamical systems and its application in empirical sciences like ecology and
the environmental sciences strives to fit the conception of modern natural science as
laboratory science (Hoyningen-Huene, 1989). In the laboratory closed systems are
constructed in which if-conditions or antecedents are prepared to produce observable effects
or consequents. The corresponding notion of causality is interventionist (Janich, 1992) in that
intervention in a specific, controlled setting makes causal relationships appear. According to
Vico´s ´verum factum´ principle truth and understanding are attributed only to systems
prepared or created by man (Hösle, 1990). Following Hacking, (1992), parts of our
environment have to be remade labouriosly into a ´quasi-laboratory´ to reproduce laboratory
phenomena. Dynamical systems make use of process descriptions and of parameters
established under laboratory conditions, they aim at the exclusion of ´noise´ and they try to
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achieve a high degree of closure. Thus the theory of dynamical systems attempts to work with
the laboratory model and the dynamical system paradigm indeed has been applied
successfully to allopoietic, technical systems.
Dynamical systems are the paradigm in the environmental sciences, both as a conceptual
background and as the formal base of simulation modeling (Joergensen, 1992, Richter, 1994,
Richter et al., 1996) although the transferability of system analysis and the paradigm of
dynamical systems to ecosystems has been questioned in general already two decades ago
(Müller, 1979). For a number of reasons we reckon the dynamical system paradigm
inadequate for the representation of ecosystems:
Dynamical systems omit the openness constitutive of ecosystems. Closed dynamical systems
run counter to the heterogeneity of ecosystems and to the practical and theoretical limitations
imposed on the observation of ecosystems. We agree with the work of Oreskes et al. (1994)
who show that ecosystem openness and the formal closedness of dynamical systems collide in
three respects: Firstly, dynamical systems require input parameters that are incompletely
known (e.g. the distributed parameters). Secondly, they are based on continuum theory which
entails a loss of information on structure and processes on finer scales (Oreskes, in press), e.g.
the Darcian velocity used for the differential equations is different from the actual velocity at
the pore scale. Continuum is a hypothetical idealization, disregarding the discreteness of
ecological entities (Breckling, 1992). Thirdly, Oreskes et al (1994) show that they recur to
additional inferences and assumptions (e.g. kinetic effects are usually neglected), making use
of auxiliary hypotheses until the dynamical system and the corresponding simulation model
fit the data. Several system structures may produce the same results, i.e. model results are
underdetermined by the data.
A dynamical system is an abstraction, in which the system is separated from its environment
or background. The background is regarded as noise, which is eliminated in the abstraction
step as only well-defined inputs (the input vector) reach the system. The system and its input
and output vector become a conceptually closed system. The notion of noise is based on a
noise/non-noise difference in conjunction with the system/environment difference introduced
by information theory and system analysis. Yet in ecology there are no grounds on which
noise (background) and system (abstraction from the background) could be distinguished.
Ecosystems and order in ecosystems may actually be the result of ´noise´, thus "noise is music
to the ecologist" (Valsangiacomo, 1998, p. 270). In system analysis what started out as an
ecological system becomes a mere system losing its ecological trait: For ecological issues are
issues in which an system-environment-context is structured due to the development of
selective behavior of the system towards its environment. The ecological view of a system-
environment-context implies unity (of the system-environment difference) despite difference
(of system and environment) or even unity due to difference (Luhmann, 1990, pp. 21-22).
The differences introduced to abstract a certain system from its context prevent re-unification
and unity of context and environment. For example the reintegration of the population-
community difference with the process-function difference is impossible. Correspondingly,
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ecosystem theory has not come up with a single example of the successful reconstruction or
prediction of both aspects of a given system (Lange, 1998).
In dynamical systems a fixed number of variables is contained. However, the assumption of a
fixed number of degrees of freedom collides with the constant come and go of organisms and
the generic innovation and extinction in ecosystems along time, resulting in the production of
internal novelty, in the change of system structure and in the creation and extinction of new
variables. In our view, ecosystems have to be regarded as self-modifying component systems,
for which the a priori definition of variables is impossible. Internal novelty and constant drift
of ecosystems and their components is not ´noise´, but it is essential for the structural
coupling of an open system to its environment (Maturana and Varela, 1987) and for the
structuring of the system-environment context, both in the past and in the future. Separation
of system and context can at best give a static, momentary view of a frozen system ´state´.
Dynamical system modeling of future states assumes that abstract state and external
parameter time account for a determinate temporal transition. However, self-modifying
systems do not transit from one state with determined properties to another determinate state,
but are in an incessant process of original self-organization, in which relations continually are
established and lost and states are superseded by confluences. No dynamical system can
account for this internal novelty and for the peculiar system times of system components. For
short time frames dynamical system descriptions may retain validity. In the long run,
however, the dynamical system as a reading frame becomes outdated (Kampis, 1994).
The notion of reversibility underlying the dynamical system paradigm implies that any
moment in time is equal and that past states can be computed from present states. The history
of the system is supposed to be contained in system structure and specific parameters. Such
systems are trivial machines, which are synthetically determined, analytically determinable,
predictable and independent of history, i.e. there is an operator relating input to output
(Foerster, 1998). However, the failure of simulation models is attributed precisely to the
ignorance of the historical character of systems and of system memory (Lange, 1998). It has
been hypothesized that sequences in complex systems show non-trivial long-range
correlations, entailing a considerable memory effect (Ebeling et al., 1995, pp. 48-50).
Historicity denotes the dependence of the present ´state´ of a system upon its history. The
notion of historicity corresponds to the notion of non-trivial machines, in which the historical
record of operations influences present operations. Non-trivial machines are unpredictable and
in most cases analytically not determinable (Foerster, 1998). On top of that, self-modifying
systems are not even synthetically determined. Temporal dynamics of self-modifying systems
are characterized by symmetry breaking, irreversibility, non-linearity, bifurcations and
evolution. From (the discovery of) complexity a path is leading to history (Longo, 1994).
5.1. Validation, validity and future scenarios
The conventional notion of validation distinguishes ´operational validation´ and ´conceptual
validity´ (Rykiel, 1996). According to that view, conceptual validity tests the internal logic of
a model and says little about the predictive capacities of the model. Operational validation
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pretends to be an "objective test on how well the model outputs fit the data" (Joergensen,
1991, p. 68-69): Operational validation thus does not imply that the internal structure of the
model corresponds to actual processes, but would be the demonstration that a model possesses
a satisfactory range of accuracy consistent with the intended application of the model.
However, the conventional notion fails for practical and principal reasons. Generally accepted
standards for testing and validating ecosystem models are inexistent. In contrast, current
practice is characterized by vague, subjective claims that model predictions show ´acceptable´
agreement with data (Kirchner et al., 1996). Validation procedures commonly consist in the
comparison of modeled and measured data or of the outputs of models for the same set of
input data. Biogeochemical models for agroecosystems have been validated this way, showing
considerable deviation when different model outputs are compared to each other and to
measured data (e.g. (de Willigen, 1991, de Willigen and Neetson, 1985, Diekkrüger, 1992).
Aside from these practical limitations , there are more fundamental short-comings of the
validation procedures in the earth sciences which are discussed by Rastetter (1996). The basal
impossibility of the verification and validation of (closed) models of (open) natural systems
has been demonstrated by Oreskes et al. (1994).
Measured data used for model calibration and validation do not cover the range of potential
conditions of system and external variables, particularly as data usually belong to short-term
data sets. Accordingly, model validity is restricted to the range of conditions which is
represented by the respective data set. When this range is surpassed, the predictive capacity of
the model is in doubt and can only be confirmed a posteriori, i.e. there is no prediction.
The calibration step, in which models with a large number of non-identifiable parameters
(overparameterization) are fitted to measured data, assures that models can be adapted to a
given data set, irrespective of the internal structure of the model. Models are not only
underdetermined by the data (Oreskes et al., 1994), but they can even become immune to the
data (Hauhs et al., 1996): eventual lack of predictive power is attributed to the ´intrinsic
complexity´ of the system under study, leading at best to a readjustment of the model (e.g. by
the re-calibration of parameters or the addition of processes). The role of simulation models as
predictive tools in the environmental sciences and as instruments of decision support has been
harshly criticized for the lack of validity and validation: Mac Lane (1988) speaks of the
construction of massive imaginary future scenarios to provide predictions which cannot be
verified by checking against objective facts. To him models are speculation without empirical
check. Funtowicz and Ravetz (1992) criticize the absence of effective tests for demonstrating
what sort of correspondence, if any, there is between models and reality. To them models are
devoid of certainty, quality and reality and are to be regarded as a post-modern phenomenon.
In the absence of testing, in the minds of their users models may take on an aura of reality
(Philip, 1991) - a particular precarious point if models are employed as risk assessment tools.
5.2. A role for dynamical simulation models in the environmental sciences?
We claim that mechanistic simulation models of ecosystems are not suitable for predictive
purposes, as they are not able to produce non-trivial predictions of future outcomes (Hauhs et
C. Biochemical Models in the Environmental Sciences 77
al., 1996). While the mathematical behavior of the formal dynamical system is computable,
the ´behavior´ of the natural system is not. Existing data sets or empirically recognized
patterns in natural systems may be reproduced by models, but this is not prediction. Non-
predictability partly owes to the self-modifying character of ecosystems, which can not be
represented by any dynamical system. To embrace the complexity of natural systems (Kay
and Schneider, 1995) means to abandon the idea of predictability.
The implications for ecological risk assessment are profound. Unpredictability of natural
systems notwithstanding, there still are calls to improve the predictability of biogeochemical
system behavior as part of a strategy to reduce global risks, e.g. to decrease the risk of nitrate
leaching to the groundwater (WBGU, 1999, p. 323). Nevertheless, there is growing awareness
that true predictability can not be achieved. For example Richter (1994) states that the more
rapid decomposition of a newly produced pesticide after repeated application may be
explained by the adaptive evolution of the microorganisms, but it can not be predicted. The
intrinsic unpredictability of ecosystems suggests to follow the precautionary principle in risk
assessment (Westra, 1997), instead of succumbing to the ecosystem engineering fallacy.
Yet if dynamical simulation models are not suited for predictive purposes, what role is left to
them in the environmental sciences?
We agree with Nancy Cartwright´s statement that models are "a work of fiction" and that
"some properties ascribed to objects in the model will be genuine properties of the object
modeled, but others will be merely properties of convenience" (Cartwright, 1983, p. 153). In
the terms of general modeling theory, the model consists of a set of attributes representing a
part of the original and a set of abundant attributes without correspondence to attributes of the
original (Stachowiak, 1983, p. 119).
Despite not being a ´real´ thing, "a model may resonate with nature" (Oreskes et al., 1994)
and thus has heuristic value, particular to guide further study. Corresponding to the heuristic
function, Joergensen (1995) claims that models can be empployed to reveal ecosystem
properties and to examine different ecological theories. Models can be asked scientific
questions about properties. Examples for ecosystem properties found by the use of models as
synthesizing tools are according to Joergensen (1994) the significance of indirect effects, the
existence of a hierarchy, and the ´soft´ character of ecosystems. However, we agree with
Oreskes et al. (1994) who regard models as "most useful when they are used to challenge
existing formulations rather than to validate or verify them". Models as ´sets of hypotheses´,
may reveal deficiencies in hypothesis and the way, biogeochemical systems are observed.
Moreover, models frequently identify lacunae in observations and places where data are
missing (Yaalon, 1994).
As an instrument of synthesis (Rastetter, 1996), models are invaluable. They are a good way
to summarize an individual research project (Yaalon, 1994) and they are capable of holding
together multidisciplinary knowledge and perspectives on complex systems (Patten, 1994).
While models as a product may have heuristic value, we would like to emphasize the role of
the modeling process: "...one of the most valuable benefits of modeling is the process itself.
These benefits accrue only to participants and seem unrelated to the character of the model
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produced" (Patten, 1994). Model building is a subjective procedure, in which every step
requires judgment and decisions, making model development ´half science, half art´ and a
matter of experience (Hoffmann, 1997, Hornung, 1996). Thus modeling is a learning process,
in which modelers are forced to make explicit their notions about the modeled system and in
which they learn how the analytically isolated components of a system can be ´glued´ (Paton,
1997). As modeling mostly takes place in groups, modeling and the synthesis of knowledge
has to be envisaged as a dynamic communication process, in which criteria of relevance, the
meaning of terms, the underlying concepts and theories and so forth are negotiated. Model
making thus may become a catalyst of interdisciplinary communication.
In the assessment of environmental risks, however, an exclusively scientific modeling process
is not sufficient, as technical-scientifc approaches to ´post-normal´ risks are unsatisfactory
(Rosa, 1998) and as the predictive capacity and operational validity of models (e.g. for
scenario computation) is in doubt. The post-normal science approach (Funtowicz and Ravetz,
1992, Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1991, Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993) takes account of the stakes
and values involved in environmental decision making. Following a ´post-normal´ agenda,
model development and model validation for risk assessment should become a transscientific
(communication) task, in which "extended peer communities" participate and in which non-
equivalent descriptions of complex systems are made explicit, negotiated and synthesized. In
current modeling practice, however, models are highly opaque and can rarely be penetrated
even by other scientists (Oreskes, personal communication). As objects of communication,
models still are closed systems and black boxes.
6. Conclusion
The dynamical system paradigm remains within the limits of an exophysically conceived
systems theory, which is based on conceptually closed systems and which claims that
essential, systemic properties arise from the particular configuration of system components.
To achieve closure of dynamical systems, the structure and processes of biogeochemical
systems are idealized or simplified, disregarding spatial and temporal variability. Criteria for
the identification of essential components, processes and parameters and for their adequate
combination in dynamical systems are lacking. Thus the choice of ´relevant´ processes and
parameters and the fabrication of system structure are highly subjective. Owing to the
impossibility of model validation, models run the risk of losing contact to the empirical
´reality´ they refer to.
In biogeochemical systems, the interplay of biological components with their geochemical
environment play a crucial role in the processing of chemical substances. As to this
interaction the paradigm of dynamical systems represents only a half-way discovery of
complexity: In our view, the closed encoding of ecosystems as dynamical systems runs
counter to the self-modifying character of ecosystems as a result of their singular history in a
singular context. As stochastic systems (self-modification) in a stochastic context (history),
´complex natural systems´ are unpredictable.
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While in the environmental sciences a representationalistic notion of dynamical system
models as the product of scientific endeavor prevails, we emphasize the importance of the
modeling process. Modeling can be a way of coping with different types of complexity: The
complexity of integrating and synthesizing (reductionist) statements and of gluing analytically
isolated components; the descriptive complexity that allows for numerous, non-equivalent
system descriptions, depending upon standpoint; the communicative complexity, both inter-
and transcientific, arising from non-equivalent descriptions of complex systems. Modeling
can be a means of the reduction of complexity as it is realizing one arrangement (or
agreement) amongst innumerous contingent arrangements.
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D. Worauf beziehen sich Simulationsmodelle?
Referenz, Fiktionalisierung und Bodenhaftung
Zusammenfassung
In diesem Beitrag wird das Verhältnis von Simulationsmodellen als syntaktischen
Zeichensystemen zu Ökosystemen als Referenz dieser Modelle untersucht. Es wird illustriert,
wie Ökosysteme als dynamische Systeme kodiert werden, d.h. wie ökosystemare Phänomene
in ein System syntaktischer Information übersetzt werden und an welchen Punkten dabei der
Kontakt zur Referenz verloren gehen kann. Ich diskutiere, inwiefern umweltwissenschaftliche
Simulationsmodelle zum Prozeß der Virtualisierung und zum Verschwinden der Realität
beitragen und zeige, daß Kongruenz zwischen Original und Modellsystem bei instabilen
natürlichen Systemen durch eine Anpassung der Realität an das Modell erreicht wird und
nicht, wie bei Simulationsmodellen üblich, durch eine Anpassung des Modells an die Realität.
Abstract
In this paper the relationship between simulation models as systems of syntactic signs and
ecosystems as the reference of these models is investigated. I illustrate the encoding of
ecosystems into dynamical systems, i.e. the way how ecological phenomena are translated
into syntactic systems and how the contact to the reference/original can be lost on the way. I
discuss whether simulation models in the environmental sciences contribute to a more general
societal tendency of virtualisation and to the disappearance of reality. I argue that for unstable
and instationary natural systems congruency between original and model system is achieved
through the  adaptation of reality to the respective model (intervention), while for simulation
models holds the opposite: The model is adapted (´fitted´) to the reality.
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1. Einleitung
Ursprünglich als Vortäuschung oder Vorspiegelung1mit negativen Konnotationen belegt, hat
die Simulation eine erstaunliche Karriere hinter sich. Simulation hat sich als
„Problemlösungsmethode, die sich auf das zeitliche Verhalten von Systemen" (Petzoldt
1997)2 bezieht in den Umweltwissenschaften etabliert, insbesondere weil sie eine
"wirklichkeitsnahe, jedoch einfachere, billigere oder ungefährlichere Untersuchung als das
Objekt" erlaubt. (Brockhaus-Enzyklopädie 1983). Eine wesentliche Stärke der Simulation
liegt mithin gerade darin, daß sie Distanz zum Untersuchungsobjekt, zur ´Realität´
ermöglicht. Simulation als die modellhafte Nachbildung eines beliebigen Systems oder
Prozesses durch ein anderes kybernetisches System (Meyers 1993) ist historisch an die
„Entdeckung der Komplexität“ (Hedrich 1994) und die damit einher gehende Entwicklung
eines theoretischen und informationstechnischen Instrumentariums gebunden.
Computermetaphern, Kybernetik und insbesondere die Theorie dynamischer Systeme prägen
seither das Bild und die Abbildung von Ökosystemen. Systemtheorie und Kybernetik als
syntaktische Artikulationen von Zeichenprozessen, die ohne Bedeutung bzw. Referenz
funktionieren (Geier 1999, S. 163) sind mit dem Anspruch angetreten, Erklärungs- und
Steuerungswissens für die unterschiedlichsten Systeme zur Verfügung zu stellen (Lilienfeld
1978). Nach einer Phase der Zuversicht, in der danach gestrebt wurde ökosystemare
Zusammenhänge mit Hilfe von dynamischen Simulationsmodellen informatorisch und
kybernetisch verfügbar zu machen ("ecological engineering", z.B. in Dubois 1981), sind
Simulationsmodelle in jüngerer Zeit in die Kritik geraten: Das Paradigma der dynamischen
Systeme sei Ökosystemen nicht angemessen (Lange 1998), Simulationsmodelle seien nicht
validierbar (Konikow & al. 1992, Oreskes 1998, Rastetter 1996) und gegenüber den
gemessenen Daten immun (Hauhs & al. 1996b), es mangele ihnen an empirischem Gehalt, sie
hätten spekulativen Charakter (Mac Lane 1988) und könnten allenfalls heuristische
Funktionen erfüllen (Oreskes & al. 1994), während sie zu Prognosezwecken untauglich seien
(Hauhs & al. 1996b). In gesellschaftlichen Verwendungszusammenhängen, insbesondere
beim Risk Assessment, nähmen Simulationsmodelle eine Aura von Realität an (Philip 1991),
die simulierte Szenarios u.U. realer erscheinen lassen als Beobachtung und sinnliche
Anschauung. So wurden z.B. jüngst die Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung des Ölteppichs aus der
Havarie der "Erika" vor der französischen Atlantikküste allein auf der Grundlage der
Prognose von Météo France geplant - ohne den Beobachtungen vor Ort Beachtung zu
schenken (Lambel & al. 2000)3. Simulationen, die für Laien und andere Wissenschafter opak
bleiben (Funtowicz & al. 1992) befördern mitunter das ´Verschwinden der Realität´
(Baudrillard 1982).
Angesichts dieser Kritik, insbesondere an der gesellschaftlich-politischen bzw. planerischen
Rolle von Simulationsmodellen, untersuche ich in diesem Beitrag das Verhältnis zwischen
natürlichem System als externem Referenten und formalem System als syntaktischem
Zeichensystem. Dynamische Systeme, die formalen Systemen gegenüber isomorph sind
(Kampis 1991, S.5) dienen als Beispiel. Ich werde fragen, worauf sich Simulationsmodelle
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beziehen, unter welchen Bedingungen Simulationsmodelle zum "Verschwinden der Realität"
beitragen und wie Kontakt und Kongruenz zwischen Modell und externer Referenz hergestellt
werden können. Dabei werde ich mich von der These leiten lassen, daß der Bezug zur
Referenz einfach zu verlieren ist, während es mühevoll ist, ´Bodenhaftung´ bzw. Kontakt zur
Referenz herzustellen.
2. Kodierung und Formalisierung: Dynamische Systeme als Syntax von Ökosystemen?
Ökosystemare Phänomene werden bei der Modellbildung im Zuge eines Kodierungsschritts in
dynamische Systeme übersetzt und berechenbar gemacht. Man bedient sich dabei eines Satzes
von syntaktischen Zeichen und Verknüpfungen, um Phänomene in numerische und/oder
mathematische Aussagen zu übersetzen (Rosen 1991, S. 58-61). In einem Dekodierungs-
schritt werden Aussagen über das Verhalten des natürlichen Systems aus den Regeln des
formalen Systems abgeleitet (Abb. D.1). Dabei kann sich das System nur so verhalten, wie es
die Theorie - hier der dynamischen Systeme - vorschreibt (Hedrich 1994, S. 30). Bei
Formalisierung und Mathematisierung ist man auf den beschränkten Vorrat an
mathematischen Zeichen und Verknüpfungen angewiesen, den die jeweilige Theorie
bereitstellt; die Darstellung wird dadurch insofern eingeschränkt, als Gleichungen wegen ihrer
mathematischen Eigenschaften und nicht allein aufgrund von Eigenschaften des natürlichen
Systems ausgewählt werden (Cartwright 1983, S. 131)4.
Abbildung D.1.: Übersetzung der Phänomene natürlicher Systeme in ein formales,
dynamisches System. Das natürliche System ist die externe Referenz, auf die sich die
syntaktischen Zeichen des formalen Systems beziehen (u/v= Vektor der Inputs/Outputs; t =
Parameterzeit; f = Zustandfunktion; g = Outputfunktion).
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Räumlich-strukturelle Kategorien dominieren die Abbildung von Ökosystemen: Ökosysteme
werden als räumliche Strukturen beobachtet, nach konventionalen Kriterien abgegrenzt und
im abstrakten Systemzustand (visualisiert als Systemstruktur) des dynamischen Systems
repräsentiert. Die im abstrakten Systemzustand fixierten Variablen spannen einen Phasenraum
auf, durch den sich das System auf berechenbaren Trajektorien bewegt, angetrieben durch den
Parameter Zeit. Zeit entspricht hier der universellen, externen Zeit Newtons, die nicht mit den
Phänomenen verbunden ist (Mittelstaedt 1980) und der Zeit Aristoteles als einer Bewegung in
einem numerisch abgesteckten Raum (Piettre 1996). Das dynamische System fungiert als
Syntax, die die algorithmische Fortentwicklung des Systems von einem früheren zu einem
späteren Zeitpunkt vorschreibt (Rosen 1991, S. 279). Dynamische Systeme, die mit der
Vorstellung von fixen Eigenschaften, statischen ´Wesenheiten´ (s. u. 3.), abstrakten Zuständen
und einer externen Zeit verknüpft sind, stehen für den einen der beiden traditionsreichen Pole
"Sein/Werden"5. Prozessualen Vorstellungen zufolge wäre dagegen die Identität eines
Systems und seiner Komponenten das Ergebnis von sich aktualisierenden Prozessen (Latour
1998, S. 172), von wechselnden Relationen und von "confluences", ´Zusammenflüssen´
(Kampis 1994), d.h. von der kontext- und zeitabhängigen Rekonfiguration des Systems durch
das jeweils aktuelle Zusammenwirken seiner Komponenten.
3. Essentialismus: Dynamische Systeme als Wesen von Ökosystemen?
Welcher (An-)Teil von Ökosystemen wird aber im dynamischen System kodiert? Eine Reihe
von informationstheoretischen (z.B. System/Umwelt, Rauschen/Nicht-Rauschen) und
ökologischen (z.B. biogeochemisch/populationsökologisch) (O´Neill & al. 1986)
Unterscheidungen werden an das natürliche System angelegt, um den dynamischen vom
kontingenten Teil abzutrennen. Die zumeist binäre Kodierung folgt dem Schema
Wert/Rest(-wert), in dem der ausgeschlossene, kontingente Rest durch bestimmte Parameter
(z.B. Dispersionskoeffizienten) und durch Kalibrierung eingefangen wird oder als Rauschen
und irreduzible "Komplexität" ignoriert wird6. Der dynamische Teil wird dann, einer
essentialistischen Leitvorstellung (Kampis 1994) folgend, die das "Wesen der Naturdinge"
(Hoyningen-Huene 1989) zu erfassen sucht, mit dem Wesen bzw. der Identität des Systems
gleichgesetzt. Die Logik der Modellierung ist üblicherweise  der Suche nach einer Essenz
verhaftet, "the essential ... system structure, i.e. the identification of essential state variables"
(Bossel 1992) ist das Begehr.
Abstrakte, digitalisierte Zustände als Essenz von natürlichen Systemen wären in dieser Sicht
die natürliche Basis, um "von vielen unterschiedlichen Wahrnehmungen zu einem durch
Denken Zusammengebrachten" (Geier 1999) S. 195) zu gelangen, mithin um ´natürliche
Arten´ wie etwa Ökosystemtypen zu bestimmen.
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4. Konzeptionelle Schließung und die Ausgrenzung der Referenz
Dynamische Systeme und die zugehörigen Simulationsmodelle sind konzeptionell
geschlossene Systeme: Das System wird von der kontingenten Umwelt abgegrenzt, die Zahl
und Art der Parameter bzw. Freiheitsgrade wird a priori festgelegt und der Systemzustand
wird eingefroren (Kampis 1994). Damit verbleibt das System auf der Ebene syntaktischer
Information und wird unzugänglich für pragmatische Information, die die Systemstruktur
verändern würde (Kornwachs & al. 1984).
Parameter fixieren und schließen das System und ermöglichen die mathematisch-numerische
Behandlung des Systems. Diese Parameter und die dem System attribuierten Eigenschaften
haben z.T. fiktionalen Charakter, die aus den Notwendigkeiten der mathematischen Theorie
(siehe 2.) bzw. der Parametrisierung des kontingenten Teils resultieren (siehe 3.): "A model is
a work of fiction. Some properties ascribed to objects in the model will be genuine properties
of the objects modelled, but others will be merely properties of convenience ... to bring the
objects modelled into the range of the mathematical theory" (Cartwright 1983, S. 153).
Konventionale Parameter sind z.B. die Halbwertszeiten für verschiedene Fraktionen
organischer Substanz im Boden (Tab. D.1), die sich an mathematisch-physikalische
Vorstellungen vom Atomzerfall anlehnen. Konventionale "Rest-Parameter", wie
Dispersionskoeffizienten spiegeln die Differenz dynamischer/kontingenter Teil wider.
Parameter ohne reale Bedeutung und externe Referenz erhöhen die Anpassungsfähigkeit des
Kalküls an gemessene Daten und tragen zur Emanzipation des Modells vom Original und
damit zu seiner Fiktionalisierung bei.
Tabelle D.1. Pools organischer Substanz in zwei Stickstoffhaushaltsmodellen. Die
Kalibrierung bezieht sich auf einen dänischen Ackerstandort (aus Vereecken & al. 1991).
Modell Pool C/N Verhältnis Halbwertszeit
DAISY Biomasse 1 6 693 Tage
Biomasse 2 10 49.5 Tage
Organ. Substanz 1 11 515 Jahre
Organ. Substanz 2 11 10 Jahre
AMINO Humus 16 50 Jahre
Fraktion 2 12 77 Tage
Fraktion 3 58 3 Jahre
Fraktion 4 76 130 Tage
Fraktion 5 76 37 Tage
Fraktion 6 24 65 Tage
Fraktion 7 24 590 Tage
Die Abgrenzung von Innen/Außen bzw. System/Umwelt und Rauschen/Nicht-Rauschen
beraubt das Öko-System seines ökologischen Charakters. Während Systeme (im
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systemtheoretischen Sinn) aus ihrer Umwelt herausgelöst werden, sind Öko-Systeme durch
einen System/Umwelt-Zusammenhang charakerisiert, also durch Einheit trotz System-
Umwelt-Differenz (Luhmann 1990, S. 210). Die Eigenart von Öko-Systemen liegt in der
strukturellen Kopplung von System und Umwelt (Maturana & al. 1987, S.85), in der
Produktion von Erstmaligkeit (Weizsäcker 1974) und in dem Potential das Fluktuationen
(Nicolis & al. 1977) und ´Rauschen´ (Valsangiacomo 1998, S. 270), d.h. die vermeintlich
kontingenten Teile des Systems, für die adaptive Anpassung und Ordnung des Systems
bereitstellen. Selbstmodifikation von Ökosystemen (Kampis 1991), d.h. die kontinuierliche
Produktion und Zerstörung von Variablen steht im Gegensatz zum begrenzten, a priori
festgelegten Vorrat von Variablen in dynamischen Systemen (Lange 1998). Ökosysteme sind
konzeptionell bzw. epistemisch offene Systeme, in denen on-line7 Erstmaligkeit produziert
wird und neue Kontexte entstehen, die die Bedeutung existierender Systemkomponenten
verändern. Wie stark diese Veränderungen auf bestimmte Beobachtungsebenen
durchschlagen, hängt z.B. davon ab, wieviel Spielraum Constraints auf höheren
Organisationsebenen (z.B. Klima) zulassen. Die Abkoppelung des Systems von seiner
Umwelt und von den internen Quellen von Erstmaligkeit führt zur Entkopplung von
dynamischem Simulationsmodell und Referenz.
5. Referenz: Worauf beziehen sich Modelle?
Um die Abbildung eines Originals konkurrieren unterschiedliche Simulationsmodelle.
Zugleich kann dasselbe Modell zur Abbildung verschiedener, konkreter Systeme dienen. Ich
skizziere im Folgenden einen Pfad der Fiktionalisierung, der von der Abbildung konkreter
Systeme über abstrakte Zustände zur Reduktion auf einen Kalkül führt.
Wenn Simulationsmodelle auf konkrete Systeme mit einer konkreten Geschichte an einem
konkreten Ort bezogen werden, haben die Aussagen des Modells zunächst nur Bedeutung für
dieses konkrete System. Eine solche Sichtweise kollidiert mit dem Streben nach Universalität
und Kontrolle der natürlichen Welt, die an Kontextunabhängigkeit, d.h. die Abstrahierbarkeit
von Wissen und Information von der natürlichen Welt und an das Prinzip der Identität durch
Veränderung gebunden sind (Merchant 1987, S. 232 ff).
In diesem Sinne wären Simulationsmodelle als Abstraktionen zu konzipieren, die vom
spezifischen Kontext unabhängig sind. Die Repräsentation von Ökosystemen durch abstrakte
Zustände, die durch eine externe Parameter-Zeit aktualisiert werden, würde diese Systeme
theoretisch und praktisch verfügbar machen. Nach dieser Lesart bezögen sich dynamische
Simulationsmodelle auf vorgängige ´natürliche Arten´, wie bestimmte Ökosystemtypen oder
bestimmte Prozesse (z.B. Stickstoffkreislauf in Ackerböden), die vom konkreten Standort mit
seiner Geschichte abstrahierbar wären. Diese Sichtweise steht im Widerspruch zu einer
prozessualen Auffassung von Ökosystemen, wie sie von einigen Ökologen vertreten wird.
Demnach wären Ökosysteme notwendigerweise als geschichtliche Systeme zu beschreiben
(Hauhs & al. 1996a), die nicht auf irgendeine Form von Gleichgewichts- oder
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Klimaxzustände zusteuern (Hauhs & al. 2000, Lange 1998, Lange 1999) und die folglich nur
schwerlich vorgängigen natürlichen Arten zuordenbar wären.
Aus Abstraktionen erfährt man nichts über das konkrete Verhalten konkreter Systeme. Zwar
ließen sich Parametrisierung und Kalibrierung von Simulationsmodellen als Anpassung eines
abstrakten Systems an konkrete, lokale Bedingungen interpretieren. Der fiktionale Charakter
vieler Parameter macht die Kalibrierung jedoch zu einer bloßen ´Fitting Exercise´, die wenig
zum Verständnis und zur Prognose des konkreten Systems beiträgt.
Mit zunehmender Fiktionalisierung werden Simulationsmodelle zu bloßen Kalkülen, die
aufgrund ihrer mathematischen Eigenschaften eine hohe Anpasssungsfähigkeit an bestimmte
Datensätze aufweisen. Der Anspruch, daß sich das betreffende Modell auf eine empirische
Realität beziehe, wird gar nicht mehr erhoben, so z.B. wenn Kastel et & al. (2000) die
Verwendung eines bestimmten Ausbreitungsmodells mit den folgenden Worten begründen:
"Our choice for this model does not imply that the mobile-immobile model is a valid process
model...We choose it merely for its capacity to fit the measured breakthrough curve...".
Tatsächlich haben die Parameter in diesem (mit nur zwei Parametern bereits
überparametrisierten) Modell keine identifizierbare physikalische Bedeutung (Lange 1998).
Hier wird nicht vorgegeben, das Modell bilde reale Strukturen oder Prozesse ab, es geht nur
noch um die Auswahl eines geeigneten Kalküls; die Simulation macht sich unabhängig von
der Struktur der materiellen Welt.
6. Simulation
Simulationen sind nicht auf die Umweltwissenschaften beschränkt. Im postmodernen Denken
von Jean Baudrillard ist Simulation als gesellschaftliche Entwicklungsstufe skizziert worden,
in der Zeichenwelten an die Stelle konkreter Realität treten: Zeichenwelten oder
Simulationen, die keine Referenz mehr zu Objekten in der Wirklichkeit haben (Baudrillard
1978, S. 14). Baudrillard unterscheidet drei historische Stufen der Abbildung bzw. der
Simulakra: Die Repräsentation, die noch vom Prinzip der Äquivalenz von Zeichen und
Referent geprägt ist; die Produktion, in der das Zeichen den Referent ersetzt; die Simulation,
in der Zeichenwelten entstehen, die über keinen Referenten mehr verfügen (Baudrillard 1982,
Baudrillard 1991, S. 17). Simulation ist "jener unwiderstehliche Ablauf, bei dem die Dinge so
miteinander verkettet werden, als ob sie einen Sinn hätten, während sie eigentlich nur durch
eine künstliche Montage und durch den Unsinn organisiert werden“ (Baudrillard 1994, S. 29).
Die Sprache der Simulation ist der Code, "die ´mystische Eleganz des Binärsystems von Null
und Eins´" (Baudrillard 1982, S. 91). Binäre Kodierung als alle Repräsentationen leitendes
Prinzip folge der "irrwitzigen Illusion, die Welt unter einem Prinzip vereinen zu können"
(Baudrillard 1982, S. 93).
Ich teile zwar Latours Kritik an einem Postmodernismus, der jede empirische Arbeit als
Illusion und Szientismus verwirft (Latour 1998, S. 65) und für den "alles Trugbild, alles
schillerndes Zeichen" ist (Latour 1998, S. 175). Die nicht unübliche Praxis einer Validierung
von Simulationsmodellen mit Simulationsmodellen (z.B. Klimamodelle; siehe Rastetter
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(1996) für eine kritische Diskussion) und der Einsatz von Simulationsmodellen bei der
Entscheidungsunterstützung (Haag & al. eingereicht) lassen es dennoch angeraten scheinen,
zu prüfen, ob und wie sich "das geschlossene System...vor dem Referenten" schützt
(Baudrillard 1982, S. 117). Fruchtbarer noch wäre es vielleicht nach Vorbildern und
Möglichkeiten zu suchen, wie ´Bodenhaftung´ bzw. Kongruenz zwischen Modell und
Original/Realität hergestellt werden kann. Auf eine solche Suche begeben wir uns im
Folgenden.
7. Anpassung der Realität an das Modell oder Anpassung des Modells an die Realität?
Was die mathematischen Zeichen und Verknüpfungen formaler Systeme und Modelle
bedeuten und worauf sie sich genau beziehen ist schwer zu bestimmen (siehe auch die
analogen, unfruchtbaren Bemühungen der Begriffsanalyse (Stich 2000). Anders gesagt: "The
notion that representations correspond to things, processes or relationships is easy to state but
notoriously difficult to justify (Gooding & al. 1989, S. 14). Daß sich die Zeichen aber auf
etwas Reales beziehen, zeigt sich da, wo Modelle einen erfolgreichen Umgang mit
natürlichen Systemen ermöglichen. Vorhersagbarkeit und regelhaftes Verhalten als
Bedingungen eines erfolgreichen Umgangs mit natürlichen Systemen sind jedoch an ein
stabiles Setting gebunden: "What a system does depends on the setting, and the kinds of
settings necessary for it to produce systematic and predictable results are very exceptional"
(Cartwright 1999, S. 73). Regelhaftes Verhalten wird durch ein bestimmtes, stabiles Setting,
eine „nomologische Maschine“ bewirkt (Abb. D.2), in der bestimmte Komponenten mit
bestimmten kausalen Kapazitäten in einer bestimmten Weise verknüpft und angeordnet sind
und die gegenüber der Umwelt und ihren Störeinflüssen abgeschirmt ist (Cartwright 1999).
´Von Natur aus´ stabile Settings und ´natürliche´ nomologische Maschinen existieren zwar, so
z.B. in der Astronomie, sie werden jedoch nur selten vorgefunden. Für ein stabiles Setting läßt
sich das Systemverhalten durch bloß phänomenologische oder Korrelationsmodelle - auch
ohne oder mit ´falschem´ Realitätsbezug - simulieren und prognostizieren; die babylonischen
Astronomie ist ein Beispiel (Toulmin 1981).
Die meisten Systeme und Settings sind jedoch instabil. Dies gilt insbesondere für
Ökosysteme, die sich selbst modifizieren und die individuellen Entwicklungspfaden folgen.
Wenn stabile Settings so selten sind, wie kann es überhaupt so etwas wie Prognose und
erfolgreichen Umgang mit natürlichen Systemen geben? Die Bedingungen für
Vorhersagbarkeit und für einen erfolgreichen Umgang müssen in den meisten Fällen erst
fabriziert werden, wie Cartwright (1999), Hacking (1992 & 1996) und Latour (1994)
nahelegen. Natürliche Systeme müssen nach dem Vorbild geschlossener Experimental- und
Modellsysteme umgestaltet, modelliert werden: "We remake little bits of our environment so
that they reproduce phenomena first generated in a pure state in the laboratory." (Hacking
1992, S. 59). Bei der Frage, "how to transform the farm into a laboratory" (Latour 1994, S.
249), dienen Modelle als Blaupausen zur (Um-)Gestaltung des Settings; Ziel ist es dabei, eine
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nomologische Maschine, d.h. ein System mit bestimmten und stabilem Setting herzustellen,
die zu regulärem und vorhersehbarem Verhalten führt (Cartwright 1999, S. 58).
Abbildung D.2.: Nomologische Maschine. Die Verknüpfung bestimmter Elemente mit
bestimmten kausalen Kapazitäten führt zu regelhaftem Verhalten. Bei Kenntnis der
nomologischen Maschine, läßt sich z.B. die Zahl von Kugeln in Eimer 2 prognostizieren (in
Anlehnung an Cartwright, 1999).
Hier spiegeln sich der konstruktive und technische Charakter (Janich 1992, S. 197-213) und
das Verum-factum-Prinzip (Hösle 1990) moderner Naturwissenschaft wider, demzufolge
Wahrheit und Verstehen nur mit Bezug auf vom Menschen geschaffene Systeme möglich
sind. Die Verzahnung von Naturwissenschaft und Technik in der experimentellen Praxis
(Hacking 1996) macht naturwissenschaftliches Wissen zu Bewirkungswissen (d.h. zu
pragmatischem Wissen, mit dem sich in der materiellen Welt beobachtbare Wirkungen
herbeiführen lassen) und Naturwissenschaften zu technischem Know-how (Janich 1992, S.
201).
Simulationsmodelle aber sind schlechte Blaupausen zur Stabilisierung von Settings und zur
Konstruktion nomologischer Maschinen. Während Experimentalsysteme auch technisch-
materiell geschlossen sind (Haag & al. eingereicht; Radder 1986) und ihre technische
Realisation damit vorgezeichnet ist (Hoyningen-Huene 1989), beschränken sich
Simulationsmodelle auf konzeptionelle Schließung, haben nur einen geringen Bezug zur
materiellen Realität und sind technisch nicht zu realisieren. Der immaterielle, untechnische
und fiktionale Charakter von Simulationsmodellen macht sie als Blaupausen für den Bau
nomologischer Maschinen ungeeignet. Welchen Beitrag sollten z.B. die Parameter aus
Tabelle D.1 zur zielgerichteten Intervention in das System und zur pragmatischen
1
2
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Umgestaltung des Settings leisten? Der mangelnde Erfolg von Simulationsmodellen läßt sich
m.E. darauf zurückführen, daß Simulationsmodelle als ´Fitting Machines´ nur lose an die
Realität angepaßt werden, während im Falle erfolgreicher nomologischer Maschinen die
Realität in einem aufwendigen Prozeß an das Modell angepaßt wird.
8. Schlußfolgerungen
In dynamischen Systemen, die vielen Simulationsmodellen zugrunde liegen, werden
Ökosysteme digitalisiert, auf syntaktische Information reduziert und berechenbar gemacht. Es
spricht wenig gegen den Versuch, Ökosysteme so zu betrachten als wären sie kybernetische
Maschinen und den heuristischen Wert eines solchen Unterfangens zu prüfen. Ich halten es
jedoch für kritikwürdig, wenn solche Modelle zu Wesenbestimmungen ihrer
Erkennntnisgegenstände erklärt werden. Denn damit wird erstens impliziert, daß dynamische
Simulationsmodelle das Original realistisch abbilden. Aufgrund des offenen,
selbstmodifizierenden Charakters von Ökosystemen ist dies jedoch nicht der Fall. Zweitens
wird suggeriert, daß Simulationsmodelle Prognose und Management und mithin einen
erfolgreichen Umgang mit Ökosystemen ermöglichen oder zukünftig ermöglichen werden.
Ihre Prognosekraft ist in den unstabilen Settings von Ökosystemen jedoch aus
grundsätzlichen Gründen begrenzt (Haag & al. 2000) und als Vorbilder zur Konstruktion
stabiler, sich regelhaft verhaltender Systeme sind sie nur bedingt tauglich. Wenn
Simulationsmodelle zur Entscheidungsunterstützung verwendet werden, so besteht (wie im
Fall des havarierten Tankers ´Erika´, s.o.) tatsächlich die Gefahr, daß die Realität hinter die
Simulation zurücktritt, wenngleich die Auswirkungen von Entscheidungen, die auf
Simulation fußen, höchst real sind.
Die Rolle von Simulationsmodellen verlangt vielleicht nach einer Neubestimmung: Als
heuristische Instrumente, als Synthesemethode und als Katalysatoren von Lern- und
Kommunikationsprozessen erfüllen sie eine nützliche Funktion bei der Organisation von
wissenschaftlichem und nicht-wissenschaftlichem Wissen. Nicht als Repräsentationen,
sondern als heuristische Instrumente konzipiert, könnten Sie u.U. einen Beitrag bei der
Unterscheidung von stabilen und instabilen Systemaspekten und bei der Suche nach Mustern
für stabile Mensch-Umwelt-Interaktionen leisten.
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Endnoten
1
 Der Duden definiert ´simulieren´ noch 1963 ausschließlich als "[eine Krankheit] vortäuschen; sich
verstellen“.
2
 In der VDI-Richtlinie 3633 heißt es zur Simulation: Nachbildung eines dynamischen Prozesses in
einem Modell, um zu Erkenntnissen zu gelangen, die auf die Wirklichkeit übertragbar sind.
3
 Bei Lambel & al. (2000) heißt es im Original: "Hélas, les autorités étaient déjà trop engagées dans
une logique où le suivi des prévisions primait sur l'observation". Ich übersetze als: ´Leider waren die
Behörden schon zu sehr einer Logik verhaftet, die die Befolgung der Vorhersage über die
Beobachtung stellte.´
4
 Ich gehe hier davon aus, daß die Annahme, die Natur spreche die Sprache der Mathematik bzw. sei
mathematisch, metaphysisch ist. Diese Annahme mag fruchtbar sein und es spricht zunächst wenig
dagegen, Ökosysteme z.B. so zu betrachten als wären sie dynamische Systeme. Damit ist aber nicht
gesagt, daß Ökosysteme ihrer Natur nach durch mathematische Zusammenhänge strukturiert sind.
5
 Bereits vorsokratische Naturphilosophen wie Parmenides und Heraklit zettelten diese Diskussion an,
in der Heraklit die Position vertritt, daß die Welt in ständigem Werden begriffen ist und "Zeit ein
irreversibler Ablauf wie der Strom eines Flusses". Dagegen glaubt Parmenides, daß jede Veränderung
nur scheinbar ist und "Zeit ein reversibler Parameter einer an sich unveränderlichen Welt." (Mainzer
1995, S. 7). Die moderne Dominanz des (platonischen) "Seins" ist ein historischer Zufall (Longo
1994); in jüngster Zeit hat neben Kampis (1991) z.B. Prigogine (1988) versucht das Gleichgewicht
zum "Werden" zu verschieben.
6
 Die Abstraktion dynamischer Systeme folgt hier einem physikalischen Leitbild: "Zu jedem Zeitpunkt
war die Physik strukturell eingeteilt in zwei grundsätzlich verschiedene Teile: in den dynamischen und
in den kontingenten. Zu jedem Zeitpunkt konnte man einen bestimmten Teil der Phänomene durch
Gesetze erklären, und der andere Teil blieb einfach übrig als Anfangsbedingung oder freier
Parameter." Naturwissenschaft könnte man demnach als diesen "Versuch einer Reduktion von
Kontingenz" (Kanitscheider 1999) charakterisieren.
7
 In der Zeit, in der das System kodiert wird, d.h. konzeptionell fixiert und von den Quellen von
Neuheit abgetrennt wird (off-line System), läuft das Original-System weiter und produziert neue
Variablen (on-line System).
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E. Paradigmen für eine nachhaltige Landnutzung: Dynamische versus
selbstmodifizierende Systeme?
1. Einführung
Ökologie, Ökonomie und Sozialwissenschaften fassen ihre Untersuchungsobjekte in aller
Regel als komplexe Systeme auf, zu deren Behandlung auf der Theorieebene Systemansätze
und auf der Objekt- und Umsetzungsebene (Simulations-)Modelle Anwendung finden.
Dynamische Systeme dienen dabei als Paradigma zur Abbildung dieser Systeme. Im Rahmen
der Debatte um die ökologischen und ökonomischen Dimensionen der "Nachhaltigkeit" (als
einem gesellschaftlich-politischen Leitbild) spielen solche Modelle eine wichtige Rolle: Sie
dienen der Prognose möglicher zukünftiger Entwicklungen und damit der Abschätzung der
ökologischen und ökonomischen Risiken, die aus bestimmten (gesellschaftlichen)
Handlungen resultieren. Gerade im Bereich großer (zeitlicher und räumlicher Skalen) scheint
uns das dynamische Systemparadigma aber nicht angemessen, sondern ist durch die
Vorstellung von selbstmodifizierenden Systemen zu ersetzen, deren Verhalten prinzipiell
nicht vorhersagbar ist. Während z.B. bei globalen Umweltänderungen einerseits Unsicherheit
und Ungewißheit zunehmen, steigt andererseits zugleich der Einsatz, der auf dem
gesellschaftlichen Spiel steht. Ein post-normales Wissenschafts(selbst)verständnis, das die
eigenen Beschränkungen anerkennt, scheint solchen Fragestellungen eher gewachsen, als die
herkömmliche normale Wissenschaft.
2. Dynamische Systeme
Im Zentrum dynamischer Systeme steht die Vorstellung eines abstrakten Systemzustandes
("state") als der Gesamtheit aller Zustände eines Systems zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt. Die
Zustände werden repräsentiert durch Zustandsvariablen, die die gesamte für einen Prozess
wichtige Information enthalten. Mögliche Zustände werden in einem abstrakten
Zustandsraum mit einer definierten Zahl von Freiheitsgraden ("Variablen") realisiert. Die Zeit
wird dabei als externer Parameter betrachtet, der mittels einer Überführungsfunktion die
Zustände aktualisiert und das System auf eine Bahn (Trakjektorie) durch den Zustandsraum
schickt. Zeit wird demnach als skalare, universelle, systemexterne und im Prinzip reversible
Größe aufgefasst: Die Wirkung der Zeit kann durch die Anwendung der zeitlichen
Entwicklungsfunktion "ungeschehen" gemacht werden, d.h. aus dem gegenwärtigen
Systemzustand kann man vergangene wie auch zukünftige Systemzustände errechnen.
Dynamische Systeme lehnen sich damit an ein klassisches, Newton´sches Paradigma an, das
ausgeht von einem linearen und starken Kausalitätsbegriff, einer skalaren, universellen Zeit
und analytisch definierten, geschlossenen Systemen, die durch externe Faktoren und
Randbedingungen gesteuert werden und deren Dynamik durch Trajektorien abgebildet wird
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(Paslack, 1991). Die klassischen Prinzipien der Lokalität, Determiniertheit und der
Vorhersagbarkeit werden nicht verletzt (Kornwachs and Lucadou, 1984).
Ein solcher Ansatz hat sich als erfolgreich für technische und (manipulierte) physikalische
Systeme erwiesen, in denen insbesondere die Zahl der Freiheitsgrade als bekannt und fix
vorausgesetzt werden kann.
3. Sind Ökosysteme dynamische Systeme?
In der ökologischen Modellbildung werden Ökosysteme unter zwei verschiedenen
Perspektiven konstituiert, einer biotisch-synökologischen und einer abiotisch-
biogeochemischen Perspektive (Allen and Hoekstra, 1992). Der biogeochemische "Teil" läßt
sich dann als Stoffhaushalt eines Ökosystems in einem dynamischen System abbilden.
Besonderes Augenmerk ist dabei auf folgende Punkte zu richten:
• Systemstruktur: Prozessbeschreibungen, die zumeist auf reduktionistischem Wege für
kleine Skalen ("Labor") gewonnenen worden sind, müssen in eine Systemstruktur
überführt werden, in der Subsysteme und Elemente auf eine ganz bestimmte Weise
verbunden sind. Die Auswahl "relevanter" Prozesse und ihre Kombination bleibt dabei
dem Modellkonstrukteur überlassen. Die zeitliche Dynamik der Systemstruktur selbst
(Systeme zweiter Art) wird i.d.R. nicht berücksichtigt, d.h. die Systemstruktur wird als
stabil betrachtet (System erster Art).
• Variablen: Welches Set von Variablen notwendig bzw. hinreichend ist, um einen
bestimmten Bereich von Phänomenen abzubilden ist a prior kaum zu beantworten.
• Parameter: Räumliche Strukturen auf verschiedenen Skalenebenen determinieren Prozesse
und ihre Parameter (z.B. bevorzugte Fließwege, Leitfähigkeitsparameter, hot spots der
Denitrifikation). Die Identifizierbarkeit der Modell-Parameter im realen System ist in
einem heterogenen Medium nicht gewährleistet, da eine a priori Identifikation von
Parameterfunktionen nicht stattfindet und sich räumlich verteilte Parameterfunktionen
durch Messungen nur bedingt eingeschränken lassen. Modelle sind meist
überparametrisiert, ihre Kalibrierung wird zur "fitting exercise. Die zur Kalibrierung
benutzten Daten entstammen dabei meist kurzen Datensets, die die Spannbreite
ökosystemarer Phänomene nicht abdecken (Oreskes et al., 1994). Damit sind Modelle von
vorneherein nur innerhalb eines bestimmten Bereichs von Umweltbedingungen valide.
Wann dieser Geltungsbereich verlassen wird (z.B. aufgrund extremer Wetterereignisse
oder langfristiger Veränderungen) läßt sich nicht a priori bestimmen.
• Anfangsbedingungen repräsentieren den Zustand des Systems zur Zeit t=0. Die
Systemgeschichte wird dabei abgeschnitten bzw. in den Anfangszustand, d.h. in die
Struktur und die Variablen des Systems verlegt. Sensitivität bezüglich der
Anfangsbedingungen ist ein eigenes Problem ("deterministisches Chaos").
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Die Annahme einer determinierten Zahl von Freiheitsgraden und einer stabilen
Systemstruktur bei der Abbildung von Ökosystemen als dynamischen Systemen ist
problematisch: Ökosysteme zeichnen sich gerade durch die zeitliche Dynamik von
Freiheitsgraden (Lange, 1998) und Systemstrukturen aus, z.B. durch Zu-/Abgänge von
Organismen.
Der jeweilige Modellzweck ist entscheidend für die Validität des Modells (Martin, 1996),
insbesondere ist zu unterscheiden zwischen Modellen als heuristischen und als prognostischen
Instrumenten (Toulmin, 1981). Dazu korrespondiert einerseits eine konzeptionelle
Validierung, die sich mit den Lücken auf der Ebene der ökologischen Theorie konfrontiert
sieht, andererseits eine operationale Validierung (Rykiel, 1996), die die prognostische
Tauglichkeit überprüft. Die operationale Validierung durch Vergleich mit gemessenen
(kurzfristigen) Datensets bzw. mit dem Output anderer Modelle, hat einer Reihe von
Modellen begrenzte Prognosefähigkeit attestiert. Langfristige und großskalige Prognosen
entziehen sich einer operationalen Validierung, damit werden z.B. globale Klimaänderungen
zu einer transwissenschaftlichen Frage (Rastetter, 1996). Eine echte Verifizierung
geowissenschaftlicher Modelle ist ohnehin nicht möglich (Oreskes et al., 1994). Wo aber
Modelle nur in loser Beziehung zur materialen Welt stehen, besteht die Gefahr, daß die
Modelle und ihre Ergebnisse einen virtuellen Raum aufspannen, in dem sich post-moderner
Beliebigkeit ohne klare empirische Korrektive entfalten kann. Modelle bilden aber oft die
Grundlage für Entscheidungen, die reale Konsequenzen in der "realen Welt" haben (Philip,
1991).
4. Selbstmodifizierende Systeme
Über kurze Zeiträume mag das Paradigma des dynamischen Systems angemessen zur
Repräsentation natürlicher komplexer Systeme sein. Betrachtet man dagegen längere
Zeiträume (wie im Rahmen von Risikoanalysen), so ist der systeminternen Produktion von
Neuheit bzw. Erstmaligkeit (Weizsäcker, 1974) in und der Selbstorganisation von komplexen
Systemen Rechnung zu tragen. Als "anschauliches" Paradigma bieten sich
selbstmodifizierende Komponentensysteme an, die folgende Eigenschaften besitzen (Kampis,
1992a, Kampis, 1992b, Kampis, 1994):
¾ Zahl und Art der Komponenten sind im Prinzip unbegrenzt
¾ Das System zerstört und produziert (auch unter Normalbedingungen) ständig
Komponenten
Dadurch werden beständig neue Variablen produziert, die nur a posteriori definierbar sind.
Kein dynamisches System kann der Komplexität dieser zeitlichen Produktion von Variablen
gerecht werden (Kampis, 1994). Charakteristsiche Unterschiede zwischen dem klassisch-
essentialistischen Paradigma und dem Selbstmodifikationsparadigma sind in Tabelle E.1.
dargestellt. Selbstmodifizierende Systeme sind weder berechenbar noch vorhersagbar. Bei
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langfristigen Betrachtungen nehmen damit Unsicherheiten und Ungewißheit in erheblichem
Maße zu. Diese Ungewißheit ist nicht technischer oder methodologischer (d.h. durch bessere
Modelle behebbar), sondern epistemologischer Natur.
Tabelle E.1. Klassisches Paradigma versus Selbstorganisation/-modifikation (in Anlehnung
an Kampis, 1994, Müller, 1997, Paslack, 1991, Röling, 1996)
Klassisch-essentialistisch Selbstorganisation
System Analytisch definiert, Geschlossen
Vorgegebene Hierarchie
Realistisch definiert, Offen
Selbsterzeugte Hierarchie
Umwelt Regelung extern Regelung intern
Komplexität Konstant Veränderlich
"Ontologie" Eigenschaften
Zustand ("state")
Relationen
Konfluenzen ("confluences")
Dynamik Reversible Trajektorie
Kontinuität
Irreversiblere Prozess
Bifurkation
Kausalität Stark, linear, direkt
Transparent
Schwach, zirkulär, indirekt
Opak
Gesetz/Generalisierung Regularität Singularität
Zeitbegriff Skalare, universelle Zeit Systemzeit (Endozeit)
Epistemologie Positivistisch/realistisch
Privilegierter Beobachter
Exoperspektive/-physik
Konstruktivistisch
Beobachterperspektiven
Endoperspektive/-physik
Wahrheitsbegriff Objektiv Pluralität von Perspektiven
Algorithmisierung Berechenbar Nicht-berechnenbar
Prognose Vorhersagbar Nicht vorhersagbar
5. Post-normale Wissenschaft
In der normalen Wissenschaft werden Probleme in handliche, kleine Teile zerlegt ("puzzle")
und einer Lösung zugeführt (Kuhn, 1973). Werte und Normen werden ausgeklammert,
"harte" Fakten prägen das Bild. Wenn es aber um umfassendere, längerfristige oder
großräumige Weichenstellungen, also um "Nachhaltigkeit" geht, kehren sich die Verhältnisse
um: Auf der einen Seite wächst die Ungewißheit und die Fakten werden weich, auf der
anderen Seite gewinnen Werte und Normen an Bedeutung und Entscheidungen lassen es an
"Härte" gewiß nicht mangeln (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1991). Die normale Wissenschaft ist
mit ihren Mitteln hier hilflos; ein post-normales Wissenschafts(selbst)verständnis (Funtowicz
and Ravetz, 1993, Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1991, Westra, 1997) erkennt dagegen die
Komplexität der interagierenden natürlichen (Kay and Schneider, 1995) und sozialen System
und die damit einhergehende Ungewißheit an. Post-normale Wissenschaft läßt sich wie folgt
charakterisieren:
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• Das klassisch-essentialistische Newton´sche Paradigma wird durch das Paradigma der
Selbstorganisation bzw. der selbstmodifizierenden Systeme ersetzt. Komplexe natürliche
(Ökosysteme) und gesellschaftliche System verfügen über das Potential, unterschiedlichen
Entwicklungspfaden zu verfolgen, die nicht vorhersehbar sind.
• Ein privilegierter, einzig-objektiver wissenschaftlicher Zugang, weicht einer Pluralität von
legitimen, nicht-äquivalenten Perspektiven. Biologische (und gesellschaftliche) Systeme
sind insofern komplex, als sie sich nicht mehr durch eine Theorie oder Disziplin
beschreiben lasssen (Kornwachs and Lucadou, 1984); die Zahl an nicht-äquivalenten
Beschreibungen läßt sich als ein Indikator für Komplexität betrachten (Casti, 1986).
• Werte und Normen gewinnen an Bedeutung - auf der Ebene der Beobachtung (die von
Theorien und von Interessen geleitet ist), auf der Ebene der Bewertung von Risiko und
Ungewißheit und bei der Abschätzung und Bewertung möglicher Handlungsfolgen. Je
größer die Ungewißheit wird und je mehr auf dem Spiel steht, desto mehr treten
naturwissenschaftlich-technische Zugänge in den Hintergrund, während
Wissensansprüche immer auf sozialen Konstruktionen fußen (Rosa, 1998). Wissenschaft
wird zum aktiven Partner in der sozialen Konstruktion von Realität (Röling, 1996).
Abbildung E.1. Post-normale Wissenschaft im Verhältnis zu angewandter Wissenschaft und
professioneller Beratung (nach Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1991 & 1993).
Die Einbeziehung der verschiedenen Stakeholder in den (wissenschaftlichen) Dialog wird bei
post-normalen (und zunächst nur dort!) nötig, die scientific community wird erweitert
("extended peer community") und "demokratisisert". An die Stelle einer instrumentellen und
strategischen Rationalität, die die Vorstellung von der (top-down) Diffusion
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wissenschaftlichen Wissens in die Lebenswelt prägt, tritt eine kommunikative Rationalität
(Habermas, 1997, Röling and Jiggins, 1994).
Die Vorstellung, das Verhalten von Ökosystemen auf verschiedenen Skalenebenen zu
prognostizieren und nach Maßgabe gesellschaftlicher Kriterien zu regulieren
("Ökosystemingenieur") steht weder im Einklang mit einem solchen post-normalen
Wissenschaftverständnis noch mit dem Vorsorgeprinzip (Perrings, 1991, Westra, 1997).
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Fromme Wünsche
Mögen alle Schlüssel doch
Flugs verlorengehen
Und in jedem Schlüsselloch
Sich der Dietrich drehen! -
Also denkt zu jeder Frist
Jeder, der - ein Dietrich ist.
Friedrich Nietzsche - Fröhliche Wissenschaft
Damit ist ferner klar, daß die Wissenschaft an einer
Weltkonstruktion arbeitet, die durch ihre Unterscheidungen, aber
nicht durch die Welt an sich, gedeckt ist.
Niklas Luhmann - Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft
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F. Parameters, prediction, post-normal science and the precautionary
principle
A roadmap for modelling for decision-making
Abstract
In the wake of the "discovery of complexity", dynamical simulation models have become
widespread, guiding human interaction with complex systems, e.g. in ecosystem management,
environmental decision-making and risk assessment. Any model establishes a reading frame
for ecological phenomena or systems, determining the parameters which are assumed to be
adequate for the encoding of ecological phenomena. Departing from a definition of
observation as the operation of distinguishing and designating and as the application of certain
distinctions to complex phenomena, we analyze the construction of reading frames. As
dynamical systems are the prevalent paradigm and reading frame for ecosystems, we describe
the sequence of distinctions and selections by which scientists encode ecosystems into formal,
dynamical system representations. Major shortcomings of the dynamical system paradigm are
highlighted: Dynamical systems are conceptually closed systems requiring a fixed set of a
priori defined parameters, part of which are parameters of convenience satisfying
mathematical needs and part of which are residual parameters which account for noise and
system background. Ecosystems in contrast are conceived as conceptually open, self-
modifying systems, which constantly ("on-line") produce novelty and new parameters and
which cannot be severed from their environment. Although calibration may adapt models to
data sets of the past, it does not assure predictive capacity nor validity. While models serve
heuristic and theoretical functions and may outline the space of possible behavior, they may
be deficient instruments for the reduction of uncertainty as to future system behavior.
Different forms of uncertainty are at the heart of environmental decision-making, among them
epistemic uncertainty, which arises when the normal, disciplinary forms of uncertainty
reduction fail and which leads to debate on adequate ways of coping with uncertainty.
Epistemic uncertainty in environmental issues may call for a different type of science that
differs from normal, positivist science. Such post-normal science is transdisciplinary,
participative and context-sensitive in that it aims at the production of knowledge for concrete,
real-world problems. New forms of knowledge production such as the concept of post-normal
science in conjunction with the precautionary principle challenge the established authority of
science and may lead to an institutional split of science into an academic branch and a
managerial, public policy branch. Correspondingly, modelling for theoretical scientific
purposes and modelling for decision-making may follow separate paths. Modelling for
decision-making may have to take into account requests for transparency and participation
("deliberation frames analysis") and the validity of model products will be judged according
to their capacity of providing context-sensitive knowledge for specific decision problems.
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1. Introduction
Models guide the observation and representation of ecological phenomena and they guide
human interaction with ecosystems. Models of ecological phenomena cover a variety of
model types, i.e. mental models (Paton, 1993), material model systems such as mesocosms
and mathematical models ranging from statistical to functional and from phenomenological to
causal models (Wagner, 1997). A model can be defined as a material or ideal (re-)production
of an object by means of analogies realized by a cognitive subject (Ehmke, 1997),
emphasizing the role of the observer and the establishment of analogies. The referents of
models are systems, or more precisely their structure (Weinert, 1995). Models are more
specific than theory in that they make use of a limited set of concrete parameters (Weinert,
1995) and in that they apply to a smaller range of phenomena (Wagner, 1997).
Experimental model systems obey a reductionistic approach in that well-defined phenomena
are subjected to controlled experiments which contain a limited number of parameters and
which are shielded from the environment (Haag and Matschonat, submitted). Such an activity
is in line with the "puzzle" solving of "normal science"(Kuhn, 1973), i.e. the solving of
delimited and well-defined disciplinary problems.
Yet as model systems refer to idealized systems with few parameters, their contribution to the
understanding of complex emergent systems in which innumerous variables interact is limited
(Haag and Matschonat, submitted). The advent of computers and the concomitant
paradigmatic change towards complexity in recent decades (Emmeche, 1997; Hedrich, 1994)
has made complex systems tractable as computers can simultaneously handle a much higher
number of parameters. The rise of systems theory (Lilienfeld, 1978) in its ´analytical´ variant
provided the formalisms for the encoding of complex systems (Arrowsmith and Place, 1994;
Ashby, 1976; Bennet and Chorley, 1978; Bossel, 1997). Accordingly ecosystems can be
encoded into dynamical systems, which attempt to capture the essence of ecological systems.
Dynamical models have become widespread in the environmental sciences, simulating and
predicting the behavior of complex ecological systems (Diekkrüger, 1992; Gnauck, 1995;
Richter, 1994) and of the interaction of ecological and social/economic systems (Costanza et
al., 1993; Underdal, 1997; Underdal, 1998). Dynamical simulation models are employed for
all types of environmental prediction, management and regulatory issues (Oreskes, 1998) on
all scales, e.g. from the local scale as in models for nutrient (Addiscott, 1995; de Willigen,
1991) or pesticide fate (Calvet, 1995; Wagenet and Rao, 1990) in agricultural soil, to the
regional scale as in watershed management models (Young et al., 1989) and to the global
scale as in climate change models (Rastetter, 1996). Simulations and scenarios frequently are
used in ecosystem management, risk assessment and decision making.
Dynamical simulation models have been criticized in recent years on the grounds that the
paradigm of the dynamical system was not adequate for the representation of ecological
systems (Haag and Kaupenjohann, 2000; Kampis, 1991; Lange, 1998), and that dynamical
models were incapable of non-trivial predictions (Hauhs et al., 1996). As tools in decision-
making simulation models were black boxes, opaque to outsiders and would follow an
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exclusively scientific-technical rationale (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1992; Rosa, 1998) imposing
instrumental rationality in what should be a participative decision process (Renn et al., 1995;
Stern and Fineberg, 1996b; Webler, 1999).
In this paper we critically analyze the conceptual underpinning of dynamical system
modelling and the role of simulation models in environmental science and decision making.
Based on the dichotomies of dynamical systems/self-modifying systems (Kampis, 1991) and
of normal science/post-normal science (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993b), we ask how it is
possible to arrive at valid frames of observation for complex systems, i.e. frames which are
valid from a scientific perspective (representation function) and a societal perspective
(management function). Firstly, we analyze the role of observation in the framing of complex
systems, drawing on constructivist systems theory for cognitive (Maturana and Varela, 1980;
Maturana and Varela, 1987) and social systems (Luhmann, 1995). Secondly, the sequence of
distinctions and selections is described by which scientists abstract and encode ecosystems
into dynamical systems. Thirdly, we highlight major shortcomings of dynamical systems and
their relation to uncertainty. Fourthly, the conventional "normal" image of science is
confronted with "post-normal" issues in which epistemic uncertainty calls for the
communicative opening of science. Finally, we depict possible consequences for (simulation)
modelling for decision-making which arise from a post-normal image of science.
2. Observation and the construction of reading frames
When constructing models of ecosystems, scientists face a frame problem: specific
parameters have to be chosen and some functional or structural relationship between these
parameters has to be expressed (Weinert, 1995) to represent a given domain of phenomena. A
parameter is conceived here as an objective-real entity or factor, which influences a given
material phenomenon causing concrete effects (Franz, 1997). As the term parameter
encompasses variables and constants (parameters sensu stricto) and as it depends on temporal
boundaries and experimental conditions whether parameter values are constant or vary, we
use the terms parameter and variable interchangeably.
The material object under study contains an unlimited number of variables; therefor scientists
need to select a list of variables, the system, which accounts for the determinate behavior of
the system (Ashby, 1976, p. 40). The construction of a reading frame for a model is not only
driven by the system under study, but also by pragmatic features related to the interests of the
model builder and the purpose for which the model is built (Stachowiak, 1983, pp. 132).
Prior to observation and distinctions, the world is unmarked, i.e. noise to an observer devoid
of distinctions. To observe anything we have to draw distinctions (Spencer-Brown, 1972). We
return to this point, when discussing the encoding of ecosystems (see fig. F.1). Observation
can be defined formally as the operation of distinguishing and designating (Luhmann, 1994,
p. 73). Basic distinctions like identity/difference and system/environment enable self-
referential systems to stand out from and to observe their environment. Such systems can be
natural systems (e.g. an organism), cognitive systems (e.g. a scientist) or social systems (e.g.
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the scientific system), which observe their environment based on distinctions. Thereby
observation uses its distinctions as blind spots: It can only see what it can see with the help of
these distinctions; it can not see -what it can not see (Luhmann, 1994, p. 85). As we draw
distinctions, marked spaces emerge from the original unmarked space. The marked space
relegates noise, background and contingent aspects to the unmarked space, a sort of residue
which is not further differentiated.
Observing ecosystems scientifically, we apply a series of distinctions ranging from the basic
to the specific. The identity/difference and system/environment distinction is the basis for
constructing classes of phenomena and of systems such as organisms, populations or
ecosystems. More specific distinctions such as producers/consumers or herbivore/carnivore
lead to a ever more differentiated model of an ecosystem. Different distinctions and the
corresponding blind spots lead to different models of the same material system, e.g. the
distinctions of a system ecologist and a population ecologist lead to different system
reconstructions (O´Neill et al., 1986) which may be incommensurable. The marked space of
the system ecologist consists of systems, subsystems, relations, compartments, pools, fluxes
etc. and differs notably from the marked space of the population ecologist, who does not even
consider ecosystems as systems, but as contingent sets of organisms (Trepl, 1988).
Scientific observation and knowledge have particular features: Firstly, whereas daily life or
object knowledge does not differentiate between a statement and its truth, scientific
knowledge resides on second order observation, in that what has been observed is not true per
se but is in turn observed with a true/not-true distinction (Luhmann, 1994). Science thus tries
to become aware of its black spots; e.g. when discussing experimental results we focus on
black spots arising from the application of a certain method or theory and the corresponding
distinctions. Secondly, science has a preference for novelty; new and abstract scientific
knowledge does not conform straightforwardly to the requirements of context-dependent
decision-making outside the scientific system. Thirdly, the scientific code of truth/non-truth
can not be used to select action (Luhmann, 1990, p. 157). Scientific knowledge thus does not
aim at action and implementation, as novel knowledge usually is not actionable and, even
more important, as the truth of a statement says little about its desirability and applicability to
non-laboratory, real-world conditions. The distinctions of science thus are not made to decide
how to interact with and manage ecological or ecological-economic systems.
In a functionally differentiated society, numerous societal systems and subsystems exist,
which perform determined functions in an exclusive way and which apply specific codes and
distinctions; e.g. in the economic system the basic code is solvency/non-solvency and in the
juridical system the code is lawfulness/non-lawfulness (Luhmann, 1995). Different codes and
sets of distinctions form different perspectives. When it comes to environmental decision-
making, different scientific disciplines and different stakeholders or social sub-/systems
organize their observation of the environment in accord with their specific codes, distinctions,
values and norms, giving rise to non-equivalent or even incommensurable descriptions of
complex ecological or ecological-economic systems. Systems have been termed complex in
case that a single discipline or perspective does not suffice to describe them (Kornwachs and
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Lucadou, 1984). This corresponds to the notion of descriptive complexity, which refers to the
relation between an observer and a system (Hauhs and Lange, 1996b). When observing
descriptively complex systems the perception of risk becomes multidimensional, value-laden
and frame-sensitive (Kunreuther and Slowic, 1996).
3. Encoding of ecosystems into dynamical systems
Scientific observers use specific distinctions to encode natural phenomena and systems into
formal systems, i.e. by choosing and formally relating certain parameters. Dynamical systems
are the paradigm for the encoding of ecosystems. "A dynamical system is one whose state
changes with time" (Arrowsmith and Place, 1994, p. 1). In the following the encoding
procedure is illustrated, in which the modeler faces a sequence of decisions, i.e. theoretical
distinctions and actual selections among a range of possible selections (Knorr-Cetina, 1991,
pp. 26-27).
The original unmarked space is disentangled step by step eventually leading to a highly
formal and abstract dynamical system employed as a reading frame for ecosystems (fig. F.1):
Into the unmarked space (fig. F.1a) distinctions are drawn, structuring the ecosystem as to its
spatial components. Applying the identity/difference distinction, scientists distinguish entities
such as species, life forms or functional groups on the basis of classification schemes. To
spatially group and relate entities, compartments such as the root zone or the leaf layer are
distinguished (fig. F.1b). Such conceptual models of ecosystems resemble snapshots of the
system focusing on spatial or more abstract structures and states. The impact of processes and
of time are envisaged as the replacement of structural elements by other structural elements or
as exchange operations among the structural elements. Accordingly, it has been claimed that
scientists acquire privileged insight into the (spatial) structure of ecosystems; users such as
foresters in contrast may have better insight into the temporal evolution of for example a
forest stand (Hauhs and Lange, 1996a).
To delimit and close the eco-system conceptually (system/environment-distinction),
boundaries are introduced (fig. F.1c). Ecosystem theory advocates boundaries which are
based on gradients and on interaction strength, with process rates declining towards the
boundaries of a system (Ahl and Allen, 1996; Müller, 1998). Yet according to such a
definition every process would require a distinct boundary; therefore boundaries usually are
conceived analytically or based on a single criterion (e.g. gradients of potential energy). The
definition of boundaries entails the definition of boundary conditions, steering input-output
behavior of the system.
Subsystems (e.g. the nitrogen cycle or the water cycle) are defined (fig. F.1d) which account
for a closed set of phenomena or processes, which demonstrate a determined input-output
behavior (e.g. input of N fertilizer and output of nitrate) and which contain a fixed number of
parameters (e.g. different pools of organic matter with different turnover rates). Relations
between the different subsystems are defined and subsystems and their relations are linked to
specific compartments and their boundaries. Interaction between subsystems and
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compartments are envisaged as input-output relationships, i.e. matter and energy are
exchanged across adjoining boundaries.
Figure F.1. Sequence of distinctions and selections leading to the abstraction of an ecosystem
and its encoding in a formal, dynamical system. For further explanation see the text.
The spatially bounded system is encoded into an abstract state which contains a number of
equations and parameters and which is taken to represent the essence of the system (fig. F.1e).
The abstract system state encompasses the totality of system states at a given time and
incorporates all the relevant information about a process´s present in a state variable (Kampis,
1994). Processes are a function of state variables and environmental input. The state is
updated by a transition function in which time serves as a parameter. According to this
Newtonian notion, time is universal, invariant, reversible, external and thus detached from the
phenomena (Drieschner, 1996; Mittelstaedt, 1980). Owing to the reversibility of time, the
effect of time can always be "undone" by the application of the time evolution function
(Kampis, 1994). Thus it is assumed that past and future system states alike can be computed if
the abstract state is known. After encoding, the behavior of the formal dynamical system can
be computed as prescribed by the theory of dynamical systems. These computations are
transferred or decoded to the material ecosystem under study and statements as to the
behavior of the ecosystem are inferred.
b ) M a rk ed  s p a ce
Id en tity /d if fe ren ce d istin ctio n
s tru c ture s
a ) U n m ark e d sp a ce
u v
c ) S y ste m -e n v iro n m e n t
d istin ctio n
B ou n da ries  & b ou n da ry
con d itio n s
d ) S ys tem  d e finitio n
 E nc o din g
• Su b sys tem s
• Re la tio n s
• Pa ra m e tersu v gf S ta te
t t
u v
e ) D y n a m ic a l s yste m
A bs trac t sta te &  e x tern al t im e
u =  vector  o f  environ m enta l
      inpu ts
v = vecto r o f  system  ou tpu ts
t  = param ete r  t im e
f  = sta te  funct ion
g  =  ou tpu t funct ion
F. Modelling for Decision-Making 118
Model building is a subjective procedure, in which every step requires judgment and
decisions, making model development ´half science, half art´ and a matter of experience
(Hoffmann, 1997; Hornung, 1996). The selections employed in the course of ecosystem
abstraction and encoding are subject to criticism precisely because they are selections, i.e.
because they include the possibility of alternative selections (Knorr-Cetina, 1981) and hence
appear as contingent). Owing to the contingent character of the selections embedded into
models, models may face critique from both scientists and laymen, when employed in the
course of decision-making.
4. Self-modifying systems versus dynamical systems
Self-modifying systems (Kampis, 1991) have been forwarded as an alternative paradigm to
dynamical systems. Self-modifying systems are component system which draw upon an open-
ended set of different types of components and which produce and destroy their own
components during their typical activities, (Kampis, 1992b). Ecosystems as self-modifying
systems produce new variables for example due to the come and go of organisms, due to new
environmental contexts, in which hidden phenotypic expressions appear or due to competition
or evolutionary processes. As self-modifying systems pick up information on-line (Kampis,
1992a), it is impossible to map all the relevant properties of the components in advance. Thus
parameters and variables are definable only a posteriori.
Dynamical and self-modifying systems are opposed in Table 1. The traditional Newtonian
paradigm is essentialist (implicit model platonism) and has established a (platonic) preference
for ´being´. Classical Newtonian systems are epistemically closed, static ´off-line´ systems
whose abstract state remains fixed and untouched by system dynamics and evolution during
the run-time of the system. The abstract state can be captured from outside, i.e. from an exo-
perspective with respect to the system. The paradigms of self-organization (Krohn et al.,
1990) and self-modification (Kampis, 1994) in contrast emphasize process, time and
´becoming´. As systems are self-referential an external point of reference is lost and the
observational frame of external observers becomes outdated, as the self-modifying on-line
system moves on.
For short time frames the dynamical system approach may be valid, but on the large scale the
dynamical exo-models break down (Kampis, 1994). On the time scales targeted by
sustainability, ecological systems may have to be conceived as self-modifying systems, as
well as the cognitive (i.e. human individuals) and social systems (e.g. the science system)
which observe and interact with them .
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Table F.1. The classical, reversible, essentialist paradigm, which dynamical systems refer to
versus self-modification as a case of original self-organization (adapted from Haag and
Kaupenjohann (2000); cf. Kampis, (1994), Paslack (1991).
Essentialism
(Reversibility)
Self-modification
(Irreversibility)
Being-Becoming Properties
States
Identity through change
Relations
Confluences
Potentiality
Objects Locally and a priori definable Globally and a posteriori
definable context- and time
dependent
Causality Transparent
Strong
Linear
Opaque
Weak
Non-linear; circular
System Dynamical systems
Analytically defined
Given hierarchy
Closed
Growing systems
Realistically defined
Self-created hierarchy
Open
Complexity Constant Variable
Environment Environment structures system
External regulation
(external drivers)
Systems structure environment
Internal regulation
Time Scalar, universal parameter time
Exo time
System time
Endo-time
Dynamics/
Development
Reversible trajectories
Continuity
Regularity
Irreversible Process
Bifurcation
Singularity
Computability Computable Non-computable
(Set not definable in advance)
5. Parameters, prediction and uncertainty
5.1. Parameters in dynamical systems?
As scientists observe the world in terms of parameters, the definition of parameters is critical.
Encoding leads to conceptually closed systems as the drawing of a marked space relegates
anything but the a priori defined set of parameters to the background of the system. Critique
of the dynamical system approach in the environmental sciences focuses on parameters:
• Many parameters are parameters of convenience as parameters are tailored to the needs of
the theory: "A model is a work of fiction. Some properties ascribed to objects in the model
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will be genuine properties of the objects modelled, but others will be merely properties of
convenience [...] to bring the objects modelled into the range of the mathematical
theory.“(Cartwright, 1983), p. 153). Thus parameters frequently lack physical meaning
and reference to reality (Haag, in press).
• The set of parameters is closed a priori. Yet ecosystems possess an infinity of parameters
and there are no theoretical grounds in ecology to distinguish the system from
noise/background (Haag and Kaupenjohann, 2000). Moreover, while the self-modifying
ecosystem constantly produces new parameters, no dynamical system can give account of
the complexity of the temporal production of variables (Kampis, 1994).
• Time is detached from the ecosystem, linearized and treated as an external parameter in
dynamical systems. However, ecosystems organize time internally (system/endo time
(Kampis, 1994; Kümmerer, 1996) and ecosystems are historical systems (Hauhs and
Lange, 1996a) with non-trivial long-range correlations (Ebeling, 1991), whose record of
past behavior determines future behavior (Foerster, 1998).
• To assure conceptual closure of the system, the parameter set is to be complete. Closure,
however, is relative to the domain of phenomena of interest and to the theory (Radder,
1986). Thus the choice of parameters is determined by the interests, the theory and the
corresponding distinctions of the respective observer. What seems a meaningful parameter
to one observer may be irrelevant to another.
5.2. Prediction, validity and reference
The parameter values of a dynamical system have to be calibrated for a specific natural
system. As many parameters are parameters of convenience lacking empirical counterparts
and as parameters in natural systems are spatially distributed and can only loosely be
restricted by measurement (Lange, 1998), models offer a high number of degrees of freedom
for calibration: Accordingly, models can be adjusted to data sets of the past. However,
calibration does not ensure predictive capacity: No data set can represent the range of
naturally occurring conditions (Konikow and Bredehoeft, 1992), so that the model is left in
the limbo, when the natural system leaves that range. Any observer´s domain of experience
encompasses only a small window of possible events, from which it is difficult to induce
future events (as in predictive modelling). Take Russel´s chicken as an illustration of the
imminence of surprise: The chicken waits eagerly for the farmer, who comes to feed her first
thing in the morning - until the unexpected day that he comes to chop off her head. In
ecology, the setting of a system may change as easily, partly invalidating past observational
data with respect to their predictive capacity. In other words: "What a system does depends on
the setting, and the kinds of settings necessary for it to produce systematic and predictable
results are very exceptional" (Cartwright, 1999). Self-modification may change the setting
and lead to fundamental non-predictability, as in the course of time the reading frame of the
dynamical model may be invalidated as new variables emerge in the real-world system.
Dynamical simulation models have accordingly been criticized for lack of empirical check
(Mac Lane, 1988), lack of reference to reality (Haag, in press), lack of predictive capacities
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(Hauhs et al., 1996; Oreskes, 2000; Oreskes et al., 1994) and lack of transparency (Funtowicz
and Ravetz, 1992). Effective tests for demonstrating what sort of correspondence there is
between model and reality are argued to be absent (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1992) and it is
claimed that it is impossible to validate models for principle reasons (Konikow and
Bredehoeft, 1992; Oreskes, 1998; Oreskes et al., 1994; Rastetter, 1996). While simulation
models may lose and loosen contact to reality (Baudrillard, 1991; Haag, in press), the
consequences of decisions based on such models are real.
Opposing a predictive role for dynamical simulation models Haag and Kaupenjohann (2000)
agree with Oreskes et al. (1994) that simulation models are heuristic tools that may "resonate
with nature". Models have theoretical value as they can be used to reveal ecosystem
properties and to examine different ecological theories (Jørgensen et al., 1995) and can be
asked scientific questions about properties (Jørgensen, 1994).
Simulation models produce statements rather on possible but not on actual system behavior
(Caswell, 1988), i.e. they outline a space of possibles or of potentiality; herein lies an
unparalleled strength of simulation modelling. The realization of specific states within this
space is uncertain, resembling the situation in the laboratory sciences: Employing closed
systems which are shielded from the environment, scientists assess capacities, e.g. the
capacity of aspirin to relieve headaches (Cartwright, 1994), but whether this capacity is
actually realized in an open, concrete real-world system, i.e. whether aspirin actually relieves
today´s headache, is beyond anticipatory scientific knowledge. Although the future behavior
of ecological systems remains uncertain, humans constantly have to decide on how to actually
interact with concrete systems.
5.3. Uncertainty and models
Simulation models can be conceived as instruments for the reduction of uncertainty as to the
behavior of ecological systems. Scientific uncertainty may be classified as (a) data
unavailability, (b) ignorance, i.e. the fact that scientific evidence cannot be generalized and (c)
indeterminacy, i.e. the fact that the parameters of the system are unknown (O'Riordan and
Jordan, 1995). Simulation models relate to this classification of uncertainty as follows:
• Data unavailability: Simulation models frequently are used to make up for lacking data;
yet the reference to reality and the validity of model outputs cannot be verified.
• Ignorance: Simulation models like any models face a trade-off between generality and
concrete significance, i.e. either they refer to specific systems with a specific setting and
history, entailing little for the general case or they are abstract general models entailing
little for the specific case (Cartwright, 1983).
• Indeterminacy: Whether the selection of parameters for a dynamical model is valid for the
domain of phenomena of interest it was intended for or for other domains cannot be stated
a priori. Self-modification may further reduce validity in the course of time.
Another classification of uncertainty distinguishes technical, methodological and
epistemological uncertainty (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993a). Technical uncertainty can be
remedied by a better conceptual and material closing of experimental systems (Haag and
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Matschonat, in press). Uncertainty as to which methods are adequate still revolves around the
question by which means true knowledge can be achieved. In epistemic debates, however, not
the truth of statements is at stake but the plausibility of conflicting knowledge claims
(Schomberg, 1993). In a situation of epistemic uncertainty analogies from well-known areas
of research are invoked, but as the principles and paradigms of these areas differ there is no
common ground as to the way how new knowledge to reduce uncertainty is to be acquired.
Environmental decision-making frequently confronts issues of epistemic uncertainty, take e.g.
the debate on genetically modified organisms in which ecologists and molecular biologists
resort to their specific disciplinary principles, analogies and models to make up for lacking
anticipatory knowledge (Kolek, 1993; Schomberg, 1993). On which paradigms simulation
models should be based and whether simulation models are valid instruments at all becomes a
matter of epistemic debate in such environmental issues.
6. New forms of knowledge production to address uncertainty?
6.1. Normal science versus post-normal issues
When simulation models are used to address real-world decision and management issues such
as large scale pollution, watershed management and climate change they are faced with
problems that differ considerably from the well-defined problems addressed successfully in
the framework of normal, positivist science producing knowledge in "Mode 1" (Gibbons et
al., 1997). Mode 1 aims at universal, objective and context-free knowledge and has led to a
complex association of ideas, methods, norms, practices, instruments and institutional
conditions. Scientific disciplines which are characterized by cognitive and social hierarchies
are its basic units. Knowledge production in Mode 1 usually shares the following positivist
positions and assumptions with normal science: Firstly, the world divides into facts and
phenomena, making nature capable of reductionistic, mathematical explanations. Secondly,
the perception of phenomena is and must be independent of values, norms and goals. Thirdly,
systems are to be studied which are "highly abstracted and idealised replicas of phenomena,
being characterizations of how the phenomena would have behaved had idealised conditions
been met." (Weinert, 1995). Messing with real-world systems outside the laboratory is
unwarranted.
In contrast, post-normal issues (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993b) deal with ill-defined problems
(Scholz, 1997) in concrete, entangled and complex economic-ecological systems, frequently
involving local-global interactions, large scales, broad scopes and a high degree of uncertainty
of all kinds, notably epistemic-ethical uncertainty: The traditional opposition of "hard" facts
and "soft" values is inverted as here decisions are found that are "hard" in every sense, but for
which the scientific inputs are irremediably "soft" (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1991). The
observation and description of post-normal issues cannot be severed from the perspective of
the observer or the observer´s values and norms; different perspectives, domains of
phenomena of interest and decisions stakes lead to differing, non-equivalent system
descriptions.
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6.2. The precautionary principle
For post-normal issues, frequently the precautionary principle is invoked. The precautionary
principle has four dimensions, (a) the threat dimension, (b) the uncertainty dimension, (c) the
action dimension and the (d) command dimension and can accordingly be phrased in general
form as follows: "If there is a threat, which is uncertain, then some kind of action is
mandatory" (Sandin, 1999). Normal science is not competent as to these dimensions, because
it (a) excludes values and thus threats from its realm, (b) trains for the exclusion of
uncertainty by establishing closed systems but not for communicating and managing
uncertainty in open systems and (c) has no code/distinctions for the selection of action nor (d)
for their justification. Thus the precautionary principle challenges the established authority of
normal science, calling for a different type of science.
6.3. New forms of knowledge production
Normal knowledge production according to Mode 1 contrasts with an emerging way of
knowledge production, Mode 2, encountered, envisioned and called for in the environmental
sciences and areas such as technology assessment, climate, risk and sustainability research.
Knowledge production in Mode 2 takes place in heterogeneous contexts of concrete
applications, framing and solving problems for concrete and local contexts (Gibbons et al.,
1997). It involves transdisciplinarity (Gibbons et al., 1997; Nowotny, 1999) disregarding
disciplinary methods, hierarchies and boundaries. The concept of post-normal science
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1992; Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993b) is akin to Mode 2 production of
knowledge. Post-normal science has to cope with the framing of complex systems under
conditions of uncertainty and perspectivity. Post-normal science comprises three aspects, (a)
the increased relevance of values, (b) the switch from the traditional Newtonian paradigm to
self-organization (Tab. 1) and (c) the recognition of the indeterminacy of ecosystem
development (Westra, 1997). It differs from normal science particularly concerning
epistemology and the way how scientific (sub-)systems (e.g. disciplines) are closed and
secluded from other scientific and social systems (Tab. 2). Extending the concept of post-
normal science leads to a managerial conception of science in which skills and judgement
become important (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993a; Nowotny, 1993). New forms of knowledge
production such as strategic research, post-normal science and Mode 2 converge in the
following points:
• Transdisciplinarity (Jaeger and Scheringer, 1998; Nowotny, 1997): Real-life/real world
problems instead of isolated disciplines drive the definition and delimitation of issues.
Methods are tailored to real-world problems instead of adapting the problems to
disciplinary boundaries and methods.
• Non-equivalent descriptions: There is no privileged epistemic access to complex systems
that would allow for a single, objective description; instead different perspectives lead to a
plurality of legitimate system descriptions which cannot be reduced to a common
denominator (relativity of parameter selection; epistemic debate, endo-perspectives).
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• Management of uncertainty and extension of the peer community: While normal science
disposes of common standards of quality and of validation, in a situation of epistemic
uncertainty the quality and validity of scientific results becomes a matter of debate
(Schomberg, 1993). Stakeholders from different scientific disciplines and from the ´lay´
public participate in quality control, which leads to the democratization of science
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1994; Röling and Jiggins, 1994). "Quality control can no longer
be performed by a restricted corps of insiders [...] Knowledge of local conditions [...] can
also determine which data is strong and relevant" (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993a),
particularly as scientists are trained to abstract and generalized conceptions
(decontextualization). Scientists should communicate uncertainty and the quality of data
to decision-makers (Costanza et al., 1992). This holds particularly for the output of
simulation models, as in the minds of their users, simulation models may acquire an "aura
of reality" (Philip, 1991), and actuality, although they may only outline a space of
possibles.
• Participation and communicative rationality: Following the guideline "deliberation frames
analysis - analysis guides deliberation" established by the U.S. National Research Council
for risk issues (Stern and Fineberg, 1996) deliberation and discourse among stakeholders
serve to identify phenomena and parameters of interest, to formulate problems and to
frame observation. Methodological foundations for stakeholder participation have been
laid in recent years (Renn et al., 1995; Stern and Fineberg, 1996; Webler, 1999), mostly
referring to discourse ethics (Kettner, 1993).While the instrumental and strategic
rationality of normal science assumes a top-down diffusion of scientific knowledge into
the "Lebenswelt" (i.e. the real-world), communicative rationality (Habermas, 1997;
Röling and Jiggins, 1994) emphasizes discourse and negotiation. Knowledge claims as to
socio-ecological complex systems and the pertaining risks are regarded as dependent on
social constructions (Rosa, 1998). #
• Precautionary principle: Action in advance of scientific proof but in accord with
stakeholders' vital interests is warranted (Perrings, 1991; Westra, 1997).
New forms of knowledge production would play an active role in the construction of frames
of observation for sustainable ecosystems.
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Table F.2. Normal, positivist science versus post-normal science (compiled and adapted from
Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993a; Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993b; Nowotny, 1999b; Röling, 1996;
Röling and Jiggins, 1994).Differences mainly attain epistemology and the closure/opening of
scientific (sub-)systems towards other scientific subsystems (e.g. disciplines) and society.
Normal science Post-normal science
Epistemology Essentialist Constructivist
Exo-perspectives Endo-perspectives
Abstraction Context
Universal knowledge Reconfiguration of knowledge in
context (local)
Regularities Singularities
Objective scientific truth Plurality of perspectives
Single description Non-equivalent descriptions
Rationality Instrumental/strategic Communicative
Methods Disciplinary Transdisciplinary
Established; universal Problem-driven; specific
Peer community
Quality control
Closed expert system
Disciplinary
Universal
Extended peer community
(Stakeholders)
Transdisciplinary
Context-specific
Problems/issues Puzzles Ill-defined issues
Disciplinary definition Real-world formulation
Analysis frames deliberation deliberation frames analysis
Uncertainty Technical
Low
Epistemic
High
Risk Scientific-technical Social construction
Stakes Low High
7. Towards Context-sensitivity: Post-normal modelling?
Conventionally, simulation models for risk assessment and decision-making follow a
scientific-technical rationale and are opaque to outsiders, whether other scientists or the public
(Oreskes, pers. com.). Modelers select the phenomena and parameters they regard as relevant,
ignoring the perspectives of other observers and modelers decide on the validity and
applicability of models. Such practice accords with Mode 1 production of knowledge
(Gibbons et al. 1997) and is justified if models are intended as theoretical or heuristic
instruments. If models are conceived for decision support, however, science leaves the
confines of academia and becomes managerial science, which is "no longer immune from
society"; thus two types of science may come into co-existence: "An institutional split [...] is
likely to occur within the sciences - between a public policy branch and an academic branch."
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(Nowotny, 1993). Environmental modelling may perform a similar split into a public policy
branch and an academic branch.
"Managerial modelling" should in our view be guided by new forms of knowledge
production, in which stakeholders participate in the framing of systems ("deliberation frames
analysis"). The choice of the domain of phenomena of interest, of the adequate theory and of
the parameters and the selection and evaluation of models for decision purposes thus would
be the task of an extended peer community operating in and for local contexts. Dynamical
models offer a remarkable potential for consensus building in concrete environmental
decision situations (Costanza and Ruth, 1998).
7.1. Validation as the establishment of legitimacy?
Some form of environmental forecasting is certainly necessary as in the "extended present"
we are living in, humans dispose of and partly predetermine the future already in the present,
reducing future degrees of freedom (Nowotny, 1995) . Notwithstanding, we do not agree with
the notion that models can be used for prediction in a literal sense, as simulation models lack
predictive capacity for real-world systems and cannot be validated (for an in-depth discussion
of validation see Haag and Kaupenjohann (2000), Konikow and Bredehoeft (1992) and
Oreskes et al. (1994).
The original meaning of validation is not necessarily the establishment of truth but of
legitimacy, typically given in terms of contracts and arguments (Oreskes et al., 1994). In the
face of the impossibility of operational and conceptual validation, some modelers conceive
validation as a transscientific requirement (Rastetter, 1996). Validation thus becomes a
negotiation process, in which criteria of validity are negotiated corresponding to the
uncertainties, stakes and interests involved. In accordance with the precautionary principle,
forecasting would become a matter of public negotiation, of arrangements between ´best
guess´ predictions and social weightings of agreed criteria (O'Riordan and Jordan, 1995).
Interaction with the ecosphere is a risky endeavor, in which risk can be conceived as a game
in which the rules must be socially negotiated within the context of specific decision problems
(Kunreuther and Slowic, 1996). Consequences arising from this for the framing and
transparency of models and for the communication of uncertainty may be guided by the
principles of the new production of knowledge.
7.2. Recontextualization
Since early modern times science strives for universality and control of the world, which are
tied to context-independence, i.e. abstractability of knowledge and information from the
natural world, and to the principle of identity through change (Merchant, 1987). In contrast,
knowledge production in Mode 2 ceases to define reliable knowledge in a universalistic sense,
but becomes tied to a particular context. It is argued that if science is to avoid becoming stuck
in the objectivity trap, it has to develop greater context-sensitivity (Nowotny, 1999). Societal
contextualization of knowledge implies that reliable knowledge will be tested not in the
abstract, but under very concrete and local circumstances. (Nowotny, 1999). Thus scientific
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models have to be evaluated for specific decision problems and specific economic-ecological
contexts.
Particularly in situations in which indeterminacy is important, contextual and local (lay)
knowledge may contribute to the validity of models as has for example been demonstrated for
a monitoring and modelling system for urban air pollution in an English town. The
formalizations and idealizations incorporated into the model by (external) scientists did not
account for specific local environmental conditions and the idiosyncratic behavior of social
and biological actors. The authors of the study conclude that "to build robust and legitimate
models, public bodies will need to devise methods of consultation and participation not only
when the model is running, but also in setting out the objectives and parameters of the model
in its earliest stages" (Yearly, 1999).
8. Conclusions
Dynamical systems are the reading frame for the scientific observation of ecological systems.
The encoding of ecosystems in dynamical systems has been challenged in this article: (1) The
sequence of selection leading to the encoding is relative to a specific domain of phenomena of
interest, to the underlying theory and to a specific perspective, consisting of a set of
distinctions and selections established by a certain discipline or "school". (2) Dynamical
systems are defined by a closed set of variables, although in ecosystems there is an unlimited
supply of things not accounted for in a given model (unmarked space). Simulation models
have limited predictive capacity and it is impossible to validate them, so that they are
deficient instruments for the reduction of uncertainty as to the behavior of ecological systems.
However, models outline the space of behavioral possibilities and it is in this sense that they
have anticipative value in decision processes, particularly as human impact on ecosystems
presumably accelerates the production of novelty in ecosystems.
Normal science trains for abstraction, decontextualization and exo-perspectives and provides
established methods (e.g. more and better data) for the reduction of uncertainty. In many
environmental issues, however, uncertainty is of an epistemic nature and can only be partly
remedied; coping with epistemic uncertainty in concrete contexts of application is not a
particular strength of normal science. Where future system development cannot be predicted,
let alone controlled (as contended by the notion of ecosystem engineering) the local, variable,
temporal and spatial context gains importance; a multiplicity of endo-perspectives thus
obtains priority over a universal exo-perspective (Nowotny, 1996). The concepts of Mode 2
and of post-normal science provide frameworks for such issues. However, Mode 2 and post-
normal science, the precautionary principle and the contextualization of knowledge
production challenge the established authority and the monopoly of science to define reality.
Scientific perspectives, reading frames and descriptions of ecological and economic-
ecological systems compete with other descriptions of the same system and the aptitude to
define and frame problems interactively and transdisciplinarily are the test stand for a
managerial science. The authority of science becomes tied to concrete practices, their results
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and impacts (Nowotny, 1999). These developments will presumably resonate in ecological
modelling: On the one hand models may continue to make a contribution to ecological theory.
On the other hand, modelling in the interstice between science and public policy may become
embedded into the "deliberation frames analysis, analysis guides deliberation" framework.
For this purpose models should become more transparent, framing of models and model
choice and the evaluation of models should involve extended peer groups (stakeholders, local
actors) and knowledge conveyed by models is to be configurated for concrete problem
contexts. Modelling thus could contribute to the organization of knowledge, e.g. it could
catalyze mutual learning processes and it could contribute to the integration of scientific and
non-scientific knowledge and of exo- and endo-perspectives.
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G. Landscape Fate of Nitrate Fluxes and Emissions in Central Europe:
A critical review of concepts, data, and models for transport and retention
Abstract
Agroecosystems are leaky systems emitting nutrients like nitrate, which affect ecosystems on
a range of scales. This paper examines the fate of nitrate on the landscape level focussing on
how landscape components either facilitate or impede N translocation from the field to the
stream (headwater). Acccording to their role in landscape metabolism, two categories of
landscape components are distinguished, ecotones/retention compartments and
conduits/corridors. Conduits such as macropores, preferential interflow-paths, drainage tiles
and streams rapidly relocate nitrate to headwaters. Retention compartments like the capillary
fringe/saturated zone and riparian vegetation eliminate N through denitrification. The
differential role of compartments is illustrated with quantitative examples from the literature.
On the landscape level retention potential for N is spatially variable and quantitatively
limited, while its realisation is uncertain. Notwithstanding, the literature indicates that on a
watershed basis the bulk of total N input is retained; thus the potential is discussed for the
retention of nitrate on different scales, i.e., the field, landscape, regional and global scale. The
transitory retention of excess nitrate in soil and subsoil solution, soil organic matter,
groundwater and riparian vegetation may delay nitrate discharge to the aquatic system for
decades, contributing to the low emission factors on basin scale. The adverse effects arising
from denitrification are discussed, presenting data on the emission of nitrous oxide from the
entirety of the different landscape compartments. It is concluded that reliance on landscape
metabolism and self-purification postpones the problem of global N overload and partially
transfers it to the atmosphere. An assessment scheme is presented which in the face of the
unpredictability of ecosystem and landscape behaviour is risk oriented (instead of impact
oriented). The scheme uses a budget approach, which accounts for the critical role of
corridors and considers the scale and scope of N emissions. A conceptual framework for the
remediation of N overload is presented which rests on the realisation of cycling principles and
zero-emission approaches on all scales of agricultural production and which pleads for
regional approaches that transcend sectoral boundaries and take account of overall regional N
fluxes.
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1. Introduction
Agricultural systems are ecosystems that are maintained in an immature state due to human
intervention (Odum, 1969). Control is largely external (Odum, 1984), manifested by frequent
external inputs of nutrients and energy, which are large compared to internal fluxes and
cycling. As plants are regularly removed from the system, plant and decomposer activity are
decoupled. Compared to natural ecosystems, agroecosystems are leaky systems with greater
amounts of nutrients flowing in and out (Hendrix et al., 1992; Magdoff et al., 1997). The
emitted substances are dispersed in the environment by transformation and transport
processes. Transformation processes break up molecules, augment the number of “small
molecules” (Addiscott, 1995) and thus increase entropy. Transport processes distribute
substances along gradients of potential energy in the environment of agroecosystems.
Intensive N fertilisation and disrupted N cycles have brought about the emission of
considerable amounts of N compounds. In terrestrial ecosystems N is mostly translocated as
nitrate, which is subject to mass flow and leaching. Average nitrate leaching from terrestrial
ecosystems in Central Europe is 15 kg ha-1yr-1: N leaching is 15.9 kg ha-1yr-1 in Germany
(Werner, 1994), 15.0 kg ha-1yr-1 in the watershed of Lake of Constance, the second largest
European lake (Prasuhn et al., 1996), and 14.7 kg ha-1yr-1 in the canton Bern in Switzerland
(Prasuhn and Braun, 1995).
The scope of N impacts ranges from adverse effects on (ground-)water quality over
acidification and eutrophication of aquatic ecosystems to loss of biological diversity, and to
impacts on atmosphere and climate, e.g., nitrous oxide as greenhouse gas (Lehn et al.; 1995,
Vitousek et al., 1997a). Ecosystems on a variety of scales are affected by N emissions. On the
local scale, groundwater quality and headwaters are affected. On the regional scale, rivers and
lakes receive large N loads, roughly half of it deriving from agriculture; e.g., in the European
Union rivers receive 55% (Isermann and Isermann, 1997) and in Germany 44 % (Werner,
1994) of total N input from agriculture. Agricultural activities account for 64% of N input into
the Lake of Constance and to natural background concentration for only 36% (Prasuhn et al.,
1996). Rivers discharging into seas are a major conveyor of N. With respect to N, the North
Sea drainages are among the most disturbed regions: Average net anthropogenic N input into
watersheds is 3900 kg km-²yr-1, 83 % of which derive from fertilisers. The resultant discharge
to the sea is 1450 kg N km-²yr-1 on average (Howarth et al., 1996).  This paper therefore
focuses on the fate of agricultural N in Central Europe.
2. Assessing N fluxes in agroecosystems
A variety of approaches has been developed to assess the N fluxes arising from agricultural
production and to evaluate potential impacts on the environment.
On the field scale, the risk of N loss is assessed with index models, budget approaches and
simulation models. Index models characterise risks only qualitatively. Examples are
DRASTIC (Aller et al., 1987) and KUL (Eckert and Breitschuh, 1994; Kerschberger and
Eckert, 1994). Index methods such as DRASTIC correlate only weakly with measured nitrate
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inputs into the groundwater (Canter, 1997), hence they are only suitable for the tentative
screening of problem areas. Budget approaches indicate site specific risk of N loss and
potential disequilibria (Bach, 1987; PARCOM, 1994; Wendland, 1994). Simulation models
for the N cycle represent processes of the N cycle at point and field scale (de Willigen, 1991;
de Willigen and Neetson, 1985; Groot et al., 1991). They have been applied to study the effect
of certain agricultural measures on emissions on field scale, e.g., (Dijkstra and Hack, 1995;
Line et al., 1993; Rode et al., 1995). However, the simulation of N dynamics and the
assessment of output potentials neither address the path nor the fate of nitrate emissions.
Recently, attempts are made to adapt life cycle assessment procedures to agricultural
production systems (Vito, 1998). Life cycle approaches assess the impact of agricultural
production systems on the environment in terms of effect potentials; they disregard the spatial
dimension and setting.
On a catchment scale, agricultural non-point-source (Ag-NPS) models are employed. They
usually are built on field-scale models of losses that are aggregated at the catchment scale.
Ag-NPS models in conjunction with GIS applications have been used to investigate the
relation between land use (i.e., land cover pattern and land use proximity to stream channels)
and N chemistry (Hunsaker and Levine, 1995; Tufford et al., 1998) and to study the impact of
best management practices on water quality (Hession et al., 1989; Prato and Shi, 1990; Tim
and Jolly, 1994). Models are compared by Novotny (1986), Line (1993), while Loague et al.
(1998) draw attention to the uncertainties intrinsic to this approach. Key limitations of the Ag-
NPS models are twofold (Merot and Durand, 1997). Firstly, they are distributed models
resting on the assumption that parameters for each individual cell are perfectly known and
that the catchment response is the aggregation of the functioning of the cells. Secondly, the
classical Ag-NPS models such as ANSWERS or AGNPS do not explicitly take account of
retention zones like hedges or riparian vegetation, overlooking processes which are essential
for the functioning of buffer zones.
The mentioned approaches only crudely address the role of the landscape into which
agricultural sites and affected ecosystems are embedded and in which transport and retention
of matter take place. Leached nitrate passes a number of compartments and landscape
elements prior to discharge to the aquatic system. Having left the root zone, nitrate passes the
vadose zone (subsoil) and a capillary fringe, eventually reaching an aquifer. Often distinct
aquifer storeys coexist, in particular an unconfined shallow aquifer may be underlain by
(semi-)confined, deeper aquifers. Lateral transport of nitrate takes place in interflow, drainage
tiles and aquifers. A riparian zone may be crossed prior to discharge into a stream. The
hydrological setting and the resultant hydrological routing can be rather complex, steering
contact times and time lags between in- and output and retention. Retention of nitrate is either
due to plant uptake or to denitrification. While the first represents temporary storage in the
system, the latter leads to the elimination of N from the system. The steering factors and
conditions of denitrification in laboratory and field have been discussed elsewhere (Ferguson,
1994, Groffman et al., 1987). The different compartments function as "landscape organs"
(Rapport et al., 1998) contributing to a specific landscape metabolism. With the metabolism
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metaphor the idea of the "self-purification" of both terrestrial and aquatic systems is
associated. Yet where in the landscape retention actually takes place and whether retention
potentials can be sustained in the long run, is not clear.
In the following landscape metabolism and its potential elements are investigated. Based on
the concepts of hierarchy theory, sustainability and landscape diversity (Barrett, 1992), a
conceptual framework is developed for the distinction of interfaces and corridors. Interfaces
or ecotones are landscape organs attenuating matter fluxes and their impact on aquatic media;
corridors lead to the rapid translocation of matter, increasing environmental risks. A review is
provided of the retention or transport potential of the different compartments along the way
from the field to headwaters, which dominate water quality downstream and which
consequently should have priority in water protection (Haycock et al., 1993). The retention
potential of landscapes is critically discussed and the wide scale and scope of nitrate losses is
highlighted. Finally, a risk assessment scheme and concepts for remediation are sketched,
taking account of the unpredictability of ecosystem behavior and of the importance of
balanced budgets and closed nutrient cycles. It is concluded that sustainable agricultural
management should avoid end-of-the-pipe solutions (relying e.g. on the retentive potential of
riparian vegetation), but employ scalar system approaches, in which natural cycling principles
should be the benchmark for best management.
3. Conceptualisation of nitrate transport and retention
Landscapes are heterogeneous "patch-works", in which spatial pattern and processes interact
(Turner, 1989) to produce domains in which either retention or transport of matter dominates.
The ensuing landscape elements operate as biogeochemical processors of matter, governing
matter fluxes and budgets on the landscape level (Frede and Bach, 1995). Ecosystem theory
conceives landscape elements as components of a nested, inclusive hierarchy with holons as
the basic units (Ahl and Allen, 1996, Allen and Hoekstra, 1992). Transfers and processes
inside a holon are more intensive than the connexions between different holons, while process
rates exhibit steep gradients at the margins of holons (Müller, 1992). Holons are delimited by
boundaries which act as differentially-permeable membranes facilitating some ecological
flows but impeding others (Wiens et al., 1985).
3.1. Retention elements
Boundaries are locations where the rates of ecological transfers tend to change abruptly; they
increase landscape resistance (Forman, 1995), and they are important control points for
material flux (Naiman et al., 1988). Spatially they are expressed as transitional zones or
ecotones (Hansen et al., 1988), particularly at aquatic-terrestrial interfaces (Naiman, 1990).
Ecotone width depends on the type of flux under consideration, with physicochemical flows
creating the widest ecotones (Gilbert et al., 1990). Retention in transition zones is due to
storage in pools with long turn-over times, e.g., nutrient stocks in vegetation (Johnston, 1991)
or the passive soil carbon pool with turnover times of up to 1000 years (Parton et al., 1988);
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retention also includes elimination and transfer to the atmosphere (denitrification). Retention
is largely determined by retention time and area of contact. Accordingly, water retention time
is the most critical factor for N removal in wetlands (Jansson et al., 1994a). From a landscape
health perspective interfaces are critical landscape organs (Rapport et al., 1998), regulating
the flow of materials across landscapes and acting as sinks in landscape transport (Tim and
Jolly, 1994).
3.2. Corridors
Corridors are conduits connecting holons and elements of larger scales (Allen and Hoekstra,
1992). Corridors are expressed structurally as preferential flow-paths on different spatial
scales. They usually are part of a hierarchical pattern of flow-paths. For example in funnel
flow, water is gradually congregated into preferential flow paths and its movement can be
conceptualized as a network of tributaries merging into rivers (Ju and Kung, 1997).
Macropore networks have been found to be continuous laterally (interflow) and vertically
(Mosley, 1982). Other examples for the hierarchical pattern of corridors are linear forms of
erosion (Helming and Frielinghaus, 1998), and the network of streams and rivers (Petts,
1994). Typical corridors are illustrated schematically in Figure G.1.
Figure G.1. Corridors in an agricultural landscape. Corridors are doorways of the
agricultural system, through which substances bypass on-site and off-site retention zones and
are conveyed directly and quickly to the aquatic system. Note the hierarchy of surface
corridors, ranging from rills to streams.
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In corridors matter translocation is rapid, so that residence time is shortened, retention zones
are bypassed and spatial distances are bridged. Substances are “flushed through” corridors and
internal processing of matter entailing transformation, cycling and retention is restricted
(Fig. G.2). Contact and interaction with corridor boundaries is limited. For example in soils
there is hardly any lateral interaction between corridor and soil matrix in macropore or funnel
flow (Ju and Kung, 1997). In the fluvial system of headwater catchments, the physical and
chemical processes are dominated by longitudinal processes as well (Petts, 1994).
While holons, boundaries/interfaces and corridors are conceived theoretically, spatially
explicit compartments can be classified as retention, intermediary and conduit compartments
(Fig. G.2), based on overall partitioning between transport and retention of matter .
Figure G.2. Classification of landscape elements and compartments. Ecotones and corridors
are conceived conceptually. Compartments are explicit sections of space, which are
distinguished according to overall matter processing rate. Water flow follows gradients of
potential energy. Towards the lateral boundaries of the compartments process rates decline.
Internal cycling (indicated by circular arrows) and residence time (indicated by reciprocal of
length) varies considerably. In conduits residence times are particularly low. The terms
corridor/conduit and ecotone/retention compartment will be used interchangeably in the text.
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3.3. Focus on nitrate leaching to headwaters
Agricultural contaminants differ with respect to their affinity to determined transport
mechanisms. Based upon their soil-solution-partitioning coefficient they can be assigned
preferential transport mechanisms (Fig. G.3).
Figure G.3. Affinity of agricultural contaminants to different mechanisms of transport as a
function of their soil-water partitioning coefficient. For nitrate, leaching is the dominant
transport process, while superficial transport in run-off water and with eroding soil is of
minor importance (adapted from Logan, 1993).
Nitrate as a highly water-soluble substance is prone to leaching with mass flow. The Lake of
Constance study illustrates the dominance of leaching as transport mechanism. Leaching
accounted for 79 % of NPS, while run-off was a minor source (3 %) and erosion was relevant
in the Alpine parts of the watershed only (Prasuhn et al., 1996). Under certain conditions,
runoff plays a more prominent role, e.g. in some major estuaries, such as Delaware Bay and
Chesapeake Bay, NPS runoff from terrestrial ecosystems accounted for half or more of total N
inputs (Cronan et al., 1999). Yet as in Central Europe up to 80 % of river water stems from
groundwater (Hamm, 1991) and owing to the general relevance of leaching this paper focuses
on subsurface processes. A characteristic sequence of compartments nitrate traverses on its
way from the field to the stream is shown in Figure G.4.
From a water quality perspective, protection of headwaters should have priority (Haycock et
al., 1993), as on a catchment scale 60% to 70% of the water in large rivers enters the system
via first to third order streams (Vought et al., 1994). According to Kirkby (1978) even 90% of
the flow of rivers comes from headwaters, defined as first- and second-order streams. Thus
low-order streams contribute the highest percentage to the loading of rivers with nutrients and
pesticides (Bach et al., 1997). The approach of this study, therefore stresses the loading of
headwaters.
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Figure G.4. Schematic of corridors and retention compartments. The sequence of
compartments depends upon the specific hydrological setting and is spatio-temporally
variable.
4. Retention in landscape compartments
The different compartments on the way from the field to the headwater are highlighted (Fig.
G.4) and their role in landscape N metabolism is illustrated with experimental data from a
variety of studies in the following section.
4.1. Soil and subsoil
Organic carbon is the key limiting factor for denitrification in subsoils, so that movement of
carbon from the soil surface is necessary to support denitrification (Rice and Rogers, 1993).
Anaerobic conditions are another precondition. Soil morphology, particularly the existence of
stratified layers within the soil profile, impeding water and solute movement may contribute
to the creation of conditions favorable for denitrification (Zakosek and Zepp, 1993).
Depending upon soil type and agricultural land use denitrification losses ranged from 1 kg N
ha-1yr-1 to 223 N kg ha-1yr-1 in a number of field experiments (Wendland, 1992).
However, denitrification in subsoil and intermediate vadose zone may be insignificant under
certain conditions (Rice and Rogers, 1993; Zakosek and Zepp, 1993): For example
unstratified coarse textured soils either lack organic carbon or anaerobic conditions. Fine
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textured soils may lack organic carbon; e.g., in some loess subsoils denitrification has been
shown to be insignificant due to the lack of organic C and thus played no role in the reduction
of nitrate transfer into the groundwater (Heyder, 1993). Under normal field conditions subsoil
denitrification potential and its rate of recovery tend to be low (Zakosek and Zepp, 1993).
Residence time of leachate in soil and underlying substrates varies from days (karst) to
decades (fine-textured, thick substrates without fissures), thus N passage to aquifers may be
retarded considerably (Hölting et al., 1995).
4.2. Groundwater and aquifers
Groundwater and aquifers diverge with respect to landscape position, chemical
characteristics, permeability and vulnerability to agricultural inputs, (Hölting et al., 1995).
Three aquifer types can be distinguished (Davis and DeWiest, 1991; Hölting, 1980):
Unconsolidated, porous aquifers (gravel, sand), consolidated aquifers (cracks in solid rock)
and karst aquifers (fractures). Retention takes place in transition zones (Gilbert et al., 1990),
while fissures and fractures serve as conduits. Depending upon permeability and
biological/chemical characteristics, aquifers as a whole can act as conduits (e.g., karst aquifers
with wide fissures) or as retention compartments (e.g., aquifers with low permeability and
high denitrification potentials). Groundwater transport usually is slow compared to superficial
water flow and can retard discharge of nitrate to streams for years or decades (see below).
4.2.1. Denitrification studies
Substantial denitrification has been observed in a variety aquifers (Hiscock et al., 1991;
Korom, 1992; Lowrance and Pionke, 1989; Mariotti, 1994; Rice and Rogers, 1993; Spalding
and Parrot, 1994), while in other aquifers little or no denitrification activity was observed
(Hiscock et al., 1991; Lowrance, 1992; Lowrance and Pionke, 1989; Mariotti, 1994; Rice and
Rogers, 1993). Actual and potential denitrification depend on biological and chemical
characteristics and on hydrology (Mariotti, 1994). The key limiting factor of heterotrophic
denitrification is organic carbon availability, while populations of denitrifiers exist in both
shallow and deep aquifer systems (Hiscock et al., 1991; Mariotti, 1994). Autotrophic
denitrification, requiring an inorganic source for oxidation, e.g., pyrite, is uncommon in
groundwater (Hiscock et al., 1991).
4.2.2. Shallow unconfined aquifers
Denitrification may be an important mechanism for reducing nitrate within selected landscape
positions, especially in near proximity to the water table (Steinheimer et al., 1998), i.e. in the
transition zone between unsaturated and saturated zones. Correspondingly, it appears to be of
greatest significance in shallow unconfined aquifers (Rice and Rogers, 1993), where
denitrification is considered an important mechanism attenuating nitrate concentration
(Lowrance and Pionke, 1989; Montgomery et al., 1997). Within the lower Rhine region in
Germany nitrate reductions for three shallow ground water catchments were 16 %, 63 % and
70 % of the nitrate reaching the aquifer (Obermann, 1982). In a superficial pleistocene
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aquifer, dissolved carbon leached into groundwater yielded maximum potential denitrification
of 65 mg l-1 nitrate (Leuchs, 1988).
4.2.3. Hydrological setting
The hydrological setting is crucial for denitrification particularly in shallow aquifers. In
Central Europe three typical constellations were found, showing the wide range of
denitrifcation potential and stressing the relevance of organic carbon (Obermann, 1991).
Firstly, consolidated aquifers with little soil cover and high permeability in combination to
high nitrate inputs entailed correspondingly high nitrate output; discharge of nitrate was only
delayed. Secondly, unconsolidated aquifers with low amounts of organic carbon in
combination with limited nitrate input led to partial elimination of nitrate. Thirdly,
unconsolidated aquifers with high amounts of organic carbon caused almost complete
elimination of nitrate.
4.3. Terrestrial-aquatic interfaces and riparian zones
There seems to be general agreement that the land-water interface regulates water quality in
agricultural watersheds (Dillaha et al., 1989), making riparian buffers the most important
factor controlling entry of non-point source nitrate in surface water (Gilliam et al., 1997).
Thus buffer zones are attributed an enormous potential for the control of water-based
pollution (Haycock et al., 1997). Riparian zones may improve water quality due to
sedimentation, plant uptake, retention in soil and microbial processes (Correll, 1997;
Johnston, 1991; Vought et al., 1994). Particularly denitrification, which ultimately exports N
from the system, is very common in wetland ecotones (Gilbert et al., 1990).
4.3.1. Field and Laboratory studies
Denitrification losses from riparian forests in Georgia and Maryland ranged from 61 to 89 %
of N inputs, while retention ranged from 39 kg ha-1 (32 kg ha-1 due to denitrification and 7 kg
ha-1 due to net retention within the system) to 74 kg ha-1 (Johnston, 1991). In riparian zones of
the river Garonne in France, denitrification was so intensive that approximately 30 m of
groundwater flow under a woodlot were enough to remove the entire nitrate (Pinay et al.,
1990). A riparian zone located below and adjacent to a field-sized watershed planted with
soybeans eliminated up to 93 % of groundwater nitrate (Line, 1993). In a large number of
studies riparian nitrate removal exceeded 90 % (Hill, 1996) and removals of 90 % seem to be
common. However, at least some wetlands seem to retain little if any N. In a study of 5
wetlands in Ontario, Devito (1990) reported net retention ranged from -12 % to + 4 %. The
overall range of N retention in wetlands is around - 30 % to + 100 % (Johnston, 1991), i.e.
depending upon wetland, net release of nitrate and complete retention of nitrate are possible.
Denitrification potentials have been studied in field and laboratory. Mesocosm experiments
yielded denitrification potentials of 29 kg ha-1yr-1 and 171 kg ha-1yr-1 for similar sites (Addy
et al., 1999), demonstrating the influence of land use legacy. Under incubated laboratory
conditions an average of 76 kg ha-1yr-1 was assessed, while soil amended in situ with N
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reached values of 160 kg ha-1yr-1 up to 1340 kg ha-1yr-1. However, under unamended in situ
conditions, average was only 2 kg ha-1yr-1 (Johnston, 1991) demonstrating that actual
denitrification in riparian zones is easily overestimated.
4.3.2. Hydrological setting
A major factor for the realization of retention potentials and the effectiveness of buffer zones
is hydrological setting (Fig. G.5) (Addiscott, 1997; Correll, 1997; Gilliam et al., 1997;
Haycock et al., 1997). It determines residence time, which is the single most important
variable for water quality improvement (Fennessy and Cronk, 1997).
Figure G.5. Schematic of vadose zone, aquifers and flow directions in a typical riparian zone
in a humid climate (adapted from Lowrance and Pionke (1989). The hydrological setting
determines, whether leached nitrate is subject to riparian retention or bypasses it. Drainage
tiles and interflow are not depicted.
For example in a controlled situation at least 10 days of water retention was needed to remove
N (Hillbricht-Ilkowska, 1995). Riparian forests of different hydrological positions thus vary
in nutrient retention (Risser, 1990) and buffer zones work well only under determined
hydrological conditions (Hill, 1996). Effective removal is restrained to riparian zones with
permeable surface soils and sediments that are underlain at a depth of 1 to 4 m by an
impermeable layer that produces shallow subsurface flow of groundwater across the riparian
area. Riparian zones connected to large aquifers may be less effective as interaction with
vegetation and soils is restricted. To improve the buffer function, water regime is to be
managed aiming at increased residence time within the system (Haycock et al., 1993).
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4.3.3. Optimum width
There is no consensus regarding width of riparian zones, except that minimum width is 10 m
(Haycock et al., 1993), while less than 5-10 m provide little protection of aquatic resources
(Castelle et al., 1994). Nitrate reductions of 100 % seem to be approached by a width between
10 m and 20 m (Vought et al., 1994) or 20 m and 30 m (Fennessy and Cronk, 1997). Given
the complexity of the riparian setting, a useful retort to the question of width is "how wide do
you want it?" (Haycock et al., 1997).
4.3.4. Sustainability of retention
Seasonal and long-term sustainability of riparian buffers is controversial as well (Addiscott,
1997). The seasonal sustainability of retention in riparian zones may be maintained in summer
by vegetation uptake and during the dormant season by denitrification, as denitrification takes
place as soon as the soil temperature exceeds 4° C (Haycock et al., 1993). Other authors,
however, stress the seasonal variability of retention, the role of extreme (e.g., storm) events
and the decoupling of peak emissions and maximum of retention activity (Addiscott, 1997;
Hill, 1996). Long-term sustainability may be affected by declining availability of organic
carbon for denitrification and decreasing uptake by old vegetation (Haycock et al., 1993).
Moreover there may be an upper limit for the retention of agricultural loads. In wetlands only
amounts below 200 kg N ha-1yr-1 could be removed satisfactorily (> 80%), while the long-
term application of higher loads resulted in removal of less than 40 % (Hillbricht-Ilkowska,
1995).
4.4. Aquatic-aquatic interfaces: Hyporheic zone and sediments
The hyporheic zone is an active ecotone between the surface stream and groundwater.
Connections are bidirectional (Bencala, 1993); exchange of water, nutrients, and organic
matter occur in response to variations in discharge and porosity (Boulton et al., 1998).
Particularly sediments act as sinks for nitrate that discharges to streams and rivers (Gilbert et
al., 1990; Pfenning and McMahon, 1996). Laboratory incubation suggests that nitrate is
rapidly depleted below the sediment-water interface (Hill, 1997). In the sediments of the river
Dorn in Oxfordshire denitrification accounted for 15 % of nitrate entering under baseflow
conditions (Fennessy and Cronk, 1997). Estimates of the magnitude of N removal during the
summer season, when streams are frequently at base flow range from <10 % to 76 % in a
number of studies (Hill, 1997). However, potential denitrification tends to be limited by
organic carbon and low temperatures; e.g., potential denitrification measured at 4° C was
77 % lower than at 22°C in lab experiments on Australian river sediments, supposedly
contributing to high nitrate concentration in the river during winter (Pfenning and McMahon,
1996). In any case, overall in-stream denitrification will be much less than in adjacent riparian
wetlands (Fennessy and Cronk, 1997).
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Transport in corridors
5.1. Preferential flow
Preferential flow takes place in macropores, fingers and funnels (Ju and Kung, 1997; Jury and
Flühler, 1992; Stagnitti et al., 1995). Preferential flow has been observed under a variety of
conditions, from sandy to clayey soils. Biopores, e.g., well connected root channels of wheat
(Triticum spp.), alfalfa (Medicago sativa L.) and corn (Zea mays L.) may induce preferential
flow (Li and Ghodrati, 1994). Preferential flow is not predictable in advance from field
analysis (Bouma, 1992; Jury and Flühler, 1992). Rapid movement of nitrate along macropores
has been observed (Bouma, 1992). For example in a heavy clay soil rapid nitrate leaching via
preferential flow through mesopores and macropores was observed leading to average nitrate
concentrations of 70 mg l-1 and maximum concentrations of 136 mg l-1 in drain discharge
(Bronswijk et al., 1995). While gaps in the N balance often are attributed to denitrification,
bypass flow may sometimes be a more important process (Dekker and Bouma, 1984).
5.2. Interflow
Interflow has been observed as an important mechanism for the rapid transport of nitrate
towards streams, particularly under stormflow and snowmelt conditions (Göttlicher-Göbel,
1987; Mosley, 1982; Peter, 1987). In forested watersheds average subsurface flow velocities
were as high as 0.3 cm s-1, due to flow along macropores and along layers at which
permeability changed abruptly. (Mosley, 1982). In small watersheds, nitrate peaked in streams
due to interflow after stormflow (Peter, 1987). At the beginning of the winter leaching period,
nitrate concentrations in the interflow of a loess site peaked, while denitrification was low
(Steininger et al., 1997). Preferential flowpaths may circumvent retention zones, as e.g., has
been demonstrated for riparian zones in Britanny (Bidois, 1999).
5.3. Drainage tiles
Drainage tiles inducing artificial interflow are particularly rapid conduits. Artificial drainage
speeds the movement of water and contaminants such as nitrate, reducing the opportunity for
denitrification to take place (Fennessy and Cronk, 1997). In a number of studies, nitrate
concentrations have been obseserved to range from 2 to 20 mg NO3 l-1 under mineral soils
(Hamm, 1991). Average annual nitrate N loss to subsurface drains has been shown to range
from 14 to 105 kg a-1, with most of the loss occurring in the winter season (Kladikov et al.,
1999). Drainage tiles can contribute significantly to water pollution. For example, around
60 % of nitrate-N in surface waters in Illinois entered through drainage tiles (Kohl et al.,
1971). Flood events can lead to large export of N in tiles; accordingly, a few days of high-
flow events led to most of the annual nitrate loss from a tile-drained field (David et al., 1997).
In many areas, subsurface drains discharge into surface ditches or streams (Kladikov et al.,
1999). Thus large amounts of N may reach streams through drainage tiles emptying directly
into the channel without contact with the riparian soil (Vought et al., 1994).
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5.4. Surface flow
Superficial preferential flow minimizes contact with the soil matrix and conveys nitrate
rapidly and directly into the aquatic system, overrunning retention compartments such as
riparian vegetation (Bach et al.; 1997, Bach et al., 1994). Preferential flow paths are part of a
hierarchical network (Fig. G.1), consisting of intermittent elements such as rills, cultivation
lines and tracks, thalwegs and ephemeral gullies (Helming and Frielinghaus, 1998) and of
more permanent streamlets. Drainage lines and streamlets change position and features
constantly and despite their importance as conduits removing substances quickly from the
field they are overlooked easily. For example a typical drainage line or streamlet in Central
Germany had a depth of only 3 cm and an average width of 63 cm, giving rise to an overall
streamlet surface of 630 m² km-² (Bach et al., 1996). Once substances enter preferential
flowpaths, retention is minimized.
5.5. Streams
Streams are "bodies of water moving to a position of lower energy" (Bren, 1993); they are
highly dynamic in time and space and are difficult to distinguish from lesser forms like
drainage lines or seeps. Uptake and denitrification in streams is limited; the bulk of
denitrification probably takes place in aquatic ecotones (sediment) and not in the stream
channel itself. In a small Scandinavian reach of 7 km length retention was less than 3 % of
total N transport in the stream (Jansson et al., 1994b). In a Canadian basin denitrification was
less than 6 % of the annual export of total N from the basin, while macrophyte uptake
accounted for 15 % (Hill, 1988). In two rivers in the USA, 7 % and 35 % of the N load
received from external sources was denitrified (Fennessy and Cronk, 1997). Annual mass
balances indicate that nitrate-N removal ranges from 1 -5 % in many streams, although values
of 20 % where also estimated (Hill, 1997).
5. Retention of nitrate on different spatial and temporal scales
In a scalar approach to N fluxes and cycles, four levels can be distinguished (Fig. G.6):
Firstly, the field and adjacent ecosystems. Secondly, a local level which is restricted to low-
order streams and ponds and their watershed. Thirdly, a regional level, which encompasses
rivers and lakes like the Rhine, the Danube or the Lake of Constance and their respective
basin. Fourthly, a global level, which includes seas like the North, the Baltic and the Black
Sea and the atmosphere as a sink for gaseous emissions.
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Figure G.6. Scalar approach to water quality, in which four levels are distinguished: The
field as the source system including adjacent terrestrial ecosystems, the local level with
streams of low order and occasional ponds, the regional level with rivers and lakes and the
global level with seas and the atmosphere.
6.1. Local scale and limitations to retention
On local scale, the capacity of landscape metabolism to retain or eliminate excess N depends
upon the pattern and interaction of retention compartments and corridors. Retention and
elimination of leached nitrate has been demonstrated for many compartments, but retention is
variable, limited and unpredictable as is illustrated for aquifers and for riparian zones:
In groundwater the availability of oxidizable material and residence time limit denitrification
Owing to these constraints in groundwater only a potential for removing up to 3 mg N l-1 can
be assumed under normal circumstances (Hiscock et al., 1991). Moreover, organic carbon
may be depleted at a higher (unsustainable) rate than it is replenished: A number of studies
indicates that currently both autotrophic and heterotrophic denitrification potentials are being
depleted, with the risk of a nitrate "breakthrough" in the future (Borchers, 1993; Böttcher et
al.; 1990a, Böttcher et al., 1990b; Obermann, 1991).
Riparian zones have been attributed a particular significance in water quality protection.
However heterogeneity in terms of soils, biogeochemistry and water pathways (Merot and
Durand, 1997) complicates the understanding of the mechanisms controlling riparian zone
functioning. Accordingly, results concerning actual retention capacities are controversial
(Steinmann, 1991) and both high and little or no denitrification have been observed in a
number of studies (Groffman and Gold, 1998). Some riparian zones may even release N
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(Steinheimer et al., 1998). Variability in nitrate removal among sites and within different
domains is high (Hill, 1996). Ground water nitrate removal rates may differ even among sites
with similar texture, drainage class and morphology (Addy et al., 1999). Caution is required
against ascribing specific ground water removal rates to different riparian zones and
vegetation. Seasonal and long-term sustainability of the system are also questionable. The
restoration of buffer zones with an optimum width > 10 m is difficult to accomplish in
densely cultivated agricultural landscapes like in Central Europe. Nevertheless some authors
assume that approximately 50 % of the N that is leached is denitrified in riparian forests and
groundwater (Groffman and Gold, 1998). Others however claim that "scientists have
frequently oversold the ability of wetlands to retain sediments and nutrients" (Johnston, 1991)
and that riparian zones can only be a partial solution of a more comprehensive remediation
policy (Bidois, 1999). Moreover, the impact of nutrients on wetlands as ecosystems of their
own right requires more consideration. In summary, the potential for retention of nitrate on
the way from the field to the stream is spatially and temporally restricted and its realization is
uncertain.
Corridors connect spatial elements and scales and thus transcend space. Emissions to
corridors generally increase environmental risks: Nitrate is rapidly lost from the system of
origin circumventing retention potentials and decoupling the N cycle spatially and temporally;
eventually emissions and their impact are aggregated on higher scales, where they elude
human control. While leading to the rapid translocation of substances, flow in corridors is
highly unpredictable.
6.2. Overstrained landscape retention
Anthropogenic N input into terrestrial ecosystems overstrains the capacity of landscapes to
retain N. The transfer of N from the atmosphere into the land-based biological N cycle has at
least doubled since preindustrial times (Vitousek et al., 1997a), i.e. human activity adds at
least as much N to terrestrial ecosystems as do all natural sources combined (Vitousek et al.,
1997b). Large parts of this (global) overload are discharged to the aquatic system. Movements
of total dissolved N into most of the temperate-zone rivers discharging into the North Atlantic
Ocean may have increased by 2 to 20-fold since preindustrial times, while for rivers in the
North Sea region, the N increase may have been 6 to 20-fold (Howarth et al., 1996). Nitrogen
fertilizers eventually end up in estuaries and continental shelves (Kroeze and Seitzinger,
1998).
6.3. Regional scale and retention on basin scale
Although N load to the sea is high, the percentage of total N input into watersheds which is
actually discharged is remarkable small: Watersheds in Central and Northern Europe, but also
elsewhere discharge only 20 % of overall N input to the sea and retain up to 80 % (Caraco and
Cole, 1999; Howarth et al., 1996). One reason may be denitrification and sedimentation on
the regional scale: denitrification in rivers and particularly in riverine ecotones, like wetlands
and sediments (Vitousek et al., 1997a) may contribute to N elimination. In-river processes
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account for losses of around 10 to 20 % of total N inputs (Howarth et al., 1996), while values
of 50 % can be attained by heavily polluted rivers like the Scheldt (Billen et al., 1985).
Retention in lakes and impoundments ranges from 20 to 80 % (Howarth et al., 1996).
Productive lakes may remove 50 % of total N input, with denitrification accounting for one
third, while the rest is trapped in sediments (Jansson et al., 1994a). Nitrogen budgets on basin
level indicate that e.g., in the Rhine basin 85 106 kg of N are denitrified (the equivalent of
33 % of total input), while in the Elbe 75 106 kg (40 % of input) are denitrified (Werner,
1994).
6.4. Temporal scales and memory effects
On the local scale, retention may be due to denitrification, but temporary storage in soil (soil
organic matter), vegetation and groundwater contribute substantially to the transitory
attenuation of nitrate overload. Long residence times in soil and groundwater and the
incorporation of N into vegetation and soil organic matter are followed by subsequent, slow
release. Apparently there is a considerable memory effect in ecosystems concerning past
nutrient input. In agroecosystems, fertilizer N is incorporated into pools with slow turnover
times, increasing N stocks. The major part of leached N derives from the mineralization of
organic matter rather than directly from applied fertilizer, as has been shown by a number of
studies (Addiscott et al., 1991). For example, in a Rothhamsted experiment nitrate leakage
declined to half its initial rate only after 41 years without fertilizer application (Addiscott et
al., 1991). Similarly, N released from riparian ecotones tends to originate from within the
system, while external nitrate input is absorbed. Nitrogen overload and built-up of organic N
have led to the hypertrophication of agricultural soils and landscapes, which may continue to
release nitrate for decades, even if nutrient inputs were reduced drastically (Addiscott et al.,
1991; Steininger et al., 1997; Vagstad et al., 1997). Due to memory effects, buffer zones may
also act as N- source long after the pollution of waterways has been abated (Gilbert et al.,
1990). Delay of N translocation in subsurface environments may be considerable; e.g.,
residence times in aquifers range from less than 1 year (karst) to 10³ years (plains of Northern
Germany (Wendland, 1992), though normally maximum residence time in German aquifers is
25 to 40 years (Bouwer, 1995) with an average of 20 years (Isermann and Isermann, 1997). It
can be inferred that "system memory", temporary storage and slow transport can delay the
emission of excess N into the aquatic system for decades. In the view of long-term
sustainability, the transfer of excess nutrients to transitory storage compartments is no
solution. While in conventional agriculture microeconomic time preferences and small-scale
system boundaries prevail, sustainable agriculture needs to take account of large-scale and
long-term effects (Norton, 1995).
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Scope of impacts
The environmental impact of nitrate depends on the scalar level under consideration
(Isermann, 1993): On a local scale, N emissions may lead to the contamination of
groundwater and to the eutrophication and acidification of dystrophic and headwater
ecosystems. Headwater streams and their ecotones tend to be particularly sensitive to
pollutant inputs (Hamm, 1991). On a regional scale, rivers and lakes are subject to
eutrophication, though they often are P limited rather than N limited. In sharp contrast to the
majority of temperate-zone lakes, where P is the nutrient that limits primary productivity by
algae and other aquatic plants and controls eutrophication, these processes are controlled by N
inputs in the majority of temperate-maritime ecosystems (Vitousek et al., 1997a).
7.1 Nitrous oxide production
While denitrification may be beneficial for aquatic ecosystems, the production of nitrous
oxide due to denitrification leads to problems on a global scale, as nitrous oxide is both a very
efficient greenhouse gas (Houghton, 1994) and plays a role in stratospheric ozone depletion
(Crutzen, 1970). There is evidence for the emission of nitrous oxide from the entirety of the
compartments discussed above (Dowdell et al., 1979, Yoshinari, 1990). Nitrous oxide
emissions from soils vary (Freney, 1997). Depending upon fertilizer type 0.07 % to 2.7 %
may evalve as N2O (Eichner, 1990). On the average 0.5-1.5 % (McElroy and Woofsy, 1985)
or 1.25 % (Bouwman, 1992) of applied N to agricultural soils may be emitted as N2O. Subsoil
production of nitrous oxide is not known (Rice and Rogers, 1993). In contaminated aquifers,
values of 3.4-7.8 kg N2O ha-1yr-1 have been measured (Ronen et al., 1988). Shallow aquifers
are supposed to be more likely sources of N2O than confined aquifers (Rice and Rogers,
1993). It is inferred that aquifers could account for 5 to 10 % of total global nitrous oxide
source (Rice and Rogers, 1993), i.e. 10 to 20 % of biogenic N2O sources could originate from
aquifers. Nitrous oxide production in riparian zone aquifers ranged from 0.026 to 3.7 % of N
input on Rhode Island (Jacinthe et al., 1998) and 0.65-0.87 % of the input in aquifers in
Maryland (Weller et al., 1994). Riparian vegetation thus has a high potential to function as
hotspot, inducing nitrous oxide production (Groffman and Gold, 1998), although in many
cases riparian vegetation may not emit more N2O than cropland (Gilliam et al., 1997). Rivers
and lakes have been observed to emit N2O as well (Mariotti, 1994; McMahon and Dennehy,
1999). Overall nitrous oxide emissions from rivers, estuaries and continental shelves increase
with increasing N loading from 0.3 % to 3 % or even 6 % of denitrification rates; thus
approximately 1 % of total N input into these systems may be emitted as N2O (Kroeze and
Seitzinger, 1998). Evidently, the contamination of the subsurface environment with nitrate has
the potential for increasing the contribution to atmospheric N2O (Rice and Rogers, 1993). In
fact, direct N2O emissions (2.1 Tg N) may equal indirect emissions (2.1 Tg N) resulting from
agricultural N input into the atmosphere and aquatic systems (Mosier et al., 1998). Thus a
(nitrate) water quality problem may be traded for an atmospheric problem (Isermann and
Isermann, 1997).
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In addition, the loss of nitrate from the field has to be considered as the loss of a resource
whose production is linked to the consumption of energy (ca. 47 MJ kg-1 N fertilizer) and to
the emission of atmospherically active substances. On the average 2500 g CO2, 10 g N2O and
1 g CH4 are emitted to produce 1 kg of N fertilizer (Kaltschmitt, 1997).
7.2. Scale and scope as evaluation criteria
For the evaluation of environmental impact, scale and scope have been forwarded as criteria
(Gleich, 1998, Scheringer, 1999). Scope may be defined as the ratio of collateral to intended
effects, with crop uptake as the main intended effect of N fertilization. Scope increases with
the length and complexity of cause-effect chains. The scale of impact ranges from
local/reversible to global/irreversible. The local-global dichotomy indicates to what extent
impacts can be attributed to local actors (Norton, 1995; Norton and Ulanowicz, 1992);
"reversibility" indicates to what extent and with what ease impacts can be subject to control
and remediation. Due to decreasing reversibility and attributability, the larger the scale and
scope of emissions, the more problematical they are. To disentangle the impact of agricultural
emissions hierarchical, scalar approaches may serve as a heuristic tool (Ahl and Allen, 1996;
O´Neill et al., 1989; Wagenet, 1998) and as basis of evaluation.
6. Simulation and prediction of nitrate fate?
Simulation models have been forwarded as tools for the prediction, management and
evaluation of agricultural emissions, in particular nitrate. For the prediction of biogeochemical
processes on compartment or ecosystem level, no valid general models are available (Hauhs
et al., 1996; Oreskes et al., 1994). Variability of the degrees of freedom and the self-
modifying character of ecosystems (Kampis, 1991; Lange, 1998) invalidate system
descriptions along larger time frames. Accordingly the simulation of (micro-)biological
processes e.g., immobilization and denitrification offers particular problems (de Willigen and
Neetson, 1985; Marchetti et al., 1997; Stockdale et al., 1997). Moreover, the interaction of
scale and physical structure is highly problematic as due to the spatial heterogeneity of
ecosystems on all scales, spatial structure is unknowable at any scales of real interest (Beven,
1996). As a consequence transport in conduits (e.g., preferential flow) is unpredictable
(Bouma, 1992; Jury and Flühler, 1992; Stagnitti et al., 1995), and upscaling of distributed
models is problematic (Blöschl and Sivapalan, 1995). Spatially transferable models have to be
calibrated and validated with data from short-term sets, which do not represent the range of
natural phenomena (Konikow and Bredehoeft, 1992). Accordingly, short-term extreme events
may override average conditions (Petersen et al., 1987), represented by models. Thus an
accurate quantitative prediction of N dynamics and nitrate loss from agricultural systems
seems impossible (Jury and Flühler, 1992, Richter and Benbi, 1996).
Transition zones present even more severe obstacles to prediction. Variability and
heterogeneity in terms of soils, biogeochemistry and water pathways in ecotones are much
greater than the additive properties of adjacent resources (Merot and Durand, 1997; Naiman et
al., 1988). The non-linearity of retention processes, the intricate physical structure and
G. Landscape Fate of Nitrate Fluxes and Emissions 155
influence of memory effects (land use legacy) turn riparian zones into singularities
(Breckling, 1992), for which a quantitative prediction seems unattainable (Wagenet, 1998).
The connection of compartments and ecosystems on the landscape level offers additional
problems.
The linkage of fluxes between different compartments is generally not well understood; e.g.,
the matter transfer between the unsaturated and the saturated zone (Del Re and Trevisan,
1995), and lateral fluxes and the flux of substances between adjacent ecosystems (Grunewald,
1996). Even in detailed, site specific case studies, a mechanistic knowledge of these
interactions has not been obtained.
7. A framework for landscape risk assessment
In a framework for sustainable agriculture and in the light of the precautionary principle
(O'Riordan and Jordan, 1995; Westra, 1997) system uncertainties as reflected in simulation
models for ecosystems need to be acknowledged (Haag and Kaupenjohann, 2000). The
concomitant shift from impact-oriented to risk-oriented approaches favors methods which
address environmental risks, capacities (Cartwright, 1994) and output potentials and which
aim at the identification of problem areas and risky management options. As indicators of
(un-)sustainable landscape management budget approaches and simple output potentials are
suitable. To indicate the risk of nutrient loss, water and nutrient budgets may be computed.
While the compilation of budgets contributes little to the understanding of a system
(Stockdale et al., 1997), budgets hint at desequilibria long before measurement or other
methods indicate elevated soil concentrations or matter loss with confidence (Baccini and von
Steiger, 1993). Output potentials for larger temporal and spatial scales may be more reliable
(Stockdale et al., 1997), as larger areas like watersheds tend to behave more determinate than
smaller ones (Corre et al., 1996; Groffman et al.; 1987 and Wagenet, 1998). The budget
approach, however, takes no account of the spatial setting into which agricultural sites are
embedded. Budgets should thus be part of a larger screening scheme, which could encompass
the following categories of risk potentials:
Site specific risk which is represented by simple, physical factors and which is linked to the
soil, topography and climate (see e.g., Marks and Alexander, 1992; Gäth and Wohlrab, 1994;
Hölting et al., 1995 for Central Europe). For nitrate leaching the frequency of soil water
exchange as a function of water surplus and texture class is a useful indicator (Gäth and
Wohlrab, 1994).
Agricultural activity risk is assessed with budget approaches, indicating long-term risks and
providing hints at potential disequilibria (Baccini and von Steiger, 1993; Isermann and
Isermann, 1997; Umweltbundesamt, 1997).
Headwater contamination risk (local risk): The spatial setting of an agricultural site and of
agricultural landscapes are to be accounted for. Corridors, their proximity to agricultural sites
and their propensity to matter input deserve particular attention: Transport in conduits tends to
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increase scale and scope as conduits usually form part of a hierachical, unidirectional
networks. Cartographic approaches may indicate the abundance and proximity of corridors
and the abundance of retention compartments within a landscape section. Quantitative
measures for landscape pattern (Gustafson, 1998) and GIS applications may facilitate
operationalisation.
Regional and global scale risk is assessed qualitatively, based on the criteria of scale and
scope and quantitatively, based on life cycle assessment (Vito, 1998), which e.g., may
indicate overall global warming potential due to N fertilization.
Such a screening approach evaluates risk potentials, while it leaves out of consideration actual
matter fluxes. The approach is thus restricted to the identification of key contributor and
problem areas; it may be followed by site specific process studies or monitoring of
environmental quality.
8. Remediation concepts
System approaches are advocated (Ikerd, 1993) focussing on nutrient cycles (Hendrix et al.,
1992; Magdoff et al., 1997), which should be both tight with regard to spatial and temporal
scales and close with regard to matter loss, ensuring a maximum of
reversibility/controllability. The plot is the valve, where losses ultimately occur, hence
optimization of cycles on the plot scale is imperative. As the plot is part of a hierarchy of
landuse and production systems, aside with the plot level, the farm and the regional level also
call for optimized cycles.
Detachment of (quasi-industrial) dairy and livestock production from the spatial extension of
farmland (Steinfeld et al., 1996) imposes major constraints on cycling approaches: While
plant production reaches an N efficiency of 57 %, overall agricultural N efficiency is only
25 %, as 85 % of plant production, together with imported feeds, are utilized in animal
production (Isermann and Isermann, 1998). With the carrying capacity of agricultural land
being overstrained, fields and grassland frequently function as waste-dumps for excess
nutrients from livestock (Isermann and Isermann, 1997). As animal production dominates the
agricultural N cycle, it becomes a key driver as to N overload.
A shift away from linear concepts, in which wastes (like excretions in animal production or
nitrate in plant production) are considered the norm should lead to integrated systems
targeting total throughput, i.e. systems making optimal use of inputs and mimicking natural
cycles. Such a concept of "zero emission" has recently been developed for industry (Mshigeni
and Pauli, 1996); it could also be useful for industrial agriculture.
The optimization of production systems on farm and larger scales remains within the realm of
sectoral approaches. While in Central Europe fertilization accounts for 83 % of total net
anthropogenic N input (Howarth et al., 1996), agricultural production is but one subsystem in
regional N metabolism. Regional approaches which assess matter fluxes among and matter
budgets of different sectors (German Council, 1996) are a way of addressing and tackling
disequilibria on larger scales. Tools for the assessment of regional metabolism (Baccini and
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Bader, 1996; Baccini and Brunner, 1991) and quantitative examples, including N fluxes and
budgets on a regional level, have been developed recently for Central Europe (Baccini and
Bader, 1996; Brunner and Baccini, 1992; Henseler et al., 1992). The identification of key
contributors and key fluxes may guide optimization on an integrated, regional level.
9. Conclusions
Different landscape elements exert control on the flux and fate of excess nutrients such as
nitrate. The conceptual approach, which distinguishes retention compartments and corridors
and which provides for the scalar assessment of risks induced by emissions can be adapted to
other agricultural inputs like pesticides. Retention of nitrate on the local scale, ranging from
the field to the stream, has been shown to be of limited and/or of uncertain extent in many
compartments on the way from the field to the stream. Storage of N in vegetation, soil organic
matter and groundwater may delay the emission of excess N for decades, masking past and
present N disequilibria and overloads. On the regional level , elimination in rivers and lakes
may contribute to the reduction of N discharge to the sea. Notwithstanding, N discharge has
experienced a manifold increase in comparison to preindustrial times, leading to the
eutrophication of coastal waters. Denitrification and the concomittant production of N2O
together with emissions arising from fertilizer production may shift the issue of N overload
from a terrestrial-aquatic to an atmospheric problem.
Current agricultural practices and end-of-the-pipe solutions (e.g., buffer zones) seem rather
unsustainable in view of the unpredictability of matter fluxes, of the uncertainties considering
retention behavior of landscape elements, of the often limited, partly non-renewable retention
potentials, and of the only temporary storage of N in landscapes. Instead of short-term, small-
scale considerations, an integrated system approach should be pursued, which envisages tight
and close cycles and the optimization of N fluxes and budgets at site, farm and regional level.
On the latter, both the fluxes induced by the agricultural production and the agricultural sector
as a whole and the fluxes arising from other human activities need to be assessed and
reconciled.
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Summary
Models for the representation of ecological systems? The validity of experimental
model systems and of dynamical simulation models as to the interaction with
ecological systems
Models, defined as reconstructions of natural systems with analogies, guide the
observation and description of and the interaction with complex ecological systems.
Conventionally, scientific models obey an image of positivist, normal (in Kuhn´s sense)
science, which claims to posses a privileged exo-perspective and to produce abstract
solutions for well-defined problems, reducing uncertainty and contributing to the
production of universal knowledge. As to many environmental systems and issues,
however, uncertainty is irremediably high, while specific interests, values and norms as
determinants of contingent, non-equivalent system descriptions gain importance. For such
issues, the image of post-normal science has been developed.
In this thesis features and limitations of models in the environmental sciences are
investigated. Background of the thesis was an interdisciplinary research project which
pretended to operationalize the notion of ecological sustainability for agricultural plant
production. Particularly, experimental model systems (I) and simulation models (II) are
critically investigated in this thesis with respect to model paradigms, analogy assumptions
and the role of models for man-environment interactions. The terrestrial nitrogen cycle and
its anthropogenic modifications serve for the illustration of model concepts and the limits
to the establishment of cause-effect relationships in non-manipulated ecological systems
(III). The use of models in science for policy is evaluated in the context of (epistemic)
uncertainty, the precautionary principle, the concept of post-normal science and the
discursive opening of the science system (IV).
Basis and material of this thesis were (a) empirical work from the environmental sciences,
(b) contributions to ecosystem theory and models in the earth sciences, (c) philosphical
work on the role/status of experiments and of models in the natural sciences and (d) work
in the fields of science research and the sociology of science, which address different
scientific practices and different forms of knowledge production.
I. Experimental model systems
Experimental model systems are materially and conceptually closed systems, which allow
for the investigation of a limited number of parameters. As material systems they are
bounded in time and space and they are closed and controlled as to matter, energy,
thermodynamics and information. Empirical-experimental model systems posses a material
component which is encoded into a formal, numerical-mathematical system in the course
of the measurement of determined parameters. The transfer of statements derived from
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model systems to open, natural systems with biotic components is critically discussed (see
II for the image of open ecological systems).
II. Dynamical simulation models
The discovery of complexity associated with the development of the theory of dynamical
systems allowed for the simultaneous handling of a large number of interrelated
parameters. The success of dynamical systems as to the representation and management of
technical (allopoietic) systems presumably has contributed to the fact that the dynamical
system has become the paradigm for the representation of complex systems. For example,
technical analogies and machine metaphors become evident in the program of ´ecological
engineering´.
Dynamical systems are conceptually closed systems, comprising a defined, closed set of
parameters. Dynamical systems are based on the notions of abstract state and identity in
time and frequently it is tacitly assumed that the abstract state represents the essence of the
represented system. Dynamical systems are ahistorical systems without distinguished
positions in time such as the past or the now. Past and present values of the state variables
can be computed as a function of the external, universal parameter time.
Against the background of the paradigm of selfmodifying systems of G. Kampis,
dynamical systems are critically investigated in this thesis. The two traditions which face
each other here can be characterized by the opposition of ´state´ versus ´processes´ and
´being´ versus ´becoming´. The contrast between static, closed conceptions, which are at
the heart of dynamical but also of experimental model systems, and of an image of
ecosystems as conceptually open systems is discussed. Major points are the evolutionary
openness of ecological systems, the internal production of new variables and the
emergence of system level properties, which relativize and make appear contingent any
separation and abstraction of the dynamical part of an ecological system from contingent
features (´noise´) and from the environment of the system. It is hypothesized that in
contrast to physical systems with a stable setting (e.g., in astronomy on human scales) in
ecosystems agents with rule-making capacities exist, which possess the potential to modify
rules on-line (within the boundaries of physical and chemical laws) according to changes
in their environment.
The status of parameters and variables deserves peculiar attention: While some parameters
in simulation models may possess a material-real reference (in the spirit of entity realism),
many parameters are derived from mathematical or practical needs. Due to such
parameters of convenience and to the exogenous and endogenous modification of
parameters in natural systems the divergence between the closed dynamical system and its
external reference, the natural system, tends to increase. Accordingly, neither the
operational (empirical) nor the conceptual validation of the closed dynamical system as
representations of conceptually open systems is possible. The lack of predictive capacity
(particularly on larger temporal scales) and the impossibility of validation render
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dynamical models deficient tools for the reduction of uncertainty as to the future behavior
of complex real-world systems.
III. The nitrogen example
The terrestrial nitrogen cycle and its anthropogenic modification serve for illustration in
the various parts and are considered in more depth in a separate part. The long-term
retention capacity of landscapes for excess nitrogen from agriculture is addressed; different
model concepts and their limitations are compared and related to different forms of
uncertainty and to the precautionary principle.
IV . Uncertainty and post-normal science
Scientific uncertainty derives among others from the impossibility to generalize existent
models and from the indeterminacy of self-modifying, ecological (and cognitive) systems.
When the shaping of man-environment interaction is on the agenda, a peculiar form of
uncertainty arises, epistemic uncertainty: different distinctions and different observer
perspectives lead to different, non-equivalent descriptions of the same system. This holds
both for scientific descriptions (e.g., the different perspectives of system ecology and
population ecology) and for real-world descriptions by local agents and stakeholders,
which posses a specific set of distinctions, interests and values. In view of the irreducible
uncertainty and perspectivity governing the identification and description of ´relevant´
phenomena and parameters, the question arises which paradigms for the description of
complex systems and the treatment of risk and uncertainty are valid. Depending upon what
is at stake, validation may be conceived as a disciplinary, transdisciplinary and
(particularly in science for policy) transscientific task. In the latter, a notion of validation
as the establishment of legitimacy may be useful. Validation at the interface of science and
society would accordingly be conceived as a communication and negotiation process
instead of an objective scientific method. Drawing from recent risk research for such issues
the image of post-normal science is developed, which encompasses the discursive opening
of scientific (sub-)systems. A corresponding role for models and modelling is sketched.
While in the science system models usually are regarded from the point of view of
representation or prediction, in the framework of science for policy the role of models as
communication instruments would have to be stressed. Models would thus serve for the
synthesis, communication and visualization of scientific knowledge, for the integration of
scientific and object knowledge and for learning to interact with complex systems.
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Zusammenfassung
Modelle für die Repräsentation ökologischer Systeme? Zur Validität von Modell-
systemen und von dynamischen Simulationsmodellen bei der Interaktion mit
ökologischen Systemen
Modelle, definierbar als Rekonstruktionen natürlicher Systeme mittels Analogien,
strukturieren die Beobachtung und Beschreibung von und die Interaktion mit komplexen
ökologischen Systemen. Wissenschaftliche Modelle sind üblicherweise einem Bild
positivistischer (im Kuhn´schen Sinn) normaler Wissenschaft verbunden, die den
Anspruch erhebt, aus privilegierter (Exo-)Perspektive abstrakte Lösungen für abgegrenzte
Probleme hervorzubringen und dabei universelles Wissen zu produzieren. Im Gegensatz
dazu macht sich post-normale Wissenschaft (in Anlehnung an Funtowicz und Ravetz)
Systeme zum Gegenstand, in denen Ungewißheit (in ihren verschiedenen Formen) hoch ist
und bei deren Beschreibung Interessen, Werten und Normen eine irreduzible Bedeutung
zukommt.
In dieser Arbeit, die in einen interdisziplinären Forschungsverbund eingebettet war, der
sich die Operationalisierung des Begriffes ökologischer Nachhaltigkeit für die
landwirtschaftliche Pflanzenproduktion zum Ziel gesetzt hatte, werden Charakteristika und
Begrenzungen von umweltwissenschaftlichen Modellen untersucht. Im Zentrum stehen
Modelle, die auf Analogien zwischen natürlichen Systemen und experimentellen
Modellsystemen (I) bzw. zwischen natürlichen und dynamischen Systemen (II) beruhen.
Dabei werden Modellparadigmen und die Rolle von Modellen bei der Gestaltung von
Mensch-Umwelt Interaktionen kritisch geprüft. Am Beispiel des Stickstoffkreislauf und
seiner anthropogenen Modifikation werden Modellansätzen und Grenzen der Ableitung
von Ursache-Wirkungsbeziehungen in nicht-manipulierten ökologischen Systemen
illustriert (III). Die planerische Verwendung von Modellen bzw. der Einsatz von Modellen
in der Politik ("science for policy") wird im Kontext von Ungewißheit, Vorsorgeprinzip,
post-normaler Wissenschaft und einer diskursiven Öffnung des Wissenschaftssystems neu
bestimmt (IV).
Grundlage und Material der vorliegenden Dissertationsschrift waren (a) empirische
umweltwissenschaftliche Arbeiten, sowie Beiträge zur Ökosystemtheorie und zur
Modellbildung in den Geowissenschaften, (b) wissenschaftsphilosophische Arbeiten zum
Status von Experiment und Modell in den Naturwissenschaften und (c) Arbeiten aus der
Wissenschaftsforschung und -soziologie, die sich mit unterschiedlichen wissenschaftlichen
Praktiken und unterschiedlichen Formen der Wissensproduktion auseinandersetzen.
I. Experimentelle Modellsysteme
Experimentelle Modellsysteme sind materiell und konzeptionell geschlossene Systeme, die
die Untersuchung einer begrenzten Anzahl von Parametern ermöglichen. Als materielle
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Systeme werden sie räumlich und zeitlich abgegrenzt und sie werden stofflich, energetisch,
thermodynamisch und informatorisch kontrolliert bzw. geschlossen. Experimentell-
empirische Modellsysteme verfügen somit über eine materielle Komponente, die im Zuge
der Messung festgelegter Parameter in ein formales, numerisch-mathematisches System
kodiert wird. Die Übertragbarkeit von Aussagen, die mittels Modellsystemen gewonnen
wurden, auf nicht-geschlossene, natürliche Systeme mit biotischen Komponenten wird
kritisch diskutiert (s. u. II).
II. Dynamische Simulationsmodelle
Die Entdeckung der Komplexität in Verbindung mit der Entwicklung der Theorie
dynamischer Systeme hat die simultane Behandlung einer hohen Zahl miteinander
verknüpfter Parameter ermöglicht. Der Erfolg dynamischer Systeme bei der Repräsentation
und dem Management technischer Systeme hat vermutlich entschieden dazu beigetragen,
daß dynamische Systeme zu dem Paradigma für die Repräsentation komplexer Systeme
avanciert sind; so werden technische Analogien und Maschinenmetaphern z.B. im
Programm eines "Ecological Engineering" augenfällig.
Dynamische Systeme sind konzeptionell geschlossene Systeme, die auf der Vorstellung
von abstraktem Zustand und Identität in der Zeit fußen. Dabei wird meist implizit
angenommen, der abstrakte Zustand repräsentiere die Essenz des abgebildeten Systems.
Dynamische Systeme verfügen über ein definiertes, geschlossenes Set von Parametern und
sie sind als geschichtslose Systeme ohne ausgezeichnete Zeitstellen wie Vergangenheit und
Gegenwart konzipiert. Vergangene und zukünftige Werte der Zustandsvariablen können,
bei Kenntnis des abstrakten Zustandes, als Funktion des (externen, universellen)
Parameters Zeit berechnet werden.
Vor dem Hintergrund des Paradigmas der selbstmodifizierenden Systeme von G. Kampis
werden in der vorliegenden Arbeit dynamische Systeme kritisch reflektiert. Dabei treffen
zwei unterschiedliche Traditionslinien aufeinander, die mit den Schlagworten "Zustand"
versus "Prozeß" bzw. "Sein" versus "Werden" charakterisiert werden können. Der
Gegensatz zwischen statisch-geschlossenen Konzeptionen, die dynamische aber auch
experimentelle Modellsysteme prägen, und einem Bild von ökologischen Systemen als
konzeptionell offenen Systemen wird diskutiert. Wesentlich sind dabei die evolutionären
Offenheit ökologischer Systeme, die interne Produktion neuer Variablen und die Emergenz
systemarer Eigenschaften, die wiederum die Abtrennung und Abstraktion des dynamischen
Teils eines ökologischen Systems von kontingenten Anteilen ("Rauschen") und von der
Umwelt des Systems als relativ und kontingent erscheinen lassen.
Im Gegensatz etwa zu physikalischen Systemen mit stabilem Setting (z.B. in der
Astronomie) gibt es in ökologischen Systemen Akteure, die, -im Rahmen physikalischer
und chemischer Grenzen - über das Potential verfügen, Regeln in Abhängigkeit von sich
verändernden Umweltkontexten on-line zu modifizieren.
Der Status von Parametern und Variablen in Modellen verdient besondere Beachtung:
Während etwa einige Parameter und Variablen eine material-reale Referenz (im Sinne
eines Entitätenrealismus) aufweisen können, fußen viele Parameter auf mathematischen
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oder praktischen Erfordernissen; solche Parameter besitzen konventionalen Charakter.
Aufgrund der Vielzahl konventionaler Parameter und aufgrund der exogenen und
endogenen Modifikation von Parametern in natürlichen Systemen wächst tendenziell die
Divergenz zwischen den geschlossenen, dynamischen Systeme und ihrer externen
Referenz, den natürlichen Systemen. Weder eine operational-empirische noch eine
konzeptionelle Validierung der geschlossenen dynamischen Modelle als Repräsentationen
für konzeptionell offene Systeme ist möglich. Mangelhafte Vorhersagegüte bzw.
prognostische Fähigkeiten (insbesondere auf größeren zeitlichen Skalen) und die
grundsätzliche Unmöglichkeit einer naturwissenschaftlich-technischen Validierung führen
dazu, daß dynamische Systeme Ungewißheit hinsichtlich des Verhaltens komplexer
natürlicher Systeme nicht ausräumen können.
III. Beispiel Stickstoff
Der terrestrische Stickstoffkreislauf und seine anthropogene Modifikation dienen den
verschiedenen Teilen dieser Arbeit als Anschauungsmaterial und werden in einem
gesonderten Teil vertieft: Das langfristige Retentionsvermögen von Landschaften für
überschüssigen Stickstoff und unterschiedliche Modellkonzepte und ihre Limitationen
werden diskutiert und zu Formen der Ungewißheit und zum Vorsorgeprinzip in Beziehung
gesetzt werden.
IV. Ungewißheit und post-normale Wissenschaft
Wissenschaftliche Ungewißheit beruht u.a. auf der mangelnden Generalisierbarkeit von
Modellen und auf der Nicht-Determiniertheit selbstmodifizierender natürlicher Systeme.
Bei der Gestaltung nachhaltiger Mensch-Umwelt Interaktionen kommt eine weitere,
epistemisch-ethische Form der Unbestimmtheit hinzu: Verschiedene Unterscheidungen
und Perspektiven des jeweiligen Beobachters führen zu unterschiedlichen, nicht-
äquivalenten Beschreibungen desselben komplexen Systems. Dies gilt sowohl für
wissenschaftliche Beschreibungen (z.B. unterschiedliche Perspektiven von Systemökologie
und Populationsökologie), mehr aber noch für lebensweltliche Beschreibungen z.B. durch
lokale Akteure und Stakeholder, die über spezifische Ensembles von Differenzen,
Interessen und Werten verfügen. Angesichts von Ungewißheit und Perspektivität bei der
Identifikation "relevanter" Phänomene und Parameter stellt sich die Frage, welche
Paradigmen zur Beschreibung von komplexen Systemen und zur Behandlung von Risiken
und Ungewißheit disziplinäre, transdisziplinäre und (bei der planerischen Verwendung von
Modellen) transwissenschaftliche Validität beanspruchen können. Dabei mag ein Begriff
von Validierung fruchtbar sein, der Validierung als Etablierung von Legitimität betrachtet.
Validierung im Zwischenbereich von Natur-/Komplexitätswissenschaften und Gesellschaft
wäre demnach als Kommunikations- und Aushandlungsprozeß und nicht als
objektivierbare, wissenschaftliche Methode zu konzipieren. In Anlehnung an neuere
Befunde der Risiko- und Wissenschaftsforschung wird das Bild einer post-normalen
Wissenschaft entwickelt, das eine diskursive Öffnung geschlossener wissenschaftlicher
(Sub-)Systeme beinhaltet. Eine Neubestimmung der Rolle von Modellen und
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Modellbildung in einem post-normalen Rahmen wird skizziert. Während im System der
Wissenschaft Modelle üblicherweise unter dem Gesichtspunkt von Repräsentation und
Prognose betrachtet werden, wäre im Rahmen einer "Science for policy" die Rolle von
Modellen als Kommunikationsinstrument hervorzuheben, sei es bei der Synthese,
Kommunikation und Visualisierung wissenschaftlichen Wissens, bei der Integration von
wissenschaftlichem und Alltags/Objektwissen oder für das Erlernen des Umgangs mit
komplexen Systemen.
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